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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is a philosophical analysis of the concept of truth. It is a development and defense of 
the “stratified” or “language-level” conception of truth, first advanced in Alfred Tarski’s 1933 
monograph The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages. Although Tarski’s paper had seminal 
influence both in philosophy and in more technical disciplines, its central philosophical claim has not 
been generally accepted. This work has two central goals: (a) to give a detailed and analytic presentation 
of Tarski’s theory and the problems it faces; (b) to offer a solution to these problems and assess the 
philosophical significance of this solution. 
The essay is divided in two parts. Part One contains a detailed and analytic presentation and 
interpretation of the stratified conception of truth. The analysis contains several steps: (a) Crucial basic 
assumptions, such as the limitation to formalized languages and the requirement of explicit definitions, 
are stated explicitly, motivated, and their philosophical significance discussed. (b) The main negative 
result of the stratified conception, the impossibility of semantic closure and of a universal language, is 
given in detail and interpreted. (c) Tarski’s criterion for adequate truth definitions, known as Convention 
T, is stated and motivated. (d) The deep structure of Tarski-style truth definitions and the necessary 
conditions for their availability are analyzed. In particular, the philosophical significance of Tarski’s 
notion of “essential richness” is discussed. (e) Finally, several problems are raised for the stratified 
conception, chief among them the unity objection, according to which the stratified conception is not a 
viable analysis of the concept of truth, since (by (a) above) an analysis should take the form of a 
definition, and on the stratified conception different languages have different definitions. There is 
therefore no one analysis of the concept.  
Part Two is a development of answers to the problems raised at the end of Part One. The crux of the 
answer to the unity objection is that Convention T, the adequacy criterion, connects the many definitions 
of truth into a single concept. However, in order to fulfill that role Convention T must apply universally, 
and a universal language was shown to be impossible ((c) above). The task of Part Two is therefore to 
develop a mode of expression that allows the universal applicability of Convention T without 
commitment to a universal metalanguage. The procedure is as follows. (a) Convention T is formalized 
in order to isolate the place in which universal applicability is required. (b) A new expressive resource 
of “abstract generality” is developed. To this purpose a digression into the semantics of natural language 
indexicals is undertaken. David Kaplan’s thesis of the direct reference of indexicals is analyzed and a 
new formal system is proposed that embodies it. It is shown that this formal system expresses abstract 
generality. (c) The notion of abstract generality is adapted to languages without indexicals and it is 
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shown that Convention T can be expressed without assuming a universal language. (d) A reconstrual of 
the task of concept analysis is proposed, which is a generalization of the answer to the unity objection.  
It is often complained against Tarski’s stratified conception of truth that it is of limited philosophical 
significance. In this work I show that, on the contrary, the problems it faces and the solutions that can 
be advanced to answer these problems have substantive philosophical consequences. The notion of 
abstract generality gives rise to a distinction between two fundamentally different modes of discourse: 
a universal but merely abstract methodological discourse on the one hand, and a concrete but inevitably 
restricted theoretical discourse on the other. This distinction has many important implications for our 
understanding of the concepts of truth, meaning and language. 
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Introduction  
 
This essay is a defense of what I shall call the stratified conception of truth. The basic idea of the 
stratified conception is that truth, as a concept that applies to judgments, applies to them not absolutely 
but as belonging to a system of representation (more concretely, to sentences in a language); and that 
the truth concept for judgments of a particular system cannot be represented in that very system, but 
only in a different one which is in some sense stronger. The concept of truth thus induces a stratification 
of our representational capacities: there is no semantically closed representational system. 
The source of the stratified conception is Alfred Tarski’s seminal monograph The Concept of Truth in 
Formalized Languages (henceforth CTFL) from 1931.1 Tarski’s analysis of truth in CTFL was highly 
influential both philosophically and technically. Today, however, it is generally rejected. 
Philosophically its immediate effect was to dispel the skepticism concerning the viability of semantic 
concepts such as truth and denotation. This skepticism was especially prevalent among the philosophers 
of the Vienna Circle, stemming to a certain extent from the influence on them of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus. Tarski’s CTFL is sometimes described as contributing to the liberation, especially of Carnap, 
from the Tractatus’ inhibiting influence.2 Technically, CTFL and the developments that followed it 
served as the basis for the by now well-established fields of model theory in mathematical logic and 
formal semantics in linguistics. Model theory was established in its present form in the 1950s through 
further work of Tarski and associates.3 Modern linguistic formal semantics is a complex framework 
with roots especially in the works of Davidson and Tarski’s student Montague, from the 1960s.4  
In the last half-century the stratified conception has become somewhat of an abused orthodoxy, an 
obviously inadequate foil against which to develop better theories. The main reason it came to be 
rejected, at least as a philosophical account of truth, is that it applies to partial, formalized, languages 
rather than to ordinary language, and therefore that it is not an analysis of “our ordinary concept” of 
truth. For ordinary language is semantically closed and unstratified, a fact we learn, for example, from 
the intuitive acceptability of unstratified truth ascriptions. The analysis of ordinary language and of our 
                                                     
1 The monograph was first published in Polish in (1933). A translation into German by Leopold Blaustein, 
authorized by Tarski, was published in (1935). An English translation by Joseph Woodger appear in the (1956) 
collection of early papers by Tarski. Page numbers for CTFL will refer to (1956). Another important source is 
Tarski’s (1944) originally English non-technical summary directed at philosophers.  
2 See, e.g., Popper (1979, p.319), Mancosu (2008), Tarski (1992) (quoted in Patterson (2012, p.216f)), Awodey 
and Carus (2007).  
3 Though it embodies a substantial modification of the conception of truth of CTFL, see Etchemendy (1988, §2), 
Hodges (1984).  
4 See Glanzberg (2014, §1) for an account of the way in which modern semantics combines Davidson’s and 
Montague’s approaches.  
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ordinary concept of truth has, since the 1970s, been taken to be the central philosophical task of 
semantics. And the first thesis of CTFL was that the concept of truth does not apply to ordinary 
language. In this essay I will largely ignore this objection from ordinary language. My intention is to 
defend the stratified conception on its own terms. In a coda to the essay I offer some preliminary 
considerations against the objection.5  
 
This dissertation has two parts. Part One contains a detailed and analytic presentation and interpretation 
of the stratified conception of truth, more or less as we find it in Tarski’s CTFL. Chapter 1 states some 
preliminary assumptions regarding the form that the inquiry will take. In particular, it is set down that 
an analysis of the concept of truth should take the form of an explicit definition in a regimented 
language. Sentences in regimented languages are also taken to be the truth-bearers, and a detailed 
presentation of the regimentation scheme is provided. Chapter 2 presents the naïve non-stratified 
conception of truth, according to which truth can and should be defined for a single universal language. 
A refutation of the naïve conception is given along the lines of §1 of CTFL. Chapter 3 has a detailed 
exposition of the philosophical core of Tarski’s stratified conception of truth. Since there is no universal 
language, truth has to be defined anew for every partial language. A criterion is provided by which the 
success of a definition can be decided, Tarski’s famous Convention T. The possibility of a successful 
definition is demonstrated and conclusions about the conditions for such a definition are drawn. The 
main condition is that the language in which truth is defined (the metalanguage) should be distinct and 
expressively richer, in a sense made precise, than the language for which truth is defined (the object-
language). Finally, some problems for the stratified conception are raised, in particular the fact that the 
stratified conception doesn’t fulfill the task as it was set up in Chapter 1, that of giving a definition of 
the concept of truth. This is because on the stratified conception each language has a different truth 
definition, and the plurality of languages cannot be avoided. This is called the unity objection.  
Part Two develops answers to the unity objection and to the other problems raised at the end of Part 
One, along the following lines. It is observed that the stratified conception doesn’t consist only of 
particular definitions, but also of more general results, in particular Convention T, the criterion for 
correctness of definitions. The main claim of Part Two is that Convention T is that which confers unity 
on the many definitions, making them analyses of a single concept. The problem of Part Two is to make 
sense of this idea without contradicting the main negative result of Part One, that no universal 
metalanguage exists. The strategy is to find the language in which Convention T can be formulated and 
show that it doesn’t have to be a universal metalanguage. Chapter 4 contains a formalization of 
                                                     
5 See for example Strawson (1949), Priest (1984), Putnam (1985) for statements of something like the objection 
from ordinary language. Others are mentioned in the coda.  
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Convention T, with the intention of laying bare the expressive resources required for its formulation. It 
is shown that the language of Convention T cannot belong to the regimentation scheme in and for which 
definitions of truth are given, but requires some new expressive device, which I dub abstract generality. 
Chapter 5 contains the theory of this expressive device. It involves a digression into the field of 
pragmatics, in particular into David Kaplan’s theory of indexicality. Briefly, I argue that the standard 
Kaplanian formal semantics for indexicals is not adequate to Kaplan’s own philosophical thesis that 
indexicals refer directly. The direct reference thesis, I argue, requires a new expressive device. Taking 
up the cues from Kaplan’s thesis, I analyze the concepts of context, linguistic agency and object, and 
come up with new semantic notions of abstract reference and abstract objects. Together they allow a 
precise understanding of the device of abstract generality, for the case of indexicals. I give a formal 
description of a new kind of language, an abstract pragmatic language, which has a device of abstract 
generality. 
Chapter 6 contains an adaptation of these notions from the case of indexicals to the case of regimented 
languages. In the new abstract metalanguage we can formulate Convention T in a way that doesn’t 
imply a universal metalanguage. The concluding Chapter 7 gives explicit answers to the objections of 
Part Two, revises the approach to concept analysis that was adopted in Chapter 1, and offers a brief 
discussion of some broader philosophical implications of the stratified approach.  
 
This essay is not meant as a historical or scholarly work on Tarski, but nor is it entirely free from 
exegetical presumption. As will become clear, especially in Part Two but also in many points in Part 
One, my stratified conception of truth contains many elements that could not plausibly be ascribed to 
Tarski. However, in general the development of these elements is inspired by close attention, first, to 
Tarski’s formulations of the philosophical aspects of his work, and second, to their historical context. 
This connection works both ways: a philosophically viable stratified conception of truth, even if not 
historically Tarski’s, faces problems that Tarski’s historical position may have faced, and can 
accordingly help us improve our understanding of Tarski’s choice of words.6  
The defining feature of Tarski’s stratified conception is the fact that on it truth for a language can only 
be defined in a distinct metalanguage. This is the feature under which the conception is usually 
considered and objected to. There are, however, other aspects of it that are not always considered 
essential to it and are therefore often ignored in the literature on truth. It is my contention that at least 
                                                     
6 There is no dearth, fortunately, of Tarski scholarship. See Feferman and Feferman (2004) for a philosophically 
and mathematically informed biography. Patterson (2012) gives a historical account of the development of 
Tarski’s analyses of the concepts of truth and logical consequence. Patterson (2008a) is a collection of essays 
about various aspects of Tarski’s work. See Woleński (2012) for a comprehensive account of the philosophical 
school Tarski was part of, the Lvov-Warsaw school of logic and philosophy. Other works are referred to in the 
body of the text. 
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some of these aspects are philosophically significant. I mention three here. First, the restriction to 
regimented languages is often understood as an artificial device with no philosophical motivation, at 
best tolerated as a simplification on the way to a full account. On the contrary, I take the explication of 
truth for regimented languages to be philosophically primary. Second, writers on truth who are not 
exclusively interested in natural language are usually interested in mathematical truth. Such writers 
almost invariably make use of arithmetization of syntax rather than, with Tarski, a direct syntactic 
theory. I will develop the theory in terms of strings of letters, not of arithmetized syntax. This is more 
a shift of emphasis than a substantial philosophical difference, but it allows insight into some issues that 
are less visible on the arithmetized approach. The third and most important point on which I will stay 
closer to Tarski is the emphatic demand to provide an explicit definition of truth. Many theorists either 
underemphasize the role of the explicit definition, or forsake it altogether. Although this tendency has 
led to many valuable technical results, I will contend that spelling out the deep structure of the explicit 
definition holds the key to the philosophical significance of the concept of truth.  
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PART ONE 
DEFINING TRUTH 
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1 Preliminary Methodological Issues 
 
 
1.1. Concepts 
The purpose of this work is to offer an analysis of the concept of truth that will shed light on the 
philosophical issues involved. There is no general agreement on what the nature of concepts is and what 
it means to analyze them. Regarding their nature, I will make the minimal assumption that says that a 
concept is something that applies to objects. Correspondingly, I take the analysis of a concept to reveal 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for its application to an arbitrary object. I also assume that these 
conditions are expressible in language, thereby excluding concepts with ineffable application 
conditions, if such there be. An analysis may consequently be identified with a statement of application 
conditions. Such a statement is called a definition.  
A theory or a definition should be judged by its import, by what it commits its proponent to. More 
concretely, it should be judged by the collection of sentences that it logically entails. If a definition 
implies an absurdity, even when hard to detect, then it can’t function as an analysis. The problem is that 
language, as it stands, does not allow us to state a definition in such a way that its import will be 
determinate, since there is no well-defined relation of logical entailment between sentences in language. 
The issues are well known. Sentences can be ambiguous with respect to the logical form of the content 
expressed: e.g., the sentence 
(1) A boy danced with every girl,  
is ambiguous with respect to the relative scope of its two quantifiers (must there have been one boy 
dancing with all the girls?). In addition, different concepts can be expressed by the same string of letters 
(e.g. "bank" as the side of a river, or as something that’s too big to fall?). Such ambiguities are a serious 
problem, since due to them there is no fact of the matter in general whether one sentence logically 
entails another. But then we cannot use definitions as our concept analyses.  
In order to avoid or overcome these problems, we can adopt in advance a set of norms to which the 
discourse must conform, called a regimentation scheme, or a logic. A regimentation scheme specifies 
the available sentence forms and the entailment relations between them. For example, we can decide to 
avoid using sentences of the form of (1) in favor of special forms that are unambiguous with respect to 
quantifier scope relation. The regimentation scheme that I will adopt in this essay is first-order logic. It 
consists only of predicates (expressing concepts), singular terms (referring to objects), truth-functional 
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connectives and quantifiers. First-order regimentation is conceptually very simple and unobjectionable, 
and its logical properties are well understood. I will have occasion to discuss the expressive 
shortcomings it might have later in the essay. Adopting a regimentation scheme solves the problem of 
structural ambiguity.  
To handle lexical ambiguity, we need to make a precise and unambiguous list of all the basic concepts 
that a definition uses. If a certain piece of discourse contains concepts that are usually expressed by the 
same word, such as “bank”, we artificially distinguish the words by using a synonym or a typographical 
addition (or by using artificial symbols to begin with). Another kind of ambiguity, that was not yet 
mentioned, is ambiguity with respect to the universe of discourse. A sentence such as (1) will not usually 
be used to speak about every girl whatsoever, but only about every girl in some context, some party, 
say. This information is not expressed in (1), a fact which again makes it impossible to determine logical 
relations on the basis of the sentence alone. In order to avoid this ambiguity, we can say explicitly in 
advance which objects some stretch of discourse will be limited to. A specification of the list of basic 
concepts and of the universe of discourse is a regimented language. Following Quine, we say that the 
basic concepts (the predicates) in a regimented language form its ideology and that the objects to which 
it refers (the domain of quantification) are its ontology.7  
The scheme I will adopt corresponds to first-order extensional logic with identity. The available 
sentence forms are predication (including identity statements), truth-functional connection between 
formulas, and quantification of formulas with respect to individual variables. The logical consequence 
relation I take to be classical, which means in particular that the law of excluded middle holds (and of 
course, the law of non-contradiction).  
 
The analysis of a concept is given by a definition, which is a sentence of the following form:  
(2) 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑃 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝜙.8 
Here "𝑃" is to be replaced by the (unambiguous) name of the concept to be defined (the definiendum) 
and "𝜙" by a first-order formula (the definiens) with at most "𝑥" as free variable, which states the 
conditions under which 𝑃 applies to 𝑥. (An implicit “for all 𝑥” is understood to be present and have top 
scope.)  
                                                     
7 The term “regimentation” is from Quine (1960, ch.5). Tarski speaks of “formalized languages” (1956, p.165f), 
but the idea is the same. For “ontology” and “ideology”, see Quine (1951; 1953, p.131). Notice that Quine is 
speaking of theories, not of languages. This is a complication I won’t go into (though see a comment in §7.5).  
8 This is the form for unary concepts. Generalizing to relation concepts is straightforward.  
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A definition is successful as a concept analysis if it is, in Tarski’s words, formally correct and materially 
adequate. Material adequacy will be the topic of Chapters 2 and 3. Formal correctness is a condition on 
definitions independent of the particular concept to be defined. A definition is formally correct, first of 
all, only if it is stated in a regimented language, the ideology and ontology of which are clear and 
unambiguous.9 For a concept 𝑃, a subclass of a definition’s ontology that deserves special mention is 
the class of 𝑃-bearers, so to speak. These are objects to which the concept 𝑃 stands to be applied, or in 
other words, the objects from which it is significant to withhold the concept. For example, although the 
concept daisy fails to apply to, say, chairs, this is not usually a fact of any interest. It is (say) only with 
respect to flowers that it is it possible to apply it and interesting to deny it. Flowers are in this case the 
bearers of the concept daisy. In the general case, for a definition of 𝑃 to be formally correct it is 
important that the domain of 𝑃-bearers be given clearly, since it is in terms of the properties of the 𝑃-
bearers that it is determined whether 𝑃 applies to them or not. If the language in which the definition is 
given doesn’t express the properties relevant to being a 𝑃 (in the case of daisy, either morphological or 
genetic properties), then a definition of 𝑃 will not be possible.  
Another important condition of formal correctness is that the definition not be circular. This condition 
needs to be fulfilled both in ideology and in ontology. On the side of ideology the condition amounts to 
saying that the definiens must not mention the definiendum, nor any concept understood in terms of the 
definiendum, nor any concept understood in terms of such a concept, etc. When we give a definition 
we are effectively assuming that the concepts in the definiens are understood and unproblematic. On 
the side of the ontology, it is required that the specification of the domain doesn’t involve the 
definiendum, i.e. that the objects over which we quantify are given determinately to begin with, and 
don’t depend for their properties on the concept to be defined. This kind of circularity is called 
impredicativity.  
The formal correctness of a definition guarantees that it is determinate for every object of the domain 
whether it falls under the concept or not, and that the definition doesn’t lead to absurdities.10  
 
                                                     
9 Tarski (1956): “The question how a certain concept is to be defined is correctly formulated only if a list is given 
of the terms by means of which the required definition is to be constructed. If the definition is to fulfil its proper 
task, the sense of the terms in this list must admit of no doubt.” (p.152) 
10 These conditions might not be exactly what Tarski means by “formally correct”, but they come close. See 
Hodges (2008), pp. 115-117 for some information. Notice that, as Hodges remarks, it is the definition and not the 
definiens that must be consistent. A definition with an inconsistent definiens is a formally correct definition of the 
empty concept.  
There are various approaches that weaken the ban on circularity. See Gupta and Belnap (1993) for such an 
approach to the concept of truth. See Priest (2006) for an approach that purports to be tolerant to absurdities (or 
at least to contradictions). I don't engage with these approaches in this work.  
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1.2. Truth-bearers 
What can we say about the truth-bearers? Loosely speaking, truth is a concept that applies to judgment-
type representational objects. By judgment-type, still speaking loosely, I mean representations of how 
things are (e.g. that snow is white) rather than of things (e.g. snow). In the philosophical literature one 
finds various such objects (or would-be objects): sentences, statements, thoughts, propositions, beliefs, 
etc. They differ, sometimes to a great degree, with respect to their properties and constitution. For 
instance, a sentence is made up of words, a belief is held by a cognitive subject, a statement is made at 
a time, etc. Since a definition of a concept is stated in terms of the constitution of the concept-bearers, 
a definition that covers all of the various truth-bearers would be a pretty heterogeneous thing. However, 
since the truth-bearers are related in systematic ways, it makes sense to choose one of them as the basic 
truth-bearer and find a basic definition of truth in terms of that kind’s constitution. If we wish, we can 
then define truth derivatively for the others. For example, one can treat propositions as the basic truth 
bearers and define a true belief as one with true propositional content, or a true sentence as one which 
expresses a true proposition, etc.  
Following Tarski, my basic truth-bearer will be the sentence.11 The reason is that I can give a pretty 
good account of the constitution of sentences. However, in many cases sentences are not good truth-
bearers because they do not express judgments, or they do not express them adequately. For example, 
the sentence 
(3) It is raining, 
is not a truth-bearer as it stands, but only when in fact used. This suggests that not sentences, but acts 
of their use, or utterances, should be truth-bearers. Second, even when a sentence does express a 
judgment, the sounds or marks of which it is composed are not essentially connected to that judgment. 
For example, the same judgment will often be expressed by several different sentences, say in different 
languages. Worse, it is sometimes the case that different judgments can be expressed by the same string 
of marks, as we saw in sentence (1). The inessentiality of the marks is especially visible when we want 
to speak about the judgment itself, for example to say that somebody holds it. I may wish to say that 
the Greeks knew all the true sentences of geometry. But surely they didn’t know the sentence “the sum 
of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles”, since that sentence is in English. These 
considerations, and related ones, lead many theorists to adopt propositions as truth-bearers – the 
contents of sentences shelled of their inessential sensible husk.  
There are, however, serious problems with taking utterances and propositions as basic truth-bearers. 
The deeper philosophical problems, especially with respect to utterances, will be central to Chapter 5. 
                                                     
11 The declarative sentence, of course. See Rojszczak (2005) for the history of Tarski’s choice.  
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For now let me just say that since the constitution of utterances and propositions is less than clear, 
making them the basic truth-bearers compromises formal correctness. With utterances, the problem is 
that the notion of context is not clear enough, and there is, to the best of my knowledge, no theory that 
presumes to give a complete and reliable account of what contexts are. With propositions the problem 
is the reverse: there are a great many theories of propositions, and as many objections to each. Moreover, 
many of these theories rely on certain objects in themselves not clearly enough defined, such as possible 
worlds, or possible situations, etc. Since a definition of truth needs to be stated in terms of the 
constitution of the truth-bearers, the problem is that we don’t exactly know what the constitution of 
utterances and propositions is. It therefore seems safest to develop a theory of truth for sentences first, 
and then apply it, if desired, to utterances and propositions. 
Still, we must answer the objections raised against sentences. The main objections were context-
dependence and possible mismatch between a sentence’s content and its outward form. The mismatch 
is problematic especially in two cases: when it creates ambiguity (as in (1)), and for propositional 
attitudes and intensional contexts. The context-dependence problem and the ambiguity problem can be 
handled by taking as truth-bearers, not naturally occurring sentences, but sentences in regimented 
languages, of the kind that we use in order to express our philosophical definitions. In Part One I will 
ignore the issue of intensionality.12 Regimented languages thus play a double role for us: they are both 
the medium in which we state definitions, and they furnish us with the objects to which the definition 
stands to be applied.  
 
1.3. Formalized languages 
We chose sentences because their constitution is relatively clear and unproblematic. It is incumbent 
upon us to give a clear and unproblematic definition of them. The concept of a sentence is relative to 
the concept of language, so really what we need to define is the concept of (regimented) language. I 
will limit the definition to first-order extensional languages.13 My definition won’t diverge much from 
the ones ordinarily found in logic textbooks, except that in logic, the relevant notion is that of truth in a 
model, and our topic is what is sometimes called absolute truth, or truth simpliciter.14 Also, I aim to be 
                                                     
12 Extending the stratified conception to intensional contexts lies beyond the scope of this essay.  
13 Tarski (CTFL) actually uses a simple type-theoretic framework, but the transition to first-order semantics is 
already present in the (1935) postscript.  
14 See CTFL, p. 199 for this use of “absolute truth” (not in contrast with “truth in a model” but with “truth in a 
domain”). Gupta and Belnap (1993) are, I think, mistaken to identify absolute truth with “truth in the unique model 
that represents the actual world” (p. 22f). This is because absolute truth doesn’t require the existence of a model. 
For example, “snow is white” is absolutely true because snow is white, not because there exists a model in which 
the sentence is true and that model represents the actual world.  
Carnap (1942) uses the term “absolute truth” to denote truth for propositions, in contrast with “semantic truth” 
which means truth for sentences in a language. So Tarski’s “absolute truth” is the contrary of Carnap’s “absolute 
truth”. Twardowski (1900) argues that truth is absolute in the sense that it properly applies to judgments with no 
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more explicit than customary about the philosophical or ontological grounding of the notions I use. I 
take a language to consist of a phonology, a lexicon, a syntax and a semantics.  
 
1.3.1. Phonology 
Phonology is the sensory aspect of language. Language can affect the senses in several ways, or sensory 
modalities, the main ones being audial, in speech, and visual, in written or typed text. I will present 
phonology in terms of typed text, but the idea is to abstract from any particular choice of sensory 
modality. The phonology of a language consists of an alphabet together with the concatenation 
operation. An alphabet is a finite set of symbols called phonemes. A string is the result of the successive 
concatenation of finitely many phoneme tokens. The precise nature of this operation depends on the 
sensory modality; in typed text it means placing one phoneme after the other on a line. 
The sharp-eyed reader will have noticed that the concept of string has not been properly defined. The 
straightforward definition would be inductive: a string is any phoneme, or the result of concatenating a 
phoneme to a previous string. However, inductive definitions are not formally correct by our 
standards.15 Rather, here the definition is genetic in something like Kleene’s sense in the case of 
numbers, i.e. a definition by which the objects are “generated or constructed in a certain orderly 
manner”.16 This talk of “generation” must be mere metaphor, since it is not the case that the numbers 
are brought into existence at any time. It is not clear, however, how to state the matter without metaphor. 
In any case, my intention is not the same as Kleene’s, since Kleene identifies his intention with 
Brouwer’s and Weyl’s, for whom the important thing is that there not be reference to the entire set of 
inductively “constructed” items.17 My own view is something of a compromise. I take strings to be a 
privileged concept, the one case in which an inductive definition suffices to fix a domain of objects. 
But it’s not that the definition generates the strings; their existence is grounded in our sensory capacities, 
for example our conception of typed text. That typed text has the desired properties is an assumption, 
and if you are reading this then I am guessing that you know enough about typed text to agree with me.  
Unlike Brouwer and Weyl, I allow the collection of strings to be an object, where needed.   
I am not pretending that phonology is free of philosophical problems. First, it is not straightforward to 
define a phoneme. The usual definition involves appeal to the semantics of a language and in any case 
a definition will have to take into account the entire alphabet.18 Another issue is that the type-token 
                                                     
indexical elements, what Quine (1960, p.193) calls “eternal sentences”, and what Kaplan (1989a, p.503) calls 
“perfect sentences”.  
15 More on this in §3.2.  
16 Kleene (1952), p. 26.  
17 Kleene (1952), p. 48, quoting Weyl (1946).  
18  The problem is to find a suitable equivalence relation to determine when two things instantiate the same 
phoneme (are allophones). The most dominant definition relies on semantics (through the device of a minimal 
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distinction, silently appealed to above, is not that simple to draw.19 And there are many other problems.20 
Despite all of these issues, I take phonology as here conceived to be a firmer basis than, say, possible 
worlds and contexts. 21 
 
Informally I will refer to phonemes and strings using quotations, e.g. "𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎". When I need to explicitly 
express concatenation I do it with the symbol “⋅” (centered dot), for example: 
(4) If 𝑠 =  "𝑎𝑏", then 𝑠 ⋅ "𝑏𝑎" =  "𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎".  
I use Quine's corner quotes when quantifying into strings.22 Then a different alphabet should be used 
for the variables – usually a Greek character will range over Latin characters, and "𝑛" will range over 
numerals. Examples: 
(5)  ˹𝑎𝜑˺ for 𝜑 ∈  {𝑎, 𝑏}, 
(6) ˹𝑥𝑛˺ for 𝑛 ≥  0.
23  
Here (5) refers to the strings "𝑎𝑎" and "𝑎𝑏", and (6) to the strings "𝑥0", "𝑥1", "𝑥2", … In general I will 
consider sub- and superscripted symbols to be a single phoneme.24 Corner quotes will also be used in 
another way starting from §2.1. I will allow myself to be careless with quote marks when I judge that 
                                                     
pair, see e.g. Odden (2005, p. 44)). In any case, it is clear that the equivalence of two sounds or figures is relative 
to the entire alphabet. For example, in Ancient Latin the forms "v" and "u" were allophones (allographs), while in 
modern English they are not.  
19  The letter "a" occurs twice (is the type of two tokens) in the string "aa". The string “aa” occurs twice in the 
string "aabaa", which in turn occurs twice in this footnote. This text, I hope, is going to be printed, perhaps even 
in vast quantities. Then each token of “aabaa” in this footnote will be a type for an occurrence in a printed note. 
You can see how complicated things are going to get. See Bromberger and Halle (2000) for a discussion by 
working phonologists.  
20 E.g. the nature of the senses; the linearity of the concatenation relation; and many others, I’m sure, will have 
occurred to the reader.  
21 Two comments. (a) The connections between strings and numbers are deep and probably not accidental. First, 
we can define the natural numbers and the arithmetical operations in terms of strings and concatenation (see Quine 
(1946), Corcoran et al. (1974)). Quine and Corcoran et al. show the equivalence between phonological and 
arithmetical theories (first- and second-order, respectively). My topic has not been the theories, but the domains 
themselves. Second, we can define strings in terms of natural numbers. So if you’re not convinced of the 
philosophical safety of phonology, we can take the natural numbers as our ontologically privileged concept (made 
by God, say), and use a coding scheme (made by Gödel) to define the strings. This is what most of the formal 
literature on truth does anyway. 
(b) In accepting types I am rejecting a certain kind of philosophical nominalism associated with Tarski. In CTFL 
Tarski uses types, though somewhat apologetically (see p.156fn). Tarski’s nominalism is addressed in Frost-
Arnold (2008), which studies the protocols of the Harvard 1940 conversations between Carnap, Quine and Tarski. 
Frost-Arnold mentions two conditions, required by Tarski, on the acceptability of a regimented language: that the 
language be first-order and that its domain consist of physical objects. Phoneme types are not physical objects, so 
it seems they should be excluded. In this sense my framework is more liberal than Tarski, since I don’t make the 
second requirement.  
22 See Quine (1940), §6. 
23  Notice the easy transition between numeral and number. 
24 This is only for convenience. The alphabet is still obviously finite.  
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no confusion is likely to result. I assume that there is a single finite universal alphabet, of which the 
alphabet of every language forms a subset.  
 
1.3.2. Lexicon 
The lexicon of a language is a finite set of strings over its alphabet. A member of the lexicon is called a 
lexeme. Lexemes will be the basic meaningful units of a language. The lexicon, being finite, can be 
defined by enumeration.25 (I include infinitely many numerals ˹𝑛˺ and the infinitely many symbols ˹𝑥𝑛˺ 
in the lexicon without thereby ceasing to think of it as finite.26 ) We distinguish the logical part of a 
lexicon from the non-logical part. Since we keep the regimentation scheme fixed (first-order logic), we 
can keep the logical part constant across languages. It consists of the symbols: ∀, =, ↓
, ˹𝑥𝑛˺ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑛, (,  and ).
27  
If the lexemes are the basic meaningful units of the language, why begin with phonology at all? 
Phonology by itself is representationally inert, in the sense that phonemes do not have anything to do 
with the meaning of expressions. Surely we could replace every occurrence of “sh” in our English 
sentences by an occurrence of “ź” and get a language, call it Engliź, that has exactly the same 
representational power as English. Using arithmetical coding as a basis is no improvement, since the 
particular number used to represent an expression is just as irrelevant for its truth as the phonological 
string, as witnessed by the plurality of possible coding schemes. Since language begins to be meaningful 
only at the level of lexemes, it makes sense to ask whether it would not be better to drop phonology 
altogether from our concept of language. Let’s call this alternative notion the intelligible language 
conception, in contrast with the phonological one, which I’m adopting. On this view the alphabet and 
the lexicon coincide. I won't spell out the intelligible conception in detail, but we can mimic it to a 
certain extent within the phonological conception by demanding that there be no multi-phoneme 
lexemes:  
(A) The symbolization stipulation: all lexemes are single-phoneme strings.  
This is the common procedure in symbolized languages. In §2.2, and later in §4, we will see that 
postulating a representationally inert medium is crucial to the stratified conception.28  
                                                     
25 E.g., 𝐿𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = "𝑃" 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 = "𝑄", 𝑒𝑡𝑐. 
26 See footnote 24. 
27 We can view these symbols as abbreviations for longer strings: “for all”, “equals”, etc. The symbol “↓” is the 
Sheffer stroke, which will be a binary connective meaning "neither… nor …". Using it makes the definitions of 
the concepts of the language simpler (see Mendelson (1997, p. 29)). When formulating arbitrary sentences, I will 
make use of the other connectives and the existential quantifier. They are to be seen as abbreviations.  
28 I can’t ascribe the intelligible conception of language to anyone with any certainty, but something along these 
lines might underlie the Language of Thought Hypothesis (see Crane (1990)); maybe also Chomsky’s Y-model 
conception of language, see for example Chomsky (1993, p.168f). If propositions are to be regarded as 
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On most treatments, the lexicon of first-order languages consists of predicates and function symbols 
(the limit case of the latter being the individual constant).29 However, we can without loss of generality 
assume our lexicon to contain only predicate symbols. If we want to regiment a given 𝑛-place function 
𝑓, we can do it using an (𝑛 + 1)-place predicate 𝑃𝑓 such that 𝑃𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛, 𝑦) holds whenever 
𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)  =  𝑦. This has several minor advantages. First, in using function symbols we are 
presupposing that the value of the function exists and is unique for any sequence of arguments; but if 
we regiment everything using predicates, this presupposition needs to be stated explicitly. This is an 
advantage, since it makes the existence assumption part of the discourse and not a presupposition. If we 
like, we can reintroduce function symbols by contextual definition:  
(7) ˹𝜙(𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)) = ∃𝑦(𝑃𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛, 𝑦) ∧ 𝜙(𝑦))˺.
 30 
In practice I will use function symbols and individual constants without notice. The second advantage 
of limiting our lexicon to predicates is that our definitions become simpler. This will be felt presently. 
The third advantage is in philosophical interpretation: the non-logical resources of a language now fall 
neatly into two categories – objects (in the domain) and concepts (predicates). There is no need to find 
a philosophical gloss for functions or individual constants.  
 
1.3.3. Syntax 
The languages that we are interested in are usable languages. Being the finite beings that we are, we 
can’t comprehend an infinitely long string. First-order languages allow the expression of infinitely many 
sentences, but if they are to be used, this infinite collection has to be specified using some single finite 
sentence. We therefore have: 
(B) The finitude constraint: A language is given in a finite statement.31  
                                                     
representational content free of representationally inert matter, then considerations against the intelligible 
conception of language might count against propositions as well. I won’t elaborate on this here.  
29 See for example Mendelson (1997, p.57). 
30 A contextual definition is not a definition in the strict sense, but as mere abbreviations of strings. Abbreviations 
such as (7) introduce ambiguity into our language, since they don’t, e.g., distinguish between negations of 
abbreviations and abbreviations of negations. There are well-known ways to handle this, and I will not pursue 
these issues further (though see §5.2.4). Russell’s theory of descriptions is the classic place to look for a discussion 
of this, see Chapter III of the Introduction of Principia Mathematica.  
31 In Frost-Arnold’s (2008) report on the Tarski-Carnap-Quine protocols of 1940 (see footnote 21), besides 
Tarski’s nominalism, it is also mentioned that acceptable languages have to be finitistic, in the sense that the 
domain of a language not be infinite, and that there be only finitely many predicates. Again, my finitistic 
requirement is a liberalization of Tarski.  
15 
 
A similar constraint is central to Davidson’s concept of language32 and to Chomsky’s notion of a 
generative grammar.33 Of course, Davidson and Chomsky are interested in unregimented language 
(though they have, perhaps, different conceptions of it).34 I’m not saying there is not an interesting 
concept of unusable languages, for example one with infinitely long sentences, but for our purposes 
these are best treated as mathematical abstractions, derivative from the primary object of investigation. 
In a sense, the distinction between usable and unusable languages plays for me the role that the 
distinction between natural and artificial languages plays for many philosophers.  
 
Technically, we can treat syntax as a single predicate 𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑥) which holds of strings which are well-
formed formulas. This predicate can be defined properly (i.e. with formal correctness), but its content 
is displayed better by an inductive definition: 
(C) Inductive definition of 𝒘𝒇𝒇:  
a. If 𝛼1 is a variable, then 𝑤𝑓𝑓(˹𝑊(𝛼1)˺), 
b. If 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are variables, then 𝑤𝑓𝑓(˹(𝛼1 = 𝛼2)˺), 
c. If 𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝜙) and 𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝜓) then 𝑤𝑓𝑓(˹(𝜙 ↓ 𝜓)˺), 
d. If 𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝜙) and 𝛼 is a variable, then 𝑤𝑓𝑓(˹∀𝛼𝜙˺).35 
This definition has two base clauses specifying the atomic formulas. Clause (a) treats of the non-logical 
predicates, and it changes from language to language based on the lexicon. In the example I assumed 
only a single unary predicate “𝑊”. The other clauses are common for all first-order languages. The 
inductive definition is the most transparent way to carve out the infinite subset of formulas from the 
infinite set of strings, since it traces the "generation" of each complex expression from the finitely many 
lexemes. The problem is, as in the case of strings, that it is not a formally correct definition. In this case, 
however, we wouldn’t want to make it a genetic definition, and we don’t need to. With any 𝑤𝑓𝑓 we 
can associate a sequence of shorter formulas that were steps in the imaginary generation procedure 
according to the inductive definition. We can represent such a sequence using a string, and this allows 
                                                     
32 Davidson (1965).  
33 See Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002). Chomsky uses the term “discrete infinity”. I’m not sure what this means 
beyond countable infinity, or an infinity produced from combinations over a finite set. See Pullum and Scholz 
(2010) for a critique of the view that (natural) language has infinitely many sentences.  
34 Note the difference between how the infinite number of sentences is “generated” on Chomsky’s view and on 
the present one. For Chomsky it is the syntax that merges lexemes and complex phrase structures together into 
more complex phrase structures “recursively”, so that the number of well-formed sentences is infinite. On my 
view an infinity of strings is provided by the phonology, and the task of the syntax is to carve out the well-formed 
subset of them (also, in another sense, recursively; see below). This is why I am tempted to ascribe to Chomsky 
the intelligible language conception from above, see footnote 28. 
35 The parentheses in 𝑤𝑓𝑓s will be used as usual and omitted according to the usual conventions. 
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us to define 𝑤𝑓𝑓 explicitly, by quantification over strings.36 It is straightforward to define a function 
which takes a 𝑤𝑓𝑓 to the number of its free variables. Henceforth I will write 𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑛(𝑥) to say that 𝑥 is 
a well-formed formula with 𝑛 free variables. A sentence is a string of category 𝑤𝑓𝑓0.  
Since both the lexicon and the syntax are defined explicitly in terms of phonology alone, phonology is 
so far the sole basis of our conception of language.  
 
1.3.4. Semantics 
But the syntactical or phonological notion of sentence is not the one relevant for truth.  Truth is a concept 
that applies to sentences as interpreted, not as mere strings. In general, the interpretation, or semantic 
theory, of a language 𝐿 is a specification of what each expression of 𝐿 means. We can represent it as a 
function 𝜆𝑥. |𝑥|𝐿 on strings, such that for 𝑠 a string, |𝑠|𝐿 is the meaning of 𝑠 in 𝐿.37 For reasons that will 
be explored in depth, the letter 𝐿 here cannot be a variable – to every language there corresponds a 
different interpretation function.  
The question of the nature of meaning is a highly vexed one in philosophy, and I prefer to prejudge it 
as little as possible and stick to a minimal view of meaning. We can make two assumptions. The first 
is that meaning is compositional:  
(D) Compositionality of meaning: the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by 
the semantic values of its lexemes and its syntactic composition. 
This assumption stems from the fact that our languages need to be usable and it actually a little stronger 
than we need. Strictly, it is enough that there be a finitely formulated specification of the meaning of 
every expression (or at least every sentence) of the language. Since strings are finite and there are 
finitely many lexemes, (D) guarantees this.  
The second assumption is that semantic theory suffices for the truth of sentences, in the sense that from 
the meaning of a sentence its truth conditions are derivable: 
(E) Truth-sufficiency of meaning: A semantic theory for a language entails a truth theory for it. 
This assumption is meant to exclude semantic theories not based on truth, such as translational or 
"internalistic" accounts of meaning, according to which meanings are given in terms of further 
                                                     
36 See Quine (1946) for an example of an explicit definition based on an inductive one. It is easy to generalize the 
example into a method that will work for any inductive definition, provided that the generation sequence can be 
represented in a string.  
37 I will omit quote marks within the scope of |𝑥|, so that, e.g., |𝑃| is the same as |"𝑃"|. 
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representational entities (semantic markers, or cognitive representations, and the like).38 The 
assumption is compatible with most of the dominant paradigms in linguistic semantics practiced, which 
have their origin in the works of Montague and Davidson.39 Without this assumption sentences cannot 
be truth bearers.  
The non-logical lexicon contains only predicates, and the logical lexicon is the same for all languages. 
We can therefore identify a language with the interpretation of its lexemes plus its domain 𝐷𝐿 – 
effectively its ideology and ontology. For convenience, we can say that the domain is the interpretation 
of the symbol “∀”, 40 and identify a language 𝐿 with its semantic function 𝜆𝑥. |𝑥|𝐿. The form of semantic 
theory thus comes down to the kind of meaning that predicates have. We are interested in extensional 
languages, which means that whatever meaning is, for our purposes it is enough to look at its extensional 
aspect. A straightforward approach is to assign to each lexical predicate its extension. It is then routine 
to show how the extensions of complex predicates is calculated from the extensions of their components 
depending on the mode of composition, in a way that satisfies (D). One problem with this is that 
sentences don’t have extensions. In this case we take two arbitrary objects, say 1 and 0, and put |𝑠| = 1 
if 𝑠 is true and |𝑠| = 0 otherwise.41 This is of course only a figure of speech. To say that |𝑠| = 1 is 
simply to say that 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑠), but in a way that allows for notational uniformity of the semantics. This is 
the model-theoretic style of semantic theory.  
The model-theoretic style relies on the assumption that the extension of every predicate is an object 
(usually a set, but we can be more liberal). This is too restrictive, for we know of cases in which there 
is no object that corresponds to a certain predicate (for example, in the case of proper classes in 𝑍𝐹 set 
theory). In such cases we cannot think of the semantic theory as a function in the proper sense, but we 
can still specify the semantics of predicates by stating their application conditions. This is called the 
truth-conditional style. Thus if in the model-theoretic style, the extension of a predicate 𝑃 would be a 
collection, say: 
                                                     
38 See Lewis (1970). See Pietroski (2005) and Glanzberg (2014) for recent gestures towards internalistic 
interpretations of semantics.  
39 See, e.g. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990), p.61ff; Larson and Segal (1995) p.25ff; Heim and Kratzer 
(1998), p.1; Jacobson (2014), pp.27ff.    
40 This is Enderton’s (1972) procedure (p. 81).   
41 This device is, of course, Frege’s. Frege used it to make his semantic system uniform in assigning reference to 
every well-formed expression. This is formally elegant, but it opens the door to a fallacy. If interpretation is a 
mathematical function, and if sentences refer either to 1 or to 0, then we are tempted to entertain the possibility 
that they might refer to something else as well, or to nothing at all. But the definition went: 1 if true, 0 otherwise. 
Can a sentence fail to be either true or otherwise? The fallacy is in thinking that 0 models something over and 
above absence of truth in a sentence, maybe some independently conceivable notion of falsity. This problem exists 
already in truth-table semantics for the sentential connectives, where we a lot one line in the table for truth and 
another for “otherwise”. We are then tempted to add another line, which is neither truth nor otherwise. I call this 
the algebraic fallacy. We should therefore keep in mind that the “|𝑠| = 1” is just a figure of speech, and really 
what we are saying is “𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑠)”.  
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(8) |𝑃| = {𝑥: 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟}, 
on the truth-conditional style we can only say what the conditions are for a predication of 𝑃 to be true: 
(9) |𝑃𝑥| = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟. 
On the truth-conditional style we don’t assign reference to subsentential expressions. But if sentential 
reference is only a figure of speech (see above), then an interpretation function is no more than a truth 
predicate or, to be more precise, a predicate expressing the satisfaction relation between objects (or 
sequences thereof) and formulas. On the truth-conditional style, we therefore identify a language with 
the extension of its satisfaction relation.  
It may seem to you that semantics as we are defining it depends to closely on truth (and satisfaction). If 
truth applies to sentences only as interpreted, conceiving of interpretation in terms of truth sounds 
awfully close to being circular. More precisely, we have a diallele holding between truth and meaning.42 
I will return to this problem in §3, and then later in §7.  
 
1.3.5. Sentences as truth bearers 
We now have a good understanding of our truth-bearer, the sentence. A sentence of a language 𝐿 is a 
phonological string, a 𝑤𝑓𝑓0 (well-formed formula with zero free variables), considered in relation to a 
semantic function 𝜆𝑥. |𝑥|𝐿 (which might be shorthand for a satisfaction predicate). The language 
relativity of sentences yields the following, perhaps surprising, result:  
(F) Individuation of sentences: let 𝑠1 be a sentence of the language 𝐿1, and 𝑠2 a sentence of 𝐿2.  
If 𝐿1 ≠  𝐿2 then 𝑠1 ≠  𝑠2.  
If 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are the same phonological string, we say they are homophones. If |𝑠1|
𝐿1  =  |𝑠2|
𝐿2 we say 
that 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are synonyms. But by (F), homophony and synonymy are not sufficient for identity. Two 
sentences are the same only if they are in the same language.  
 
With these preliminary stipulations and definitions in hand, we can move on to our main problem, that 
of defining truth.   
                                                     
42 A diallele (δἰ ἀλλήλων) is the circumstance in which a concept is understood in terms of another and vice versa. 
It is one of the skeptical tropes used by Sextus Empiricus to undermine philosophical theses. Particularly relevant 
to our case is his attack on the Stoic concepts of truth and of the grasped representation (φανταςία καταληπτική). 
See his Against the Logicians, I.426, II.85. In brief, his complaint is that the Stoics defined the grasped 
representation as that which represents what exists, and they define what exists to be that which is given in a 
grasped representation. I was led to this notion by Kant (see footnote 44). 
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2 Naïve Truth   
 
The previous chapter was concerned with the formal correctness of definitions. But a definition might 
be flawless formally and still fail as an explication of a concept, if it doesn't capture the content of the 
concept to be defined. A definition must therefore conform to something which is somehow given to us 
beforehand. This conformity is called by Tarski the material adequacy of a definition. What it means 
in general for a concept to be "given to us beforehand" is a difficult question. In the case of the concept 
of truth, the starting point is what can be called the naïve semantic conception of truth. The present 
chapter discusses the naïve conception and its refutation in the form of the liar paradox, corresponding 
in essence to §1 of CTFL.43  
 
2.1. The naïve-semantic conception of truth 
2.1.1. Statement 
We are looking for a formula of the form: 
(1) 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥) ↔ 𝜙(𝑥), 
where “𝜙” is replaced by a statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary sentence 
𝑥 to be true. Loosely speaking, a sentence is true just in case the state of affairs that the sentence reports 
indeed holds. In other words, a sentence expresses its own truth conditions, for example: 
(2) 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒("𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒") ↔  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒.  
It follows that for every sentence, we have a statement of its truth-conditions in reach: the sentence 
itself. It should be straightforward to generalize this notion into a statement of the form (1). For consider 
an analogous case. Imagine that the following is a satisfactory definition of the concept bachelor:  
(3) 𝐵𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑥) ↔ 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑥) ∧ (𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑥) ≥ 18) ∧ ¬∃𝑦𝑊𝑖𝑓𝑒(𝑦, 𝑥). 
                                                     
43 The English term “materially adequate” is from Tarski (1944), and is used in the (1956) English translation of 
CTFL. In the Polish version of CTFL we find “merytorycznie trafna” and in the German “sachlich zutreffende”. 
A more literal translation would be “contentually accurate” (if “contentually” were a word).  
Carnap, in the English version of The Logical Syntax of Language (1937), uses “material” to translate “inhaltlich” 
(see §§77-81), which, like “sachlich”, would more literally would be rendered “contentual”. This might be the 
origin of Tarski’s “materially”. I remember reading Quine reminisce about being the one who suggested to Carnap 
“material” for “inhaltlich”, but I can’t find the place. See Hodges (2004), (2008), Patterson (2008b), (2012, 
§4.1.1), for discussion. 
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This is a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for bachelorhood for an arbitrary person. It 
follows from this definition that for every person, say Jan, we have a particular statement of these 
conditions: 
(4) 𝐵𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝐽𝑎𝑛) ↔ 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝐽𝑎𝑛) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝐽𝑎𝑛) ≥ 18 ∧ ¬∃𝑦𝑊𝑖𝑓𝑒(𝑦, 𝐽𝑎𝑛). 
The relation of (3) to (4) is that of the universal to the singular. We would think that (1) and (2) would 
be related in the same way, but this is not the case. There is no way to get (1) from (2) by generalizing 
over a singular term. The problem is that although a sentence expresses its own truth conditions, it is 
not mentioned in the statement of those truth conditions in the way that John is mentioned in the 
statement of his bachelorhood conditions. This is the generalization problem.44   
 
In various fields in and around mathematical logic we often use the device of a schema in order to 
generalize over sentence position. This lets us formulate the naïve-semantic conception of truth, which 
says that the concept of truth is such that we expect it to entail all instances of the disquotational T-
schema: 
(A) Disquotational T-schema: 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(˹𝜙˺) ↔ 𝜙, 
where an instance is had by replacing "𝜙" with some sentence of the language in question 𝐿, and "˹𝜙˺" 
with a name of that sentence.45 These instances are called disquotational T-sentences. Sentence (2) is 
the instance had by replacing “𝜙” with 
(5) The sea is blue. 
We say that (2) is a T-sentence generated from (5). The naïve conception of truth amounts to saying 
that for every sentence of the language in question, the T-sentence generated from it is entailed by (the 
                                                     
44 This problem is stated by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, A58-9/B83:  
If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object must thereby be 
distinguished from others; for a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related 
even if it contains something that could well be valid of other objects. Now a general criterion of truth 
would be that which was valid of all cognitions without any distinction among their objects. But it is 
clear that since with such a criterion one abstracts from all content of cognition (relation to its object), 
yet truth concerns precisely this content, it would be completely impossible and absurd to ask for a mark 
of the truth of this content of cognition, and thus it is clear that a sufficient and at the same time general 
mark cannot possibly be provided. Since above we have called the content [Inhalt] of a cognition its 
matter [Materie], one must therefore say that no general sign of the truth of the matter of cognition can 
be demanded, because it is self-contradictory. 
See Prauss (1969, p. 177ff) for a discussion of the similarity between this passage and Tarski’s generalization 
problem.  
45 On this formulation, the occurrence of "𝜙" within "˹𝜙˺" is inert, and is just meant to remind us that the latter is 
a name of the former. It would also have been possible to treat "˹𝜙˺" as a composite expression in which the corner 
quotes express an expression-naming device (not exactly the Quine quotes of §1.3.1, but similar enough). See 
below for expression naming.  
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definition of) the concept of truth. In another terminology, we can say that they are analytic to the 
concept. This is a condition on material adequacy: a definition that doesn’t entail all the T-sentences is 
materially inadequate.  
The main negative result of CTFL is that the naïve conception is untenable. The reasons will be given 
below (§2.3). But if it had been tenable, the naïve conception would have had important philosophical 
benefits. That's why many philosophers, especially since the 1970s, have tried to maintain it by 
negotiating some other assumption made by Tarski, usually about the logical framework. Except in 
passing, I will not discuss the other strategies in this work. I turn now to some of the philosophical 
benefits a tenable naïve conception would have had. The first is the fact that it is intuitive. As its name 
suggests, the naïve conception expresses our "pre-theoretic” concept of truth.46 The other benefits take 
more explaining.  
 
2.1.2. Escape from relativity 
If sentences are our truth-bearers, then since sentences are only such relative to a language, truth 
becomes relative to a language. This is disturbing. Surely truth should be the first and foremost objective 
concept, dependent on how things are and not on how they are expressed. It is a virtue of the naïve 
conception that under it we can make the relativity to language benign, at least with respect to a certain 
privileged class of languages.  
In §1 of CTFL Tarski discusses something like the naïve conception in relation to a language he calls 
everyday language.47 In Tarski's usage this is not a general term under which several particular objects 
such as English and Hebrew fall, but a certain mode of discourse, something like unregimented 
discourse.48 Tarski describes everyday language as universal, in the sense that anything that can be 
expressed at all can be expressed in it:  
(a) Universality thesis for everyday language: everything that can be expressed at all can be 
expressed in everyday language. 
                                                     
46  See, e.g., McGee (1991): “[the disquotational T-schema] is so deeply embedded in our ordinary thinking about 
truth that we might fear that, once we decide to give [it] up, we should become so badly disoriented that we should 
not be able to talk about truth at all” (p. vii).  
47  "Język potoczny" in the original Polish; "Umgangssprache" in the German; "colloquial language" in the (1956) 
English. I take "everyday language" from Tarski (1944), originally published in English.  In that paper Tarski uses 
both the terms “everyday language” and “natural language”, though not, I think, interchangeably. See below.  
48 That for Tarski everyday language means unregimented discourse and not an object such as English is visible 
in places such as (1956, p.60). See also CTFL, p.267, where he speaks of philosophers who think that “the one 
natural language [is] colloquial language”; the Polish for “colloquial language” here reads “język życia 
potocznego”, more precisely translated as “the language of everyday life” (p.116).  
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One also finds in the philosophical literature heavy use of the expressions natural language and 
ordinary language. They are in general used interchangeably, and in two senses. Sometimes they are 
used in the sense of Tarski's "everyday language", to refer to unregimented discourse.49 But often we 
find expressions such as "English and other natural languages".50 Here it seems that not a mode of 
discourse is meant, but a general concept under which several particulars fall. In order to be clear about 
the distinction, let's call languages such as English, Hebrew, etc. world-languages. When I don't care 
to distinguish between everyday language and world-languages, I use the term "ordinary language."51 
It is often assumed in the literature, sometimes implicitly, that world-languages are universal, in the 
sense described above. This yields: 
(b) Universality thesis for world languages: everything that can be expressed at all can be expressed 
in any world-language. 
From this thesis it follows that every two universal languages are intertranslatable: for every sentence 
in the one there is a synonymous sentence in the other.52 Under this universality thesis, we can treat all 
world-languages as identical up to translation.  
 
Another frequent assumption in the literature is that ordinary language is the primary object of study 
for the philosophy of language. Formalized languages are perceived by many as only peripherally 
important to major philosophical concerns. This gives rise to another thesis: 
(c) The primacy of ordinary language thesis: ordinary language is our primary object of study.  
This is actually two theses, corresponding to the two senses of "ordinary language". Combined with the 
appropriate universality thesis, the significance of the primacy thesis is that in the important case, that 
of ordinary language, we don’t have to worry about language relativity.53 This is an important advantage 
of a conception of truth that allows universality, such as the naïve conception, over one that doesn’t, 
such as Tarski’s. 
                                                     
49 This seems to be the use associated with the early "ordinary language" philosophies and with Wittgenstein. 
50  See, e.g., Soames (1999, p.52), Priest (1984, p.117).  
51  The term "natural language" I reserve for something else, which will not be discussed in this work. Briefly, it 
seems most fitting for what linguists understand by it, a certain natural cognitive faculty. This is not unambiguous 
either. It might refer to an innate cognitive faculty (encoding a universal grammar?) or to the grammar 
implemented in the mind of an individual at a time (an I-language?), or maybe to something else. Notice that 
neither universal grammar nor I-language is the same as a world-language.  
52 I ignore the possibility that the unit of translation may be greater than the sentence. 
53 Most philosophers who subscribe to the primacy thesis subscribe to the universality thesis as well. An exception 
might be Kripke (1975), if his footnote 34 (p.714) is something to go by. See Burge (1979, p. 174fn) for a brief 
critique, also McGee (1991, p.91). Kripke says that “natural language in its pristine purity, before philosophers 
reflect on its semantics” might not be universal, but I’m not sure what he means by that.  
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2.1.3. Disquotationalism 
The naïve conception is also important for the family of philosophical positions known as deflationism. 
The common core of deflationist theories is the claim that the collection of T-sentences defined by the 
T-schema exhaust the content of the concept of truth, and that therefore we should not expect a more 
informative definition that entails them. On this view the T-schema functions, not as a material 
adequacy condition on definitions, but as a definition in its own merit.  
Where the truth-bearer is the sentence, deflationists sometimes call themselves disquotationalists.54 A 
common philosophical gloss on disquotationalism is that truth, though it has no philosophical content, 
has a certain "function", sometimes dubbed logico-linguistic.55 This function is to allow the indirect 
assertion of sentences, when for some reason the sentences themselves are not available for assertion, 
e.g. when they are not known or when there are too many of them to assert. 
For example, consider the two sentences: 
(6) Everything Alfred says is true, 
(7) Alfred says that war is evil. 
From (6) and (7),56 using the disquotational T-schema (A), we can derive the sentence: 
(8) War is evil. 
So a person asserting (6), using the truth concept, will find himself committed to (8), even if he never 
as much as entertained (7),  e.g. when he is endorsing all of Alfred's assertions on authority. In this way 
the naïve conception can serve as the engine for indirect assertion, without us needing to come up with 
a definition.  
 
 2.2. Syntactic closure 
Unfortunately, the naïve-conception faces some serious difficulties. Most notably, the requirement it 
places on an adequate definition of truth is such that no formally correct definition can fulfill it. The 
problem is that it presupposes that the language in question 𝐿 is semantically closed. A language is 
semantically closed if it expresses its own semantic theory, which for us comes down to being 
syntactically closed (expressing its own syntactic theory) and expressing its own truth predicate. 
                                                     
54 See, e.g., Leeds (1978), David (1994), Williams (1999), Horsten (2011). The term “disquotation” is from Quine, 
and some ascribe to him the view as well.  
55  See, e.g. Williams (1999, p.547f).  
56  Regimenting (7) as direct discourse.  
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Syntactic theory is definable in phonology, so it’s enough that 𝐿 express its own phonological theory. 
For consider an instance of the disquotational schema (A), a disquotational T-sentence such as (2), 
reproduced here:  
(9) 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒("𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒") ↔  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒.  
According to the instructions adjoined to the T-schema, the two occurrences of the string 
“𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒” in (9), once mentioned and once used, are occurrences of the same sentence. This 
means that they are in the same language, by §1.3.5F. The used occurrence of the string is a subformula 
of the T-sentence, which means that they too are in the same language. Therefore, on the naïve 
conception, the language for which truth is defined is the same as the language in which it is defined.57  
 This section is about syntactic and phonological closure. The task is to define, in a formally correct 
way, a syntactically closed language. More generally, we will show how, on the basis of an arbitrary 
language 𝐿, we can define its syntactic closure 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿). This is hardly a new result, but it will be 
instructive to reproduce it in the current setup.  
 
2.2.1. A syntactically closed language 
Let 𝐿𝑊𝑠 be a language with a unary predicate "𝑊" expressing whiteness and an individual constant "𝑠" 
referring to snow. The domain contains snow together with the collection of strings over the alphabet 
of 𝐿𝑊𝑠. In a weak sense, 𝐿𝑊𝑠 is phonologically closed since it quantifies over its own strings. But in 
order to define its own syntactic theory (the predicate 𝑤𝑓𝑓,see §1.3.3) it needs to be able to refer to 
strings individually. It needs to have, not only the ontology of phonology, but also its ideology. We 
want to extend 𝐿𝑊𝑠 to a syntactically closed 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿𝑊𝑠) that can also speak about snow being white.  
Let 𝐿𝑊𝑠 be like 𝐿𝑊𝑠 with the addition of the phonological concepts for 𝐿𝑊𝑠: names for the phonemes 
and a symbol for the concatenation operation. A name for an 𝐿𝑊𝑠 phoneme will be an underlined version 
of that phoneme: "𝑊" denotes "𝑊" and "∀" denotes "∀" and so forth. Concatenation will be marked by 
a centered dot "⋅".58 Between underlined names I omit it, so that both "𝑊 ⋅ 𝑠" and "𝑊𝑠" denote the 
string "𝑊𝑠". The lexicon of 𝐿𝑊𝑠 then consists of the symbols 𝑊, 𝑠, ∀, ↓ , =, 𝑊, 𝑠,⋅ . This allows us to 
define 𝑤𝑓𝑓 for 𝐿𝑊𝑠 in 𝐿𝑊𝑠, along the lines of §1.3.3. However, 𝐿𝑊𝑠 does not have names for all of its 
own symbols; in particular, there is no way to refer individually to the underlined phonemes and to the 
                                                     
57 Strictly speaking, we don’t have to assume a full phonological theory. It is enough that 𝐿 has names only for its 
sentences and not for other strings. However, since 𝐿 will have infinitely many sentences, the only way to name 
all of them is through a full phonological theory. If this full phonological theory is given only in a strictly stronger 
metalanguage (as is the procedure of Gupta (1982)), then I don’t say that the language is syntactically closed.  
58 To make concatenation a total function, let's say that the concatenation of anything with snow yields snow 
again.  
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centered dot. "𝑊" denotes "𝑊", but nothing in the lexicon denotes "𝑊”. 𝐿𝑊𝑠 is not yet phonologically 
closed.  
It obviously won’t do to simply add further names to designate the unnamed phonemes (say, "𝑊", "∀"), 
since the problem would arise again for these new names. This way of going about things leads to a 
regress:  
(B) The naming regress: If every phoneme is named by a single phoneme, then a syntactically 
closed language will have an infinite alphabet. 
This is because some phonemes will not name phonemes (e.g. "="), so we need a bijection between the 
alphabet and a proper part of it, which is only possible with an infinite alphabet. 
We can avoid the regress if, instead of letting phonemes denote phonemes piecemeal, we systematize 
this relation and define an operator which takes an expression to its name. More precisely, since an 
object may have many names, we define an operator 𝑞 which takes an expression to its canonical name. 
Here is an informal recursive definition:  
(C) Recursive definition of canonical name: 
a. The canonical name of snow is "𝑠"; the canonical name of “𝑠” is "𝑠"; etc.  
b. The canonical name of an underlined phoneme 𝛼 is ˹ 𝑞(𝛼)˺, e.g. "𝑞(𝑠)" canonically denotes 
"𝑠".  
c. The canonical name of a string is the concatenation of the canonical names of its elements 
in order, e.g. "𝑞 ⋅ (⋅ 𝑞(𝑠) ⋅)" canonically denotes "𝑞(𝑠)" (which is also denoted non-
canonically by "𝑞(𝑞(𝑠))"). 
Let 𝐿𝑊𝑠
𝑞
 be like 𝐿𝑊𝑠 with the addition of three symbols: “𝑞” for the operator 𝑞; "𝑞" for the phoneme 
"𝑞"; and " ⋅ " for the concatenation symbol “⋅”. The domain of 𝐿𝑊𝑠
𝑞
 will include all strings over the 
enlarged alphabet (as well as snow). It is easy to see that every string of 𝐿𝑊𝑠
𝑞
, and in particular every 
sentence string, is not only an element of the domain, but also has a name in 𝐿𝑊𝑠
𝑞
. On this basis we can 
define 𝐿𝑊𝑠
𝑞
's syntactic theory, and we have 𝐿𝑊𝑠
𝑞 = 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿𝑊𝑠). 
The operator 𝑞 was defined informally. We want to be sure that it can be defined in a formally correct 
way. In the literature we find two ways to mention expressions: quotation and structural-descriptive 
naming (arithmetization is a case of the latter). I’ll examine them in turn.  
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2.2.2. Proper quotation 
Quotation is often assumed to be an unproblematic, transparent means for naming linguistic 
expressions, so much so that its converse "disquotation" is held to be clear enough to explicate truth. 
But the problem of quotation is a difficult one, and its difficulties are not unrelated to the ones plaguing 
the concept of truth. These problems were already noticed by Tarski in CTFL, but have not played an 
important role in the debate on truth.  
Sometimes “quotation” is used as a generic term for a device for naming strings, including under it 
structural descriptive naming as well. I wish to characterize proper quotation. To see what I mean by 
proper quotation, notice that in this very sentence, the word "sentence" is mentioned (as well as used). 
However, the letter "s" is apparently not mentioned in that sentence. On the structural-descriptive 
method this is impossible, as we will see shortly, since the name of a complex expression is composed 
of the names of its letters. This suggests the following characterization of proper quotation: 
(D) Characterization of Quotation: Quotation takes an expression in use to its name. 
If we want to make 𝑞 into a pure quotation operator we need to define it so that it takes as argument, 
not a name of an expression, but the expression itself, and returns its name, e.g.  
(10) |𝑞(𝑊𝑠)| = "𝑊𝑠".  
This seems to conform to how we perceive quotation: in quoting an expression I am not using names 
for the phonemes making up the expression, though I am certainly using the phonemes themselves.  
Implementing proper quotation faces some difficulties. Let 𝐿𝑞 be like 𝐿𝑊𝑠 with the addition of a proper 
quotation operator "𝑞". The first problem is with syntactic theory. If 𝐿𝑞 is to be syntactically closed, 
then the predicate 𝑤𝑓𝑓 should be definable in it. There is no difficulty in formulating the definition 
from §1.3.3(C). The sentence that says that the string “𝑊𝑠” is a 𝑤𝑓𝑓 is expressed in 𝐿𝑞 by the string:  
(11) 𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑞(𝑊𝑠)), 
and as desired, it follows from (10) and from the definition of 𝑤𝑓𝑓. However, (11) itself is supposed to 
be a 𝑤𝑓𝑓 of 𝐿𝑞, but it is not captured by the definition in §1.3.3(C), because the expression “𝑞(𝑊𝑠)” 
is not well-formed: Its argument form is a sentence instead of a singular term.59 One way to respond to 
this problem is to loosen our definition of 𝑤𝑓𝑓 so as to allow predicates to take arbitrary strings as 
arguments. Apart from being ad-hoc, this would overgenerate, since now a strings such as “𝑊(𝑊𝑠)” 
                                                     
59 Recall that “𝑞(𝑊𝑠)” is the abbreviation (§1.3.2) of an expression containing a predicate “𝑃𝑞(𝑊𝑠, 𝑥)”. But this 
last expression is an atomic formula that doesn’t fall under the base clause of the inductive definition in §1.3.3(C).  
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would also be a 𝑤𝑓𝑓. Another possibility is to add a clause in the definition of 𝑤𝑓𝑓 expressly for the 
operator 𝑞:  
(12) If 𝛼 is any string, then ˹𝑞(𝛼)˺ is a singular term.60  
This would give 𝑞 a special status, something like a logical operator. Maybe this is the right way to go 
about it, but it at least deserves some discussion. 
Similar problems arise at the level of semantics. Recall that by §1.3.4D (compositionality), the meaning 
of a complex expression has to depend on the meanings of the parts. Normally, then, we would expect 
for 𝑞 a clause in the form of: 
(13)  |˹𝑞(𝛼)˺|  = 𝑓(|˹𝛼˺|),  
for some function 𝑓 on meanings. But there is no function on the meaning of expressions which can do 
the work of quotation, as is evident from the fact that two different strings often have the same meaning. 
The semantic value of a quoted expression is not computed from the semantic value of the expression 
quoted, but from the expression itself:  
(14)  |˹𝑞(𝛼)˺|  =  ˹𝛼˺.  
This means that "𝑞" is not an extensional operator. But worse, it isn't any kind of intensional operator 
either. Like in the syntactic case, we would have to accommodate it expressly in our general semantic 
framework and give it the status of a logical operator.  
These departures from our usual definitions are perhaps bearable. A more difficult problem is that 
having 𝑞 on board would compromise the unambiguity of the language. Consider the 𝐿𝑞 expression: 
(15)  𝑞(𝑊) ⋅  𝑞(𝑠). 
The string (15) is given two different meanings by the semantics of 𝐿𝑞. We could use (14) to calculate 
the meaning of (15) if we knew what in (15) replaces "𝛼" in (14). But (15) has two readings: on the first 
we have one application of 𝑞 with 𝛼 = "𝑊) ⋅  𝑞(𝑠", and on the second we have the concatenation of 
two applications of 𝑞, one with 𝛼 =  "𝑊" and the other with 𝛼 =  "𝑠", together yielding the string 
“𝑊𝑠”. In general, the problem is that if we allow any string whatever within the scope of 𝑞, then the 
string signaling the end of that scope, namely ")", becomes ambiguous, obliterating the distinction 
between use and mention.61   
                                                     
60 Strictly: “if 𝛼 is any string and 𝑥 is a variable, then 𝑃𝑞(𝛼, 𝑥) is a 𝑤𝑓𝑓”.  
61  Using Polish notation would only make things worse, since it depends even more substantially on expectations 
about how the function’s argument will look like.  
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To sum up, proper quotation is not as innocent as one might assume from reading the literature on truth. 
Pending a responsible treatment, we shouldn't help ourselves to it. (I’ll continue to use quotation in the 
informal discussion.) 62 
 
2.2.3. Structural-descriptive naming 
The informal definition (C) of the canonical naming operator 𝑞 uses quotation names, for example in 
the clause: 
(16) The canonical name of snow is "𝑠"; the canonical name of “𝑠” is "𝑠"; etc. 
In view of the problems with quotation, we would like to see whether 𝑞 can be defined differently. In 
view of the naming regress, we can’t use single-phoneme names instead ((16) would be formalized as 
“𝑞(𝑠) = 𝑠 ∧ 𝑞(𝑠) = 𝑠 ∧ …”). The only way to avoid the regress is to reject its hypothesis that every 
phoneme is named by a single phoneme. The hypothesis follows from our practice of using a 
symbolized language in which every lexeme is a single phoneme (§1.3.2A). Rejecting it means that the 
lexicon will contain multi-phoneme strings: "for all", "snow", etc. Among these we can include multi-
phoneme names of single phonemes, for example “𝑒𝑠𝑠” for “𝑠”.  
Accordingly, let us define a language 𝐿𝑆𝐷, whose lexicon contains the name of a binary function "𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐" 
for concatenation, and names for all the phonemes: "𝑒𝑠𝑠" for "𝑠", "𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑦𝑜𝑜" for "𝑊", etc. Names of 
strings are had by concatenating names of phonemes, e.g. 
(17) |𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑦𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 𝑒𝑠𝑠|  =  "𝑊𝑠".63 
In this way 𝐿𝑆𝐷 will have names for all strings over its own alphabet without recourse to a special 
quotation operator. Among other strings it will have names for its own lexemes, and among the lexemes 
are the names of the phonemes: 
                                                     
62  These problems are raised in CTFL, §1. There is a swell of literature on the subject in the past two decades. 
See Saka (2013) for a good overview with references. A relatively early influential treatment is Davidson (1979) 
(it involves an appeal to demonstratives and to an unexplicated relation of 𝑥 being a token of 𝑦). The problem 
with this literature is that it is concerned with a different problem, that of accounting for various quotation 
phenomena in natural language. See, e.g., the introduction the collection Brendel, Meibauer and Steinbach (2011), 
as well as the opening chapters of Cappelen and Lepore (2007) for a glimpse of what this literature tries to 
accomplish.  
Boolos (1995) has a solution to the quotation problem for regimented languages, on which the form of the quote 
mark is determined according to the content of the quotation. His suggestion amounts to superscripting numerical 
indices to the parentheses of 𝑞, so that if 𝛼 is a string and 𝑛 is the greatest number such that 𝛼 contains ˹)𝑛˺, then 
𝛼 will be quoted using parentheses ˹(𝑚˺ and ˹)𝑚˺ with 𝑚 > 𝑛. This allows us to parse a string unambiguously in 
an effective way. But compositionality is thereby compromised, since now the meaning of an expression depends 
not just on the expression itself, but on an expression of which it is a part. 
63 When concatenating multi-phoneme lexemes I put a space between them. For uniformity, we can also think of 
the space existing between concatenated single phoneme lexemes.  
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(18) |𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 𝑒𝑠𝑠|  =  "𝑒𝑠𝑠". 
Compare: 
(19)  |𝑒𝑠𝑠|  =  “𝑠”, 
(20)  |𝑠| = 𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑤. 
It is easy to see that 𝐿𝑆𝐷 is adequate to express the phonology and the syntax of any language, including 
itself. We introduce abbreviations: 
(21) "𝑠" abbreviates "ess"; “ ⋅ ” abbreviates “𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐”; "∀" abbreviates “forall”, etc. 
(22)  Convention: “ ⋅ ” is omitted between underlined abbreviations. 
So that: 
(23)  |𝑠|  =  |𝑒𝑠𝑠|  =  “𝑠”, 
(24)  |𝑒𝑠𝑠|  =   |𝑒 ⋅ 𝑠 ⋅ 𝑠|  =  |𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 𝑒𝑠𝑠|  =   “𝑒𝑠𝑠”. 
The function 𝑞 of canonical naming can be explicitly defined in these terms. With these abbreviations 
𝐿𝑆𝐷 looks and feels like our usual symbolic languages, but under the hood it has a solid structural-
descriptive engine that takes care of phonological closure.64  
 
2.2.4. Conclusion 
If 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 are languages, let 𝐿1 ∪ 𝐿2 be the language whose ideology is their combined ideologies 
and whose ontology is the union of their ontologies. We wanted to find the syntactic closure of 𝐿𝑊𝑠, 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿𝑊𝑠). It can now be defined as 𝐿𝑊𝑠 ∪ 𝐿𝑆𝐷. Quite generally, for every language 𝐿, we have 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) = 𝐿 ∪ 𝐿𝑆𝐷. This concludes the task of this section.  
We also get some support for the phonological conception of language as against the intelligible 
conception (see §1.3.2). On the intelligible conception, language doesn’t include a phonological aspect. 
The motivation for this view is the fact that phonology is representationally inert and the claim that 
language is essentially representational. But if the reasoning of this section is sound, then in order to 
have syntactic closure we must make a detour through some representationally inert medium (numbers 
                                                     
64 The difference between this method and the more common method of arithmetization of syntax is that on this 
method we have direct reference to strings. To say of a string 𝑠 that it is a 𝑤𝑓𝑓 can be true in a simple sense. By 
contrast, the method of arithmetization relies on a correspondence between strings and numbers. This is 
unproblematic in proof-theoretic contexts, but less natural when dealing with semantics philosophically. See 
Quine (1940, ch.7) for a phonological approach.  
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or strings). Otherwise, because of the naming regress (B) we fall foul of the finitude constraint 
(§1.3.3B).65  
 
2.3. Refutation of the naïve conception 
The naïve conception, we said, requires that the language it is about be semantically closed. A language 
is semantically closed if it is syntactically closed and has its own truth predicate (a predicate that 
conforms to the naïve conception). We recently managed to define a syntactically closed language 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿𝑊𝑠). Let 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 extend 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿𝑊𝑠) with a predicate “𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)” which entails all disquotational 
T-sentences as in (A). 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 is semantically closed. We show it to be impossible. 
 
2.3.1. The liar paradox 
The problem is of course the semantic paradoxes. The informal version of the liar paradox ("this 
sentence is not true") is not reproducible within our regimentation scheme, but the paradox can be 
formulated using diagonalization in any semantically closed language.66 We’ll set up a general 
diagonalization schema for 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 and then apply it to get the paradox. First, we define a restricted 
substitution function:  
(25) 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦) = the result of substituting a string 𝑥 for the free occurrences of a variable 
“𝑥” in a string 𝑦. 67 
For example, 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑊𝑥, 𝑠) = 𝑊𝑠. This function is explicitly definable in strictly phonological terms, 
along the lines of Quine (1936).68 Now observe that the formula 𝛾 = 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑞(𝑥)) denotes the result 
of substituting a name of 𝑥 for the variable “𝑥” in 𝑥. In other words, if 𝛿 is a formula with “𝑥” free, then 
𝛾(𝛿) denotes the self-application of 𝛿.  For example, 𝑆𝑢𝑏 (𝑊𝑥, 𝑞(𝑊𝑥)) = 𝑊 ⋅ 𝑞(𝑊𝑥), which is a 
sentence which says that the string “𝑊𝑥” is white. 
                                                     
65  Compare Thomason (1975, p.127) and Richard (1986) who reach similar conclusions (Richard’s term 
“quotation” means structural-descriptive naming). See also 201D8-202C6 of Plato’s Theaetetus (Socrates’ dream) 
for something like the intelligible vs. the phonological conception of language.  
66 Gupta (1982) shows that a language can have names for all its sentences, and a truth predicate, and fail to 
produce the paradox. But his language is syntactically closed only in a degenerate sense: it has names for its 
sentences but no string manipulation resources, so it can’t express diagonalization. (See footnote 62.) 
67  The used variable “x” in the definition is unrelated to the mentioned variable “x”. 
68 I’ll give a sketch. Let 𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦) return the result of substituting 𝑥 for the final free occurrence of “𝑥” in 𝑦. 
Then the following is a recursive definition of 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦): 
a. 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑥      (𝑖𝑓 "𝑥" 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑦) 
b. 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝐹𝑠𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝑦)    (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒). 
This recursive definition satisfies the conditions stated in footnote 36 and can be transformed into an explicit 
definition. See Quine (1936) for (rather complicated) details.  
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Next let 𝜙(𝑥) be some 𝑤𝑓𝑓1 (unary formula) of 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚, with “𝑥” as free variable. Then  
(26)  𝜙(𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑞(𝑥))) 
means that the result of substituting a name of 𝑥 for “𝑥” in 𝑥 (i.e., 𝑥’s self-application) is 𝜙. For example, 
if we take 𝜙 to be “𝑊𝑥” again, then “𝑊(𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑞(𝑥))” is itself a unary predicate which says that the 
self-application of its argument is white. For an appropriate choice of 𝜙, (26) is an 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 formula. Since 
𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 is syntactically closed, there is a name for (26) in 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚. Let “𝑎(𝜙)” abbreviate that name. Now 
since (26) is a 𝑤𝑓𝑓1, we can apply it to itself, i.e. substitute “𝑎(𝜙)” for the variable in (26), to get: 
(27)  𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑎(𝜙), 𝑞(𝑎(𝜙))). 
For an appropriate choice of 𝜙, (27) denotes in 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 a string, of which we can then predicate 𝜙. This 
is the diagonalization of 𝜙: 
(28) 𝜙(𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑎(𝜙), 𝑞(𝑎(𝜙)))), 
for which we give an abbreviation in 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚: 
(29)  𝑑(𝜙) ↔ 𝜙(𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑎(𝜙), 𝑞(𝑎(𝜙)))). 
For an appropriate choice of 𝜙, the diagonalization in (28) has a name in 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚, which we abbreviate 
𝑞(𝑑(𝜙)). Note that (by the definitions above of 𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝑞(𝑑(𝜙))): 
(30)  𝑆𝑢𝑏(𝑎(𝜙), 𝑞(𝑎(𝜙))) = 𝑞(𝑑(𝜙)). 
Consequently (by (29) and substitution of identicals), we have:  
(31)  𝑑(𝜙) ↔ 𝜙(𝑞(𝑑(𝜙)). 
This is the well-known fixed-point or diagonal lemma. It is a lemma schema – we get one for every 
unary formula 𝜙.69  
 
To get the paradox, we take 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 formula “¬𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)” and put it for “𝜙” in (29) to get its 
diagonalization 𝑑(¬𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)). This is a sentence of 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 (the liar sentence). We show that this sentence 
is interderivable with its negation. For assume: 
                                                     
69 The essence of the diagonalization schema is of course Gödel’s procedure in (1931) for the case of provability. 
The generalization to a schema applicable to any predicate is in Carnap (1934, §35).  
I have relied on Sereny (2006) for my formulation. The proof that the diagonal schema does what I say it does is 
given in any competent logic text book (e.g. in Mendelson (1997, p. 203)). Notice that on my presentation we get 
a sentence that genuinely predicates 𝜙 of itself (of its string), and not just a sentence provably equivalent to the 
predication of 𝜙 of it.  
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(32)  𝑑(¬𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)). 
From (29) and (30), with substitution of identicals and equivalents, we have: 
(33)  ¬𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑞(𝑑(¬𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)))). 
By the disquotational T-schema (A), (33) yields: 
(34)  ¬𝑑(¬𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)). 
This completes one direction. For the other, see that (34), together with (29) and double negation 
elimination get us: 
(35)  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑞(𝑑(¬𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)))). 
And using the T-schema again we go from this back to (32). Therefore (32) and (34) are interderivable 
contradictories, which with the law of excluded middle lands us in outright contradiction.70   
⊠ 
 
The only premise used in these derivations beyond classical logic and facts about phonological closure 
was the T-sentence generated by the liar sentence. The availability of this T-sentence was a consequence 
of the assumption that the predicate “𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)” in 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 conformed to the naïve conception of truth. It 
follows that no predicate can conform to this conception; the requirement it puts on definitions of truth 
is inconsistent. This concludes the refutation of the naïve conception.71  
 
2.3.2. The significance of the paradox 
How should we interpret this result? The first thought is that the concept of truth turns out to be an 
incoherent concept. It seems to me that an incoherent concept is not strictly speaking a concept at all, 
except in name.72 This is because concepts are themselves the vehicles and building blocks of 
intelligibility and coherence. In order to say what an incoherent concept is, we would have to have a 
                                                     
70 We would get this result with a principle weaker than the T-schema, e.g. 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(˹𝜙˺) ⇔ 𝜙 (T-interderivability). 
Consequently, any predicate governed by a principle at least as strong as T-interderivability, for example a 
necessity predicate, would entail a contradiction when diagonalized in this way. For the necessity predicate this 
is essentially Montague’s (1963) result.  
71 Most purported solutions to the semantic paradoxes attempt to preserve the naïve conception at the cost of 
weakening classical logic so that the contradiction fails to follow logically from the assumptions. This has led to 
a wealth of insight about the nature of logic, but has not yet borne a satisfactory solution to the paradoxes. See 
Murzi and Carrara (2015) for a comprehensive survey of the effort of logical revision in the face of the semantic 
paradoxes, with a dismal (though tentative) conclusion about the prospects of this project.  
72 In the sense of Aristotle:"a dead man is a man only in name" (389b31-32).  
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theory of the constitution of concepts, of the way in which a concept is built up from more basic 
elements. Then we could show how some combinations of these elements fail to add up to a proper 
concept, and these combinations would be incoherent concepts.  
I don't know what the elements of concepts are. In this work I am abstaining from discussing concepts 
directly (see §1.1). My proxy for a concept is the definition, which I consider to be a declarative 
sentence, in other words a theory. To each concept there corresponds a theory, and the incoherence of 
a concept can be explicated by a property of its corresponding theory, namely inconsistency. Now it 
seems to me that, strictly speaking, an inconsistent theory is no more a theory than an incoherent concept 
is a concept, and for the corresponding reasons. A theory tells me something about the world, and an 
inconsistent theory tells me nothing. So in order to understand what an inconsistent theory is we need 
an account of the constitution of theories from more basic elements, which would show how some 
combinations of these elements do not successfully add up to a theory. 
As it happens, we have such an account. The elements of theories are sentences in a language, and 
inconsistency is defined as entailment of a contradiction, a sentence of the form ˹𝛼 ∧ ¬𝛼˺ for some 
sentence 𝛼. The fundamental notion that underlies theories and concepts is therefore that of language; 
and a language can express contradictions without thereby ceasing to be a language except in name. It 
is in terms of (sentences in a) language that we can explicate failed theories and concepts. The reasoning 
of the previous section shows that any theory that conforms to the naïve conception entails a 
contradictory sentence, and is therefore inconsistent. And this means that the naïve conception defines 
an incoherent concept.  
But the plot thickens. In §1.3.4E (truth-sufficiency) we assumed that a semantic theory for a language 
must be such as to entail a truth theory. If this is so, then the inconsistency of a truth predicate for 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 
implies the inconsistency of a semantic theory for it. This is the real consequence of the liar paradox. 
Unlike a mere contradictory sentence, which effectively destroys a theory that entails it but is 
unproblematic for the language in which it is expressed, a paradoxical sentence entails a contradiction 
in the semantic theory of that very language. A semantic theory for a language like 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚 is simply not 
possible. Semantically closed languages are inconsistent. Now if we accept the assumptions of §2.1.2 
concerning ordinary language, this means that ordinary language is inconsistent. This is how one usually 
interprets Tarski's result in §1 of CTFL.73  
Some thinkers have embraced this conclusion and advanced approaches that accommodate it or 
capitalize on it.74 The reasoning seems to be that, although we have strong intuitions about the semantic 
                                                     
73 E.g. in Soames (1999, p.49ff).  
74  Most notably Priest (1984). Eklund (2002), Patterson (2009), and Scharp (2013) also seem to offer an 
inconsistent language approach, but they think of language more in terms of a cognitive faculty. Their notion of 
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closure of ordinary language, we don't have any regarding its consistency. We should therefore learn to 
stop worrying and love the bomb. The insistence on consistency is a mere logician's hang-up that we 
are better off without: ordinary language is happily inconsistent.75 The problem with this strategy is that 
since (interpreted) languages are individuated by their semantics (see §1.3.4), a language for which no 
semantic theory can be given is not strictly speaking a language at all, except in name. An inconsistent 
language is not a language in which inconsistencies can be expressed, but a language which cannot 
consistently be given. A more precise way to express the upshot of the paradox is to say that 
semantically closed languages, and with them universal and ordinary languages, simply do not exist. 
This is, after all, what we end up saying about proper classes relative to 𝑍𝐹 set theory.76  
As a final remark, notice that this makes the concept of truth different from other concepts. Whereas in 
order to explain the failure of ordinary concepts we could rely on the notion of language, the failure of 
the concept of truth makes the very notion of language impossible. In this sense the concept of truth is 
more fundamental than other concepts, and its breakdown a graver predicament. This I take to be the 
main import of §1 of Tarski CTFL.77  
 
2.3.3. The generalization problem again 
It may be that we will find the precise tweak of logic that will solve the paradox. This is difficult for 
me to imagine, but it is hard, as the Danes say, to prophecy, especially about the future. Regardless of 
                                                     
language does not satisfy the truth-sufficiency requirement from §1.3.4E. As a response to the paradox, such an 
approach amounts to changing the subject. (The same cannot be said about Priest, at least not easily.) 
75 Priest (1984, p.128), quotes Wittgenstein (1953) to the effect that the classical logician lives in “superstitious 
fear and awe of contradiction”.  
76 This is more or less Herzberger’s point in (1966) and (1967). Priest (1984, p. 120), has a rejoinder with which 
I will not deal here.  
77  This is a good place to point out a wide-spread misreading of Tarski, which has been hinted at earlier. In the 
literature on truth and on Tarski one constantly encounters statements such as “Tarski said… that English is 
‘inconsistent’” (Patterson 2009, p.388; Heck 1997, 545fn), and variations thereon. At least in CTFL and in (1944) 
I have found no statement by Tarski to that effect. In CTFL he says that everyday language (or “colloquial 
language”, “Umgangssprache”, “język potoczny”) is inconsistent, but as I’ve claimed in §2.1.2, this should be 
understood as referring to unregimented discourse, not to such languages as English or Polish. In (1944) Tarski 
refines his position towards ordinary language, and in fact uses two terms: “everyday language” (e.g. p.349) and 
“natural language” (e.g. p. 347). Given Tarski’s well-known meticulousness with words, I assume that he is 
making a conceptual distinction corresponding to the terminological one, though it is admittedly a subtle one 
which he never elaborates. About natural language he says that it is the object of empirical research (p.365). 
Maybe this is what I called (§2.1.2) “world-languages”, like English (though see also footnote 51).  
Now in (1944), unlike in CTFL, there is no direct argument that either everyday language or natural language is 
inconsistent. In both cases the claim is that their structure is not exactly specified, and therefore that “the problem 
of [their] consistency has no exact meaning” (p.349). So I think we should be wary of attributing to Tarski the 
claim that, say, English is inconsistent. More likely, his position is that the question simply doesn’t arise for 
English. 
You may object that great advances have been made in recent decades in linguistic semantics (based on Tarski’s 
work) and that now an exact specification of the structure of natural language is at least conceivable. But nothing 
in these exact specifications (as implicit, e.g., in semantics textbooks such as Heim and Kratzer (1998)) hints that 
natural language is semantically closed. These themes are taken up again briefly in the Coda. 
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the paradox, there is a difference between thinking of the naïve conception as an adequacy criterion on 
definitions and, like the deflationists, thinking of it as a theory. On the deflationist or disquotationalists 
view of truth (see §2.1.3), the content of the concept of truth is exhausted by the collection of T-
sentences, or the theory that has it as an axiomatic basis, and the function of truth is to allow us indirect 
assertion, for example when certain sentences are unknown to us or if there are too many of them to 
assert directly. The collection of T-sentences is given by the T-schema: 
(36) 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(˹𝜙˺) ↔ 𝜙. 
This is not a formally correct way to give a collection of sentences. For example, if the language under 
discussion is 𝐿𝑊𝑠, then the expressions “𝜙” and “˹𝜙˺” are not part of it. They are place holders for 
sentences and sentence names, and we get a T-sentence by “inserting” a sentence and its name into the 
place-holders.  I scare-quoted “inserting” because we don’t actually do anything. If 𝑥 is a sentence, let 
𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥) denote its disquotational T-sentence. The insertion metaphor is just an intuitive way to say 
that we assert all of the instances that we would get if we would have inserted etc. A formally correct 
formulation of the collection of T-sentences would be a collective assertion of them. But this is, on the 
deflationist view, precisely the case for which we need the truth predicate to begin with. The real form 
of the T-schema would be something like this:  
(37)  ∀𝑥(𝑤𝑓𝑓0(𝑥) → 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥))) 
where 𝑥 ranges over expressions of 𝐿𝑠𝑒𝑚. But then the disquotationalist view of truth is circular. 
This is not just an unfortunate coincidence. We resorted to a schema because of the generalization 
problem (§2.1.1). if it was possible to define the schema using more innocent means, we would have 
resorted to those means instead. What the truth predicate provides is theoretical unity, the possibility to 
assert many sentences in one.  Although every T-sentence is expressible without a working truth-
predicate, expressing their totality requires a truth predicate. But there are other ways to get theoretical 
unity beside through a truth predicate. For consider the naïve conception of truth, not on its deflationist 
interpretation. If the naïve conception is understood, not as a theory, but as a criterion for the material 
adequacy of a truth definition, then we don’t need to assert every T-sentence in order to express it. It is 
enough to assert the relation of logical consequence between a (variable) definition and the set of T-
sentences. This is conditional theoretical unity and it relies, not on the concept of truth, but on the 
concept of logical consequence. We will see below (§4.2) that this makes a big difference.78  
  
                                                     
78 See Gupta (2011b) for a similar point.  
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3 Stratified Truth  
 
The naïve conception of truth is untenable because it implies commitment to the existence of 
semantically closed languages, and such languages do not exist. If we want to make progress in the 
elucidation of the concept of truth, we need to look for a characterization which preserves as much as 
possible of the content of the naïve conception, but which doesn’t presuppose semantic closure. We 
distinguish between the language 𝐿 for which truth is to be defined (the object-language) and the 
language 𝑀 in which the definition is formulated (the metalanguage). We assume nothing at the outset 
concerning their identity or non-identity. This is the characteristic feature of the stratified conception 
of truth.  
The central task of this chapter is to show that a definition of truth is possible on the stratified 
conception, and therefore that the stratified conception, unlike the naïve one, is a viable philosophical 
account of truth. In §2.1.2 the hope was expressed that the relativity of truth to language could be 
circumvented. The failure of the naïve conception belied that hope. Truth will have to be defined anew 
for every language. This makes it pressing to have a material adequacy criterion to replace the naïve 
conception. This criterion will be put forth in §3.1. §3.2 we will construct a formally correct definition 
of truth for our toy language 𝐿𝑊𝑠 from Chapter 2, and discuss the conditions for the possibility of such 
a definition. §3.3 will raise some problems for the stratified conception, the resolution of which will 
require the whole of Part Two.  
 
3.1. Convention T 
The undoing of the naïve conception was due to the commitment it implies to the existence of 
semantically closed languages. This commitment is engendered by the disquotational T-schema:  
(1) 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(˹𝜙˺) ↔ 𝜙. 
Since the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side (the object sentence) is required to be identical to 
the sentence used on the right-hand side (the truth condition), and since identical sentences belong to 
the same language (see §1.3.5), this forces the language of the truth predicate to be the same as the 
language of the object sentence. If we want to avoid this, we need to characterize T-sentences without 
requiring the identity of the object sentence with the truth condition. What suggested this requirement 
in the first place was the observation in §2.1.1 that a sentence expresses its own truth conditions. The 
observation is no doubt sound in itself, but in this case misleading, since a sentence 𝑠 is not the only 
sentence to express 𝑠’s truth conditions. What we need is to generalize (1) so that the truth condition 
does not have to be identical to the object sentence, just a synonym or a translation of it. The following 
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criterion, Tarski’s famous Convention T, generalizes the naïve conception by dropping the requirement 
of semantic closure:  
(A) Convention T: 
A definition of the predicate "𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)" in a language 𝑀 is an adequate truth definition for a 
language 𝐿 if it entails all instances of the translational T-schema: 
The Translational T-schema: 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝛼)  ↔  𝜙, 
where "𝛼" is replaced by the name of an 𝐿-sentence and "𝜙" by the translation of that sentence 
into 𝑀. 
 
Convention T is not yet a definition, but there are some conclusions about truth that we can draw already 
at this point. If 𝑀 defines a truth predicate for 𝐿 we say that 𝑀 mentions 𝐿, in symbols 𝑀 ≻  𝐿. Clearly 
for 𝑀 to mention 𝐿, 𝑀 must be able to express a T-sentence for every sentence of 𝐿. It must therefore 
contain a translation for every sentence of 𝐿. We then know the following: 
(B) Hierarchy in the abstract: 
(a) 𝐼𝑓 𝑀 ≻  𝐿 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑀 ≠  𝐿 (irreflexivity), 
(b) 𝐼𝑓 𝑀 ≻  𝐿 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐿 ⊁  𝑀 (asymmetry), 
(c) 𝐼𝑓 𝑀 ≻  𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀  ≻  𝑀 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑀  ≻  𝐿 (transitivity). 
Clause (a) can be proved by a reasoning parallel to that of the liar paradox in §2.3.1 (except that now 
there is no paradox, see below). Clause (c) follows from the fact that 𝑀 has a translation for every 𝑀 
sentence, and in particular for 𝑀's truth predicate for 𝐿. Clause (b) is a consequence of (a) and (c). 
Mentioning is thus a partial ordering. This is the (in)famous Tarskian hierarchy of metalanguages.  
Two immediate corollaries of (B) stand out:  
(B) Corollaries: 
(d) There is no semantically closed language, 
(e) There is no universal metalanguage. 
Clause (d) is the contrapositive of (a) above, and is known as Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem. It is 
important to see the difference between this result and the failure of semantic closure in the case of the 
naïve conception. The naïve conception of truth presupposes the semantic closure of the languages it 
discusses, in the sense that its very formulation doesn’t make sense for languages which are not 
semantically closed. That’s why the proof of a contradiction causes a total breakdown in the naïve truth 
concept. At the end of §2 we were left in aporia, with no way to talk about truth at all. In the parallel 
38 
 
case of (B)(a), the derivation of a contradiction serves merely to exclude the special limiting case in 
which 𝑀 = 𝐿. Convention T itself is still usable and, I think, correct. The paradox is not only defused, 
it is put to work.  
By a "universal metalanguage" 𝑈 in clause (e) I mean a language that mentions all languages. Assume 
such a language exists. Then it must mention itself, contrary to (d). Or we might say it is universal in a 
weaker sense, that it mentions all languages beside itself. But then, if 𝑈 exists, then there is a semantic 
theory for it, which will have to be formulated in a metalanguage 𝑈. Since mentioning is a partial 
ordering, this will engender a new hierarchy of languages that mention 𝑈, and 𝑈 can’t be said to be 
universal even in the weaker sense. Therefore there is no universal metalanguage. 
 
The results in (B) are said to be “in the abstract” because they follow from Convention T independently 
of any particular truth definition. Now if 𝑀 ≻ 𝐿, then this must be related somehow to the contents, the 
expressive powers (ideology and ontology), of the two languages. 𝑀 must have some kind of expressive 
advantage over 𝐿. This is what Tarski calls essential richness.79 But speaking abstractly we have no 
insight into the nature of this expressive advantage, and so have no way to interpret it philosophically. 
It is only once we have a particular definition in front of us that we can say what the stratification of 
truth consists in. Our task in what follows is to observe one way of defining truth (essentially Tarski’s) 
in order to see what expressive resources are involved. We can phrase this as a guiding question for this 
chapter: 
(C) Essential Richness Question: If 𝑀 ≻ 𝐿, what expressive advantage does 𝑀 have over 𝐿? 
 
3.2. Defining truth 
3.2.1. Expressing the T-sentences: a puzzle 
More fully phrased, (C) asks what expressive resources a metalanguage 𝑀 must possess in order to 
express a definition of truth for a language 𝐿 that conforms to Convention T. According to Convention 
T, a definition is adequate if it entails all of the T-sentences for 𝐿. First of all, then, 𝑀 must be able to 
express the T-sentences. A T-sentence contains nothing more than the name and the translation of its 
object sentence.  
Here we face a certain embarrassment. Truth is relevant for interpreted sentences, not for mere 
phonological strings. On our framework an interpreted sentence is a string together with the semantic 
theory for the language in which it is to be interpreted. But a semantic theory already entails a truth 
                                                     
79  Tarski (1944, §10).  
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theory for the language (§1.3.4E). If 𝑀 refers to 𝐿 sentences as interpreted, then by hypothesis we are 
already in possession of a truth predicate, and there is no need to define anything. In case of a truth-
conditional semantic theory, interpretation is defined in terms of truth, and we have a flat-out circularity, 
or a diallele (See §1.3.4). Tarski is in the same predicament: in his informal discussion he stresses that 
truth applies to interpreted sentences (CTFL, p. 166), and he relies on the notion of translation in his 
formulation of Convention T (as I have above), but he leaves these notions unexplicated. It was 
Davidson's insight in (1967), and less explicitly, Montague's (1970),80 that the dependence of Tarskian 
truth on interpretation can be turned on its head: if truth is taken as primitive then the definition can be 
used to elucidate meaning. However, we can’t define truth in terms of interpretation and vice versa at 
the same time.  
Our procedure will be the following. We do not suppose that a semantic theory for 𝐿 is already present 
in 𝑀. Instead, we let the intended truth predicate in 𝑀 apply to uninterpreted sentence strings. For these 
strings we construct a single definition, which appeals neither to truth nor to meaning, and which will 
serve at the same time both as a definition of truth and an interpretation. In this way truth and meaning 
grow together like two flowers on a single stem, or, if you prefer a different figure, are like the duck 
and the rabbit of the ambiguous image. If you dislike figures altogether, wait until §7.5, where the issue 
of the diallele will receive a happy solution in straight terms.  
 
With this much in the way of alleviating remarks, let us resume the thread of investigation. 𝑀, we said, 
must be able to express the T-sentences, and a T-sentence contains nothing more than the name and the 
translation of its object sentence. 𝑀 must therefore be able to name all sentence strings and to express 
translations of all 𝐿 sentences. The first requirement is taken care of if we let 𝑀 have full phonological 
structural-descriptive naming capacities, i.e. to include 𝐿𝑆𝐷 (see §2.2.4). In order for 𝑀 to have 
translations of all 𝐿 sentences, 𝑀’s ontology must match or exceed 𝐿’s ontology (i.e. 𝐷𝐿 ⊆ 𝐷𝑀), and 
𝑀’s ideology must match or exceed 𝐿’s ideology (i.e. for every predicate of 𝐿 there is a formula of 𝑀 
with the same extension). In short, in order to express every T-sentence for 𝐿, a language 𝑀 must (a) 
include phonology and (b) match or exceed 𝐿 in expressive power.  
We have already encountered a language that fulfills these conditions: the syntactic closure 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) 
(§2.2.4). We can easily see that 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) does not only fulfill these conditions for 𝐿, but also for itself. 
However, if these conditions sufficed for defining truth, then 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) would be semantically closed, 
which is impossible. Therefore, it is not sufficient, in order to define truth for 𝐿, to contain phonology 
and to match 𝐿 in expressive power. We are faced with the following puzzle. On the one hand: 
                                                     
80 But already present in Dummett (1959). See also Etchemendy (1988, §1.2).  
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(a) For 𝑀 to adequately define truth for 𝐿, it is necessary and sufficient that it express a 
sentence that entails every T-sentence for 𝐿. (by Convention T) 
On the other:  
(b) For 𝑀 to adequately define truth for 𝐿, it is (necessary but) not sufficient that it express 
every T-sentence for 𝐿. (since 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) is not semantically closed) 
 
The difference between the sufficient condition stated in (a) and the insufficient condition stated in (b) 
is that (a) requires there to be a definition, a single sentence from which all T-sentences follow. It is one 
thing to be able to express every sentence of a collection individually; quite another to express the whole 
collection in a single sentence. The T-sentences for 𝐿 exhaust, in a sense, the content of the concept of 
truth for 𝐿. But something more is needed in order to unify that content into a single concept. That extra 
something, which above in §2.3.3 we called theoretical unity, is what systematically eludes a language 
with regard to its own truth predicate. Our guiding question for this section can be refined accordingly: 
(C’) Essential Richness Question (refined): If 𝑀 ≻ 𝐿, what expressive advantage does 𝑀 
have over 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿)? 
 
3.2.2. The inductive definition 
If we had finitely many T-sentences, we would be able to conjoin them into a single sentence which 
would entail each of them. But there are as many T-sentences as sentences of 𝐿, which is to say infinitely 
many, and there are no infinite conjunctions.81 The problem of truth turns out to be another one of the 
problems with the idea of the infinite. It will be instructive to take a look at how concepts that apply to 
the most basic of infinite systems, the system of natural numbers, are handled formally. The relevant 
devices are those of an inductive definition, a recursive definition, and a proof by induction. I’ll sketch 
some trivial examples with numbers to serve as a roadmap for the case of truth. 
The natural numbers are defined inductively: 
(2) Inductive definition of number:  
(a) Zero is a number        (base clause), 
(b) For all 𝑥, if 𝑥 is a number, then 𝑥's successor is a number   (step clause), 
(c) Nothing else is a number       (extremal clause).  
                                                     
81 More precisely, we would need a definition of the form “𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥) ↔ (𝑥 = ˹𝜙˺ ∧ 𝜙) ∨ (𝑥 = ˹𝜓˺ ∧ 𝜓) ∨ …. See 
CTFL p.188.  
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We assume that zero and successor are previously understood, and written "0" and “𝑠(𝑛)”, respectively. 
The idea behind such a definition is that we start with zero as root and generate the numbers successively 
and indefinitely using the successor function. The successor function is understood to produce different 
successors for different numbers, and zero is understood to succeed no number. The extremal clause 
limits the numbers to the objects that were generated through this procedure.  
A recursive definition of a numerical concept 𝑃 states the conditions for applying 𝑃 to an arbitrary 
number 𝑛 in terms of the generation sequence that leads from 0 to 𝑛; more precisely, in terms of a 
condition on the predecessor of 𝑛, or directly in the case of 0. The operator of addition, for example, or 
the relation of being a sum, is defined recursively as follows: 
(3) Recursive definition of addition: 
(a) 𝑥 + 0 = 𝑥        (base clause) 
(b) 𝑥 + 𝑠(𝑦) = 𝑠(𝑥 + 𝑦)      (step clause) 
Put into a single sentence, this definition becomes:  
(4) 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑧 ↔ (𝑦 = 0 ∧ 𝑥 = 𝑧) ∨ ∃𝑣(𝑦 = 𝑠(𝑣) ∧ 𝑧 = 𝑠(𝑥 + 𝑣)). 
Of course, some concepts are definable explicitly on the basis of concepts defined recursively, for 
example:  
(5) 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛(𝑥) ↔ ∃𝑦(𝑦 + 𝑦 = 𝑥). 
Such concepts are still to be considered recursive. Inductive and recursive definitions justify proofs by 
induction. In this way assertions about infinite collections can be proved using finite means. For 
example, we can prove that the definition (5) has the following desired consequence: 
(6) ∀𝑥(𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛(𝑥) ↔ ¬𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛(𝑠(𝑥))). 
 
This is the model according to which we will define truth. The inductive basis, parallel to (2) above, is 
the collection of strings (see §1.3.1). Truth is a concept that applies to sentence strings. The sentences 
were defined explicitly, in analogy with (5) above, in terms of the concept of 𝑤𝑓𝑓, which was defined 
recursively like (3) above. In the same way we will define truth, the semantic concept for sentences, 
explicitly in terms of the semantic concept for 𝑤𝑓𝑓s, satisfaction. The relation of satisfaction will be 
defined recursively. This will allow us to derive T-sentences for all 𝐿 sentences, in analogy with (6). 
What is satisfaction? Intuitively, a 𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑛 (a formula with 𝑛 free variables) 𝛼 expresses a relation 𝑅𝛼 
which holds (or fails to hold) between 𝑛 objects, as assigned to "roles" or "places" in the relation. The 
free variables 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 in the formula represent the roles. Satisfaction is then a relation that holds or 
fails to hold between a 𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑛 and an assignment (mapping) of objects to the variables 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛. An 
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assignment 𝜎 satisfies a 𝑤𝑓𝑓 𝛼  if and only if the objects assigned to the roles designated by the variables 
stand in the relation 𝑅𝛼. I will sometimes speak as if it is the objects (or sequences of them), and not 
the mappings, that satisfy formulas. Where 𝛼 is a 𝑤𝑓𝑓1, 𝑅𝛼 is not strictly speaking a relation but a 
unary concept. Then I will say that it is the object (assigned to the free variable) that satisfies or fails to 
satisfy the formula. If 𝛼 is a 𝑤𝑓𝑓0, a sentence, then again 𝑅𝛼 is not properly speaking a relation. In this 
case it makes no sense to speak of satisfaction. However, for uniformity, we will say that it is either 
satisfied by all or by no variable assignments. 
We will formally define the binary predicate 𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑥, 𝜎) for the language 𝐿𝑊𝑠, where 𝑥 is a formula and 
𝜎 an assignment function. For readability I use lowercase Greek letters “𝜎” and “𝜏” for variables that 
range over assignment functions, but they are to be read as standard first-order variables. We let the 
metalanguage 𝑀 possess structural-descriptive resources and homophonic translations of 𝐿𝑊𝑠’s non-
logical vocabulary. Thus "𝑠" in 𝑀 refers to snow, and "𝑊" denotes whiteness, just like in 𝐿. We need 
some auxiliary notions (in 𝑀): 
(7) 𝜎(𝑥)  = the object that assignment 𝜎 assigns to variable 𝑥. We decree that 𝜎(𝑠) = 𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑤, for 
any 𝜎. 
(8) 𝜎𝑥→𝑦 = the assignment that is like 𝜎 except (maybe) in assigning 𝑦 to the variable 𝑥, 
(9) 𝑆𝑇(𝑥) if and only if 𝑥 is a variable or 𝑥 = "s" (𝑥 is a singular term). 
(10) 𝐷𝐿(𝑥) if and only if 𝑥 is in the domain of 𝐿. 
 
The base clause of the recursive definition gives satisfaction conditions for atomic formulas. In 𝐿𝑊𝑠 we 
have two predicates: the logical ˹𝛼 = 𝛽˺ and the non-logical ˹𝑊𝛼˺; and two classes of singular terms: 
variables and "𝑠". Correspondingly, we have two base clauses:  
(D) Recursive definition of satisfaction (base clauses) 
(a) 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒=(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∃𝑧(𝑆𝑇(𝑧) ∧ (𝑥 = 𝑊 ⋅ 𝑧 ∧ 𝑊(𝜎(𝑧)))), 
(b) 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑊(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝑆𝑇(𝑧) ∧ 𝑆𝑇(𝑤) ∧ (𝑥 = 𝑧 ⋅=⋅ 𝑤 ∧ 𝜎(𝑧) = 𝜎(𝑤))). 
The step clauses correspond to the two ways of composing formulas: truth-functional connection (𝜙 ↓
𝜓) and quantification (∀𝛼𝜙): 
 (D) Recursive definition of satisfaction (step clauses) 
(c) 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝↓(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∃𝑧, 𝑤(𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑧) ∧ 𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑤) ∧ 𝑥 = 𝑧 ⋅↓⋅ 𝑤 ∧ (𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑧, 𝜎) ↓ 𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑤, 𝜎))), 
(d) 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝∀(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∃𝑧, 𝑤(𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑧) ∧ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑤) ∧ 𝑥 = ∀ ⋅ 𝑤 ⋅ 𝑧 ∧ ∀𝑣(𝐷
𝐿(𝑣) → 𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑧, 𝜎𝑤→𝑣))). 
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Given a formula 𝑥 and a variable assignment 𝜎, we can calculate whether 𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑥, 𝜎) by going backwards 
through 𝑥’s construction tree up to the atomic formulas. Seeing the four clauses as individually 
sufficient and disjointly necessary, we can put the recursive definition in the form of a proper definition: 
(D’) Recursive definition of satisfaction (full) 
(e) 𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒=(𝑥, 𝜎) ∨ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑊(𝑥, 𝜎) ∨ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝↓(𝑥, 𝜎) ∨ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝∀(𝑥, 𝜎). 
The disjunction in this definition is exclusive. It is a phonological fact that (for any assignment 𝜎) a 
string 𝑥 can fall under at most one of the disjuncts.82 Defining truth for sentences is now straightforward:  
(E) Definition of truth for 𝑳𝑾𝒔 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥) ↔ 𝑤𝑓𝑓0(𝑥) ∧ ∀𝜎(𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑥, 𝜎)). 
 
From this definition all T-sentences follow. Let’s demonstrate for the object sentence “∃𝑥1∃𝑥2(𝑊𝑥1 ∧
¬(𝑥1 = 𝑥2))" (“there exist two things, one of which is white”). The following sentences are all 
equivalent:  
(a) 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(∃𝑥1∃𝑥2(𝑊𝑥1 ∧ ¬(𝑥1 = 𝑥2)))  
(b) ∀𝜎(𝑠𝑎𝑡(∃𝑥1∃𝑥2(𝑊𝑥1 ∧ ¬(𝑥1 = 𝑥2))), 𝜎))     by (E) 
(c) ∀𝜎∃𝑧(𝐷𝐿(𝑧) ∧  𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝜎1→𝑧, ∃𝑥2(𝑊𝑥1 ∧ ¬(𝑥1 = 𝑥2)))   by (D)(d) 
(d) ∀𝜎∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝐷𝐿(𝑧) ∧ 𝐷𝐿(𝑤) ∧  𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝜎1→𝑧,2→𝑤, 𝑊𝑥1 ∧ ¬(𝑥1 = 𝑥2))) by (D)(d) 
(e) ∀𝜎∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝐷𝐿(𝑧) ∧ 𝐷𝐿(𝑤) ∧  𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝜎1→𝑧,2→𝑤, 𝑊𝑥1) ∧ ¬𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝜎
1→𝑧,2→𝑤 , ¬(𝑥1 = 𝑥2))) 
        by (D)(c) 
(f) ∀𝜎∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝐷𝐿(𝑧) ∧ 𝐷𝐿(𝑤) ∧ 𝑊𝑧 ∧ ¬(𝑧 =  𝑤))   by (D)(a),(b) 
(g) ∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝐷𝐿(𝑧) ∧ 𝐷𝐿(𝑤) ∧ 𝑊𝑧 ∧ ¬(𝑧 =  𝑤))   since ∀𝜎 is vacuous 
Therefore, we have derived: 
(11)  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 (∃𝑥1∃𝑥2(𝑊𝑥1 ∧ ¬𝑥1 = 𝑥2)) ↔ ∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝐷
𝐿(𝑧) ∧  𝐷𝐿(𝑤) ∧ 𝑊𝑧 ∧ ¬(𝑧 =  𝑤)) 
⊠ 
 
Inspect it to see that it is really the T-sentence generated by our object sentence. The sentence on the 
right-hand side of the biconditional in (11) is an (almost homophonic) translation of the sentence 
mentioned on the left-hand side (it is not completely homophonic because of the domain restriction). 
                                                     
82 This fact is crucial for deriving the T-sentences.  
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By induction we can show that for every 𝐿 sentence the appropriate T-sentence can be derived. The 
inductive definition seems therefore to conform to Convention T.  
 
3.2.3. A clue  
If (E) is a materially adequate truth definition for 𝐿 in 𝑀, then we should be able to answer the essential 
richness question (C): what expressive resources, beyond the ontology and ideology of 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿), are 
required for the definition of truth for 𝐿? By inspection of definitions (D) and (E) we find that the only 
item not in 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) is the ontology of variable assignments. On the face of it this seems to constitute 
a genuine advantage in expressive power. Variable assignments are mappings from the countable set of 
variables to the domain 𝐷𝐿. The cardinality of the collection of assignments is therefore |𝐷𝐿|ℵ0 , which 
is often greater than the cardinality of 𝐷𝐿. For example, if 𝐷𝐿 is denumerable, then the collection of 
assignments will have the size of the continuum. This is a significant difference, and suggests a concrete 
answer to (C): the advantage of 𝑀 over 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) that allows it to define truth is the ontology of variable 
assignments.  
This answer is wrong. The assignment functions I used in the definition of satisfaction were had the 
entire infinite set of variables as their domain, but only a finite number of variables occurs in every 
formula. It is possible to define satisfaction, a little less elegantly perhaps, with finite variable 
assignments or finite sequences of objects.83 Unlike the set of all total variable assignments, the set of 
finite sequences over 𝐷𝐿 is of the same size as 𝐷𝐿 if 𝐷𝐿 is infinite, and can be coded in it. Since a 
syntactically closed language will always have an infinite domain (since it contains phonology), it will 
always be possible to code finite sequences in it. There is therefore nothing in the recursive definition 
of satisfaction that requires more expressive resources than those present in 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿). We are back at 
the puzzle of §3.2.1: what, in addition to the expressive resources of 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿) is required for defining 
truth for 𝐿?  
The answer lies in the fact that inductive and recursive definitions are not, strictly speaking, definitions 
at all. An inductive definition works by generating the items one by one, and a recursive definition 
works by tracing the items up their generation history. But this talk of generation and of tracing up a 
history is no more than metaphor.84 On our framework a definition is a statement of application 
conditions, a statement that appeals to concepts, objects, their interaction in the form of predication, 
and the logical composition of judgments using connectives and quantifiers. Temporal or causal notions 
such as “tracing up a generation history” are not part of it. If we do formulate a recursive definition in 
the grammatical form of a statement of application conditions (as we did for addition in (4) and for 
                                                     
83 See CTFL, p. 195fn; also Popper (1955).  
84 See §1.3.1, footnote 21 for genetic inductive definitions.  
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satisfaction in (D)(e)), then this statement does not constitute a formally correct definition, since the 
step clauses contain the definiendum and thus render the definition circular. On the one hand, the 
temporal metaphor that accompanies an inductive or a recursive definition does not meet our standards 
of clear and explicit discourse, making the definition formally incorrect. On the other hand, since the 
resources used in the inductive definition of truth don’t exceed those of 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿), and since we know 
that truth can’t be defined in 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐶(𝐿), the temporal metaphor is doing some work. We can’t just get 
rid of it. It neither discloses nor conceals the answer to our essential richness question; it gives us a sign.  
 
3.2.4. The explicit definition 
What we need is to convert the materially adequate but formally incorrect recursive definition into an 
explicit definition. In §1.3.3 (footnote 36) I mentioned a method by Quine to transform recursive 
definitions into explicit ones under certain conditions. The condition is that we can represent the 
metaphorical generation sequence in a (finite) string. Unfortunately, although we could apply this 
method to the syntactic concept 𝑤𝑓𝑓, it won’t work for the corresponding semantic concept of 
satisfaction. The reason is that whether an assignment function 𝜎 satisfies a universal formula ˹∀𝑥𝜙˺ 
depends on whether 𝜎𝑥→𝑎 satisfies ˹𝜙˺ for every 𝑎 ∈ 𝐷𝐿, and 𝐷𝐿 might be infinite. If we wanted to 
represent the “construction sequence” in a string, in the general case the string would have to be infinite, 
which is impossible. There is, however, another strategy for converting inductive or recursive 
definitions into explicit ones. This is the strategy suggested by Frege’s attempt to redeem the concept 
of number from the constructive metaphor of inductive definition, and it is the one used by Tarski in 
CTFL (though he doesn’t spell out the details). First, the idea is to view the base and step clause of the 
inductive definition of number in (2), not as describing a construction procedure, but as a statement to 
the effect that the concept of number includes zero and is closed under successor: 
(12) 𝑁0 ∧ ∀𝑥(𝑁𝑥 → 𝑁𝑠(𝑥)). 
This is read as a statement about the concept 𝑁, expressing what we can call its closure property. The 
next step is to identify 𝑁 with this property. By generalizing over 𝑁 we make the closure property a 
condition on concepts. We then define 𝑁 as the conjunction of all of these concepts. Formally:  
(13)  𝑁𝑥 ↔ ∀𝐹(𝐹0 ∧ ∀𝑦(𝐹𝑦 →  𝐹𝑠(𝑦)) → 𝐹𝑥). 
In words: an object falls under the concept of number if and only if it falls under every concept that has 
the closure property, i.e. includes zero and closed under successor.  
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We can apply this general strategy to recursive definitions,85 for example to the case of addition ((3) 
above). For readability, let’s first put forth the following abbreviations: 
(14) 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒+(𝑅) ↔ ∀𝑣𝑅(𝑣, 0, 𝑣), 
(15) 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝+(𝑅) ↔ ∀𝑣∀𝑢∀𝑤 (𝑅(𝑣, 𝑢, 𝑤) → ∃𝑡(𝑡 = 𝑠(𝑤) ∧ 𝑅(𝑣, 𝑠(𝑢), 𝑡))). 
The explicit definition of addition is then: 
(16) 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑧 ↔ ∀𝑅(𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒+(𝑅) ∧ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝+(𝑅) → 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)).
86 
Explicit definitions defined in terms of recursive definitions (e.g., (5)) can stay as they are, except that 
we need to remember that they now implicitly involve quantification over predicate position. 
Definitions such as (13) and (16) clearly allow for proofs by induction.  
 
We apply this procedure to the case of satisfaction. The idea is the same: transform the recursion clauses 
into a closure condition on relations, this time between variable assignments and formulas. The closure 
clauses are simple transformations of the induction clauses: 
(17) Second-order closure clauses for satisfaction concepts: 
(a) 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑊
2 (𝑅) ↔ ∀𝑥∀𝜎(∃𝑧(𝑆𝑇(𝑧) ∧ (𝑥 = 𝑊 ⋅ 𝑧 ∧ 𝑊(𝜎(𝑧)))) → 𝑅(𝑥, 𝜎)), 
(b) 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒=
2(𝑅) ↔ ∀𝑥∀𝜎(∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝑆𝑇(𝑧) ∧ 𝑆𝑇(𝑤) ∧ (𝑥 = 𝑧 ⋅=⋅ 𝑤) ∧ (𝜎(𝑧) = 𝜎(𝑤))) → 𝑅(𝑥, 𝜎)), 
(c) 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝↓
2(𝑅) ↔ ∀𝑥∀𝜎(∃𝑧∃𝑤(𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑧) ∧ 𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑤) ∧ (𝑥 = 𝑧 ⋅↓⋅ 𝑤) ∧ (𝑅(𝑧, 𝜎) ↓ 𝑅(𝑤, 𝜎))) →
𝑅(𝑥, 𝜎)), 
(d) 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝∀
2(𝑅) ↔ ∀𝑥∀𝜎(∃𝑧∃𝑤 (𝑤𝑓𝑓(𝑧) ∧ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑤) ∧ (𝑥 = ∀ ⋅ 𝑤 ⋅ 𝑧) ∧ ∀𝑣(𝐷𝐿(𝑣) →
𝑅(𝑧, 𝜎𝑤→𝑣))) → 𝑅(𝑥, 𝜎)). 
The explicit definition is, as in the case of addition, a conjunction of all concepts that fulfill the closure 
conditions: 
(18) Explicit definition of satisfaction (second order): 
𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∀𝑅(𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒=
2(𝑅) ∧ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑊
2 (𝑅) ∧ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝↓
2(𝑅) ∧ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝∀
2(𝑅) → 𝑅(𝑥, 𝜎)). 
 
This definition is second-order, and as such not yet formally correct according to our regimentation 
scheme. We can improve on it by observing how it avoids the circularity of the recursive definition 
                                                     
85 For the case of numbers and strings I don’t think we should, see §1.3.1.  
86 Compare the formally incorrect (4). 
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(D)(e). That definition was circular since the definiendum 𝑠𝑎𝑡 appeared in the definiens, in the step 
clauses. In (18) we replace the definiens in the definiendum with a variable over relations, and quantify 
over it. In order for this definition to succeed, concepts have to be quantified over, i.e. they have to be 
objects in the second-order domain. 87 
But, importantly, in order for a definition of truth for 𝐿 to succeed, 𝑀 doesn’t have to have all of its 
concepts as objects. We can get a formally correct definition, and in addition a more fine-grained 
understanding of what is required for a truth definition, by letting the extensions of the necessary 
concepts in the first-order domain of 𝑀. We need to revise the closure clauses in an obvious way: in 
(17) we change the second-order variable “𝑅” into a first-order variable “𝑟”, and the predications 
˹𝑅(𝑥, 𝜎)˺ into set-membership statements ˹〈𝑥, 𝜎〉 ∈ 𝑟˺. This makes (18) into a first-order definition :  
(F) Explicit definition of satisfaction (first-order): 
𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∀𝑟(𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒=
1(𝑟) ∧ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑊
1 (𝑟) ∧ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝↓
1(𝑟) ∧ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝∀
1(𝑟) → 〈𝑥, 𝜎〉 ∈ 𝑟). 
 
The derivation of the T-sentences from this definition is similar to the derivation from the recursive 
definition, and a proof by induction that all T-sentences are derivable goes through in the same way. 
The definition of truth in (E) can be kept if we understand the satisfaction predicate it employs to be 
defined as here. We therefore have a formally correct and materially adequate definition of truth for 
𝐿𝑊𝑠. 
 
3.2.5. Some remarks 
The central task of this chapter, and of Part One, has been achieved: we have provided a formally correct 
and materially adequate definition of truth. The definition applied only to a particular language 𝐿𝑊𝑠, 
but it is clear how to apply it to other languages. I close this section with some comments.  
With respect to the central question of this section, concerning the expressive resources necessary for 
defining truth, the first-order definition (F) has several advantages over the second-order one (18).88 
According to the second-order definition, in order to define truth a metalanguage has to have variables 
of a higher-order than the object-language. Essential richness is here a question of logic. This makes it 
incompatible with a first-order regimentation scheme, and in fact with any regimentation scheme of 
                                                     
87 This is due to the fact that 𝐿 is first-order, and therefore that variable assignments are also first-order objects. If 
𝐿 had been second-order, 𝑀 would have to be third-order, etc.  
88 Tarski’s own definition in the main text of CTFL is higher-order. In the postscript from 1936 he expresses a 
preference for first-order definitions. See Schiemer and Reck (2013) for a historical account of the general shift 
from type-theoretic to model-theoretic logic.  
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bounded order. By contrast, the first-order definition cashes essential richness out in ontological terms. 
The metalanguage is a language of logically the same kind as 𝐿, but it needs to have more objects in its 
domain (objects of a higher order). We can stay with a simple regimentation scheme that recognizes 
only concepts and objects.  
The second advantage is that we can give a more fine-grained answer to the question of which new 
objects need to be countenanced. The domain of a second-order variable usually includes all sets over 
the first-order domain, or at least some natural collection of such sets, for example the definable sets. 
On the first-order definition we see that there is a single object which needs to be in the domain of 𝑀 
in order for the definition of truth to succeed: the extension of the satisfaction relation, |𝑠𝑎𝑡|. If |𝑠𝑎𝑡| ∈
𝐷𝑀, then (and only then) the definition will yield the correct result. This fact is of philosophical 
significance. In §1.3.4 we identified a language with the extension of its satisfaction relation. The 
necessary and sufficient condition, then, for 𝑀 to be able to express a truth definition for 𝐿 according 
to the first-order definition, is that 𝐿 be an object in the domain of 𝑀. The term object-language, on this 
way of defining truth, takes on a literal sense.  
 
Another issue that bothered us was the interdependence of truth and meaning, the diallele. In §3.2.1, in 
order to sidestep this problem, we decided try to give a definition that relies neither on the concept of 
truth nor on the interpretation of sentences. This definition was then to be used both for truth and for 
interpretation. For the case of truth, it was shown that our definition is successful. It remains to show 
that it will work also as a semantic theory. We put forth two styles of meaning theory: truth-conditional 
and model-theoretic (see §1.3.4). The definition of satisfaction is of itself already a definition of truth-
conditional semantics. Defining model-theoretic semantics is also straightforward, but requires more 
ontology. In general, we define the semantic value of a predicate to be the set of things that satisfy it: 
(19) |𝜙|  =  𝑦 ↔  (𝑥)(𝑥 ∈  𝑦 ↔  𝑠𝑎𝑡(˹𝜙𝑥˺, 𝑥)).89 
The added ontological assumption is that such a set exists in 𝐷𝑀. For every concept definable in 𝐿 we 
need to have a set in 𝐷𝑀. In other words, the requirement that model-theoretic semantics puts on the 
ontology of a metalanguage is greater than the minimal one of having 𝐿 as an object in 𝐷𝑀. It is that 
every formula in 𝐿 be an object in 𝑀. In other words, that 𝑀’s ontology contain 𝐿’s ideology. 
 
                                                     
89 Here I speak as though it is objects and not assignment functions that stand in satisfaction relations with 
formulas. This definition is straightforwardly generalizable to 𝑛-ary predicates.  
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In the literature on truth after Tarski explicit definitions are often not required, or nor emphasized. 
Sometimes an axiomatic approach is adopted and sometimes recursive or inductive definitions are put 
forward without discussion of their nature or formal correctness. Maybe the motivation is a hope to 
thereby avoid stratification. But in §3.1 we saw that stratification of languages is forced upon us even 
before we contemplate a particular style of definition. Axiomatic treatments therefore neither avoid 
stratification nor explain it. By following through Tarski’s own procedure of defining truth explicitly, 
we can go beyond the conclusions derived abstractly from Convention T, that the languages constitute 
a partial ordering. The explicit definition tells us precisely what the ordering consists in: mentioning a 
language means referring to it. The impossibility of semantic closure then becomes a case of the more 
general assumption of the well-foundedness of collections.  
One might feel uneasy with my quick dismissal of inductive and recursive definitions as metaphors or 
heuristics in the service of explicit definitions.90 After all, inductive definitions are very commonly used 
and certainly enjoy a firm set-theoretic grounding.91 But it is important to recognize that on the set-
theoretic accounts, inductive definitions are strictly speaking not definitions, but intuitive ways to 
present certain relations between sets that are defined explicitly: usually the set defined by the base 
clause of an inductive definition and the sets defined by the iterated application of some operation or 
set-theoretic function on the base set, until a fixed-point is reached. These operations should not be 
understood as actions (except metaphorically) any more than we say that, say, the union operation is an 
action. Kripke (1975) exploits the temporal metaphor of the inductive definition in order to align his 
definition of truth with some intuitions. But at the end of the day, his definition too is conceived as an 
explicit definition in a strictly stronger metalanguage.  
 
3.3. Tarski’s revenge paradox 
The post-Tarskian literature on the liar paradox is plagued by the phenomenon of revenge paradoxes. 
The typical plot is this: a new kind of language 𝐿 is defined so as to express a predicate “𝑇(𝑥)” which 
holds of all and only the true sentences of 𝐿. The liar paradox is avoided by weakening the logic in 𝐿, 
at least for certain “pathological” cases. The liar sentence is declared to be one of those cases, and the 
inference to contradiction fails. 𝐿, it seems, pace Tarski, is semantically closed. However, it is then 
shown that a paradoxical sentence can be formulated using the terms of the solution. This is the revenge 
paradox. Or, according to an alternative analysis, the problem is that the predicate “𝑇(𝑥)” only 
approximates the truth predicate for 𝐿. For example, on theories which block the inference to 
contradiction by rejecting bivalence the predicate “𝑇(𝑥)” is defined so as to have the same extension as 
                                                     
90 See the footnotes on pp.175f, 177, 180, 182 in CTFL for comments on this issue.  
91 E.g. Moschovakis (1975), Aczel (1975). 
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the truth predicate for 𝐿. However, if bivalence is rejected, then the extension of a predicate is not 
enough. In order to faithfully express truth for 𝐿, “𝑇(𝑥)” would have to share both the extension and 
the anti-extension of truth for 𝐿, and this it cannot consistently do. If defined precisely, the proper truth 
predicate for the object-language on such solutions will generally be defined in a richer metalanguage, 
leaving us with “the ghost of” stratification.92  
The lesson we should draw from the revenge phenomenon is that in order to assess a proposed account 
it is important to examine the actual definitions and the language they’re given in, and not so much the 
behavior of the defined predicate if it is expressed in a different language. Not every theorist provides 
a clear statement of the metalanguage, so it is not always easy to assess a solution.93 One gets the feeling, 
however, that the second lesson to draw from the revenge phenomenon is that stratification is 
unavoidable. It might therefore come as a surprise, a quite disturbing one, to find out that accepting 
stratification doesn’t grant immunity from revenge; for the stratified conception too faces a number of 
serious difficulties, one of which is an instance of the revenge problem. This is disturbing because then 
there is no other conception to fall back on.94 I will close Part One with a brief presentation of what I 
take to be the most serious problems. Part Two will be devoted to their solution.  
 
The first problem with the stratified account is that it doesn’t do what it set out to do. Our task was to 
provide an analysis of the concept of truth, and we stipulated that concept analysis takes the form of a 
definition of a truth predicate (see §1.1). In a sense, we have succeeded too much: we asked for one 
definition and were presented with a swarm of them. For each object-language-metalanguage pair a 
different definition is required. The impossibility of semantic closure and of a universal metalanguage 
makes it the case that this multiplicity and relativity to language cannot be reduced. In the absence of 
an account of why all of these definitions are definitions of the same concept, we can’t say we have a 
philosophical analysis of the concept of truth. As Putnam complains, it seems that while Tarski’s 
definitions give us the extension of the concept of truth, they don’t capture its sense, i.e. the intuitive 
notion of truth.95 This is therefore one problem facing a stratified account, which I will refer to as the 
unity problem: what unifies the various definitions into a single concept? 
The unity problem seems to have an easy answer, to which Putnam’s complaint points the way. Putnam 
wants the sense of the concept of truth. I don’t know what senses of concepts are, but one popular way 
                                                     
92 This sketch is inspired especially by Kripke (1975), but it applies to many other theories as well. See Beall 
(2007a) for various approaches to the revenge phenomenon and Beall’s introductory essay for an overview.  
93 See Leitgeb’s critique of Field’s solution in Beall (2007).  
94 Except perhaps Priest’s, with which I won’t engage in this work.  
95 Putnam (1985, p. 64). Tarski himself presents his project as a search for a philosophical analysis of truth, see 
e.g. (1944, p. 341). 
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to think of the senses of predicates is as functions from circumstances of evaluation (possible worlds, 
times, etc.) to their extensions. These functions are called intensions, and they may be said to provide 
the unity of a predicate that has different extensions in different circumstances. For example, the 
extension of “president” at a time not so long ago has Obama as a member up, but it doesn’t anymore. 
Yet it is the same predicate then and now. What defines it is therefore not its extension but its intension, 
the function that maps 2016 to a collection that includes Obama and 2017 to a collection that excludes 
him. Similarly, although on the stratified conception there is a different definition of truth for every 
language (and metalanguage), what makes them all into definitions of truth is their conformity to 
Convention T. This suggests that we think of Convention T as, in some sense, the intension of the 
concept of truth, and of the different languages as so many circumstances of evaluation. Convention T 
is the unifying element. This is the intensional reply to the unity objection.  
This leads us to the second problem of the stratified conception. One of our central negative results is 
the impossibility of a universal metalanguage, a language that mentions all other languages. But then 
which language is Convention T formulated in, and the other results that applied across the board such 
as the indefinability theorem itself? This is the effability problem. It is a generalization of the revenge 
paradox, and it effectively undermines the intensional reply to the unity objection.96  
Finally, we have the following classical problem. If the semantics of a language is given in its 
metalanguage, and the semantics of the metalanguage in a metametalanguage, etc., then we are never 
in a position to say what the interpretation of a language really is. Since without giving its interpretation 
we can’t be said to have given a language, the upshot is that no language can ever be given. This is the 
regress problem.  
I consider these problems to be of great importance. Their solution, correspondingly, will require drastic 
measures.  
 
 
 
  
                                                     
96 See e.g. Black (1948, p.59), Priest (1984), McGee (1991, p.81) for statements of the effability problem. The 
tradition of the revenge paradox (or strengthened liar) actually begins with the attack on stratified theories, in 
particular Russellian type-theory, as early as Ushenko (1937). See Bennet (1967) for a review of an exchange in 
1950s regarding Ushenko’s paradox. (See also Rozeboom (1958) and the discussion culminating in Drange 
(1969).)  
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PART TWO 
CHARACTERIZING TRUTH 
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Let me recapitulate briefly the dialectic of Part One. Our main task is to analyze the concept of truth, 
where an analysis was stipulated (§1.1) to take the form of a definition in a precisely defined, i.e. 
regimented, first-order language. Sentences in regimented languages were also chosen to play the role 
of truth-bearers, in virtue of the fact that they are defined precisely and in unproblematic terms (§1.2, 
§1.3). Our first candidate analysis was the naïve conception of truth (§2): 
 The naïve conception: the concept of truth entails all disquotational T-sentences.  
This analysis had the virtue of eliminating the relativity of truth to language by being consistent with 
the thesis that there is a single language in which everything can be expressed: 
The strong effability thesis: there is a language such that anything expressible is expressible 
in it.97 
However, the naïve conception was shown to be untenable, and the strong effability principle false, by 
the liar paradox. Following Tarski, we replaced the naïve conception with a stratified version thereof, 
called Convention T: 
Convention T: A definition in a language 𝑀 is an adequate truth definition for a language 𝐿 if 
it entails all translational T-sentences. 
That Convention T is a tenable condition on definitions was shown in §3 by giving a definition of truth 
that conformed to it. However, it had some negative results, like the refutation of the strong effability 
thesis. It was shown (§3.1) that a universal metalanguage 𝑈 would be incoherent, and that the languages 
were ordered in an unbounded hierarchy. The effability principle can be replaced with a weaker version:  
The weak effability thesis: Anything expressible is expressible in some language or other.  
This is, in broad outline, the stratified conception of truth as we find it in Tarski. But then, it was pointed 
out, the stratified conception does not fulfill the task that was set out for it, which was to find a single 
definition of the concept of truth. This was the unity objection. It was replied that, although the stratified 
conception is committed to an irreducible plurality of truth definitions, they all have to conform to the 
same Convention T. We can therefore think of Convention T as the intension of truth, and of the various 
definitions as its extensions. To this reply another objection was raised, to the effect that Convention T, 
if it is to apply to all definitions for all languages, would have to be formulated in the impossible 
universal metalanguage 𝑈. This was the effability objection.  
Part Two will develop a solution to the effability objection by showing that Convention T can be 
formulated, with general applicability, in a language which is not the universal metalanguage 𝑈. In 
                                                     
97 In §2.1.2 we called this “the universality thesis”.  
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Chapter 4 we will formalize Convention T into a single first-order sentence. This will reveal its logical 
form and the expressive resources required for its formulation or, what comes to the same thing, its 
language. We will show that this language consists of the language of phonology 𝐿𝑆𝐷 (from §2.2) plus 
something more. That extra something, however, cannot be regimented in our standard regimentation 
scheme. Chapter 5 is a digression into the domain of pragmatics, and in particular into indexical theory, 
in search of the missing expressive resource, which I will call abstract reference or abstract generality. 
Chapter 6 will adapt this resource to our own framework and will provide a fully explicit formulation 
of Convention T. The concluding chapter 7 will spell out our solution to the effability objection and the 
unity objection, as well as a revision in how we understand concept analysis. Solutions to some other 
problems will also be given there.  
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4 The Language of Convention T 
 
4.1. The logical form of Convention T 
Our procedure will be to formalize Convention T according to first-order syntax and to ask what the 
(minimal) language is in which it can be formulated. I will refer to this language as 𝑍. For convenience, 
let’s repeat Convention T here: 
(A) Convention T (informal): 
A formally correct definition of the predicate "𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)" in 𝑀 is an adequate truth definition 
for 𝐿 if it entails all instances of the translational T-schema: 
(The translational T-schema): 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝛼)  ↔  𝜑, 
where "𝛼" is replaced by the name of an 𝐿-sentence and "𝜑" by the translation of that sentence 
into 𝑀. 
 
4.1.1 The main connective 
Superficially, Convention T looks like a conditional: 
A formally correct definition of the predicate "𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)" in 𝑀 is an adequate truth definition 
for 𝐿 if … 
Its general form is therefore:  
(1) 𝜙 → 𝜓. 
Here the logical consequent 𝜓 (which comes first in the English formulation) is a predication of a 
general term (“adequate truth definition for 𝐿”) on a general term (“a formally correct definition”). 
Frege habituated us to regiment this form as a quantified conditional: 
(2) ∀𝑑(𝜌(𝑑) →  𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑)). 98 
𝐴𝑇𝐷 is short for “adequate truth definition” and 𝜌 will be replaced by a definition of “formally correct 
definition of 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥)”. The variable 𝑑 ranges over definitions, which are strings. So we know the first 
thing about 𝑍: its ontology includes the domain of strings, i.e. phonology. I use the letter 𝑑 for the 
                                                     
98 I use Greek letters for the parts I haven’t regimented yet and Latin ones for (sometimes abbreviated) strings in 
the language 𝑍. 
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variable in order to separate it from the other variables I will use (𝑑 is for “definition”). The antecedent 
𝜙 of the main conditional (1) is: 
… it entails all of the instances of the translational T-schema…  
The pronoun “it” refers back to “a formally correct definition”, i.e. to 𝑑 of (2). Of it a complex condition 
is predicated, for which we use the letter 𝜎. The overall logical form of Convention T is therefore this: 
(3) ∀𝑑(𝜌(𝑑) ∧ 𝜎(𝑑) → 𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑)). 
This reading makes Convention T a statement of a sufficient condition for the adequacy of a truth 
definition. It is obviously also meant as a necessary condition.99 Hence, formally, Convention T is a 
biconditional, having the form of a definition of material adequacy: 
Convention T (Step 1): 
∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔  𝜌(𝑑) ∧ 𝜎(𝑑)). 
 
What is missing from this formulation is the generality over languages. On our regimentation scheme 
generality is expressed by quantifiers. Treating “𝐿” and “𝑀” as variables over languages, we get: 
(4) ∀𝐿∀𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝐿, 𝑀) ↔  𝜌(𝑑) ∧ 𝜎(𝑑, 𝐿, 𝑀)). 
However, I will suppress the language variables for the time being.  
 
4.1.2 Formal correctness 
A formally correct definition of 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥) (in a language 𝑀) is a sentence of the form ˹∀𝑥(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑥) ↔
𝜏)˺, where 𝜏 is replaced by the definiens, a formula of 𝑀 with at most “𝑥” as a free variable and not 
containing the definiendum. This is easily defined as a condition on strings which we abbreviate as 
“𝐷𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑥)”. This implies that apart from phonological ontology, 𝑍 must have phonological ideology, 
i.e. structural-descriptive naming resources (§2.3).  
                                                     
99  See Patterson (2006) for an argument against the necessity reading of Convention T. As a counterexample 
Patterson has in mind definitions of truth of the form “𝑥 is true if and only if 𝑥 corresponds to a fact that obtains” 
(p. 28), which don’t entail the T-sentences but, he would say, are materially adequate. Patterson has to give a 
satisfactory theory of facts before his definition can be considered formally correct.  
Gupta (2011c) argues that conforming to Convention T is not a necessary condition for the extensional adequacy 
of a truth definition (nor for its intensional adequacy, nor for what he calls “sense” adequacy). He seems to 
conclude that this implies that it is not necessary for the material adequacy of a truth definition. But this is too 
quick. The point of Convention T is to give a criterion of adequacy, i.e. a decidable test. Extensional adequacy is 
not decidable (unless we already possess the concept of truth, and then we don’t need a definition). The fact that 
Convention T is weaker than an extensional adequacy criterion is to be expected, and desired. Convention T 
allows us to assess a truth definition in the terms of the metalanguage.  
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Another feature of formal correctness is logical consistency. A sentence is consistent if and only if it 
logically entails no contradictory sentence. The relation of first-order logical entailment is not only 
well-defined, but has a complete deductive system, from which it follows that we can define entailment 
in purely phonological terms. The relation of logical entailment will be abbreviated, as a binary relation 
between (uninterpreted) strings, as follows: 
(5)  𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) ↔ 𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑦. 100 
Let “𝐹” abbreviate the name of some logically false sentence (take “∃𝑥(𝑥 ≠ 𝑥)”), then consistency can 
be defined as follows: 
(6) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑥) ↔ ¬𝐸(𝑥, 𝐹). 
The definition of “formally correct definition”, or 𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓 is then:  
(7) 𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑥) ↔ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑥) ∧ 𝐷𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑥). 
It should be noted that this definition of formal correctness doesn’t ensure consistency, since it doesn’t, 
in fact, ensure the absence of circularity. What it ensures is that the definiendum not occur in the 
definiens, and that the string itself, as uninterpreted, not entail a contradiction. A circularity or a 
contradiction could still come about via interpretation, for example if one of the terms in the definiens 
is itself defined in terms of the definiendum, or if the domain contains an object that is somehow linked 
to the definiendum (e.g., as its extension). It is important therefore to think of the definiendum as a 
completely uninterpreted string to begin with.  
 
The definition of formal correctness yields the following partial regimentation: 
Convention T (Step 2): 
(𝑑)(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔  (𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑑) ∧ 𝜎(𝑑))). 
 
4.1.3 The T-schema 
The informal condition encapsulated in 𝜎 reads:  
[the definition] entails all instances of the translational T-schema: 
                                                     
100 See Goodman and Quine (1947), p. 120. Maybe you’re worried that completeness is established in model-
theory, so it might not be general enough for our concerns. For example, the completeness result doesn’t 
meaningfully apply to the model theoretic proof procedure itself, but surely a philosophical account of truth should 
apply to that as well. I defer to Kreisel (1967) on this point.  
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(the translational T-schema): 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝛼)  ↔  𝜑, 
where "𝛼" is replaced by the name of an 𝐿-sentence and "𝜑" by the translation of that sentence 
into 𝑀. 
 
Since the T-schema is so central, I’ll digress in order to get a firmer handle on schemata in general. 
Schemata are used in several key places in and around mathematical logic. The most important 
(alongside in Convention T) are in stating first order axiomatizations of fundamental formal theories, 
namely logic, arithmetic, and set-theory. Let’s say that a theory is a deductively closed collection of 
sentences. By deductively closed I mean, as usual, a collection 𝑇 such that if a sentence 𝑥 is the logical 
consequence of some conjunction of sentences in 𝑇, then 𝑥 is in 𝑇. A subcollection 𝐴 of 𝑇, such that 
every member of 𝑇 is a logical consequence of 𝐴, is called a basis for 𝑇. If a basis can be given 
finitistically (i.e., in a single sentence), I call it an axiomatization of 𝑇. If it can be given finitistically in 
the language of 𝑇, it is a finite axiomatization. 
Let’s look at the arithmetical case. The straightforward way to regiment the standard Peano-Dedekind 
axiomatization is in a second-order arithmetical language 𝐿𝑃𝐴
2 . The axiom that calls for a second-order 
language is the induction axiom: 
(8) ∀𝐹(𝐹0 ∧ ∀𝑥(𝐹𝑥 → 𝐹𝑠(𝑥)) → ∀𝑥𝐹𝑥). 
There is a way to approximate this axiom in a first-order language 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1  without predicate variables. It 
consists in taking as axiom every instance of the induction axiom schema: 
(9) 𝜙0 ∧ ∀𝑥(𝜙𝑛 → 𝜙𝑠(𝑥)) → ∀𝑥(𝜙𝑥), 
where an instance is had by replacing “𝜙” (along with its argument) with a unary formula of the 
language (applied to the argument). The class of sentences arrived at in this way is a basis for a first-
order theory of arithmetic which we can call 𝑃𝐴. This is not a finite axiomatization, since (9) is not a 
sentence in 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1 . Although 𝑃𝐴 consists only of 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1  sentences, it is not given in 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1 . In order to see 
which language it can be given in, we have to express it in a formally correct first-order sentence. Let 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑥) map a unary formula of 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1  to the instance of (9) that it generates (this is easy to define in 
phonological terms). In order to assert all of these instances we use the concept of truth (in its capacity 
as a device of indirect assertion, see §2.1.3):  
(10) ∀𝑥(𝑤𝑓𝑓1(𝑥) → 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑥))). 
In words, for every unary formula 𝑥, the instance of the induction schema generated by 𝑥 is true. This 
is precisely what we do when we use the schema (9). In this sentence the quantifier ranges over strings, 
not numbers, and a truth predicate for 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1  is used. (10) is therefore given in a metalanguage for 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1 . 
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Though every sentence of 𝑃𝐴 is in 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1 , the theoretical unity of 𝑃𝐴 is provided by the concept of truth, 
which cannot be expressed in 𝐿𝑃𝐴
1 .101 
One uses a schematic first-order theory instead of a second-order theory when one wants to avoid the 
ontological commitment that a second-order theory makes to a domain of concepts.102 Instead of 
quantifying over concepts, in (10) we quantify over strings. This is just what we want for the language 
𝑍 which needs on the one hand to apply to all languages, but on the other hand cannot have all languages 
in its domain. If we can formulate Convention T with quantifiers that range only over the phonology of 
languages, without taking in their semantics, then 𝑍 would be just 𝐿𝑆𝐷 (from §2.2.4), the language of 
phonology and structural-descriptive naming. It would apply to all languages since all languages have 
a phonological aspect. As we will see, 𝑍 will have to contain something more.  
  
We go back to Convention T. After the previous step of regimentation, we had the following form:  
(11) ∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔  (𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑑) ∧ 𝜎(𝑑))). 
The letter “𝜎” stands for the condition expressed by the translational T-schema: 
(12)  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(𝛼)  ↔  𝜑, 
where "𝛼" is to be replaced by the name of an 𝐿-sentence and "𝜙" by the translation of that sentence 
into 𝑀. We unpack the T-schema in the same way that we did the induction axiom schema. First, we 
introduce an abbreviation: 
(13)  𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑙(𝑥) = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(⋅ 𝑥 ⋅) ↔⋅  𝑡𝑙(𝑥).
103 
This function maps a string to the T-sentence that it generates using the translation function 𝑡𝑙. This 
translation function will be scrutinized in the next section. In order to mark its existence, I mention it in 
the subscript adjoined to the abbreviation.  
In the case of the arithmetical induction axiom schema what we wanted is to assert all of its instances. 
For this we needed a truth predicate, which meant that the theory had to be given in a metalanguage. If 
it were the case that a truth predicate is needed also in the case of the T-schema, then Convention T 
would have to be in a truth-defining metalanguage for the metalanguage 𝑀, and since it applies to any 
𝑀, that would make it the universal metalanguage. Fortunately, the T-sentences are not asserted in 
                                                     
101 See §2.3.3 for a brief discussion of theoretical unity. The first-order theory is, of course, weaker than the 
second-order one, for reasons related to the need for higher-order quantification in giving an explicit definition of 
number (see §3.2.4).  
102 See §3.2.5 for discussion. 
103 I will use corner quotes when mixing use and mention. This is less precise and more readable than the 
machinery used in §2. In this chapter there is less reason to be precise and more reason to be readable.  
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Convention T. What is asserted (conditionally) is the fact that they follow logically from the proposed 
definition. We can call this hypothetical theoretical unity, and it doesn’t require a truth predicate, just a 
relation of logical entailment, which can be defined in phonological terms.104  
Here is a full formalization of Convention T, making use of the schematic apparatus with hypothetical 
theoretical unity: 
(B) Convention T, fully formalized:  
∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔  (𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑑) ∧ ∀𝑥(𝑤𝑓𝑓0(𝑥) → 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑙(𝑥))))). 
In words: A string 𝑑 is an adequate truth definition if and only if it is a formally correct consistent 
definition, and for every sentence 𝑥, 𝑑 entails the T-sentence generated by 𝑥 using the translation 
function 𝑡𝑙.  
Everything in the definiens, except for the translation function 𝑡𝑙, is definable in phonological terms. 
For readability, we can encapsulate it in a single abbreviation 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑙(𝑑). More readably, 
Convention T becomes:  
(14)   ∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔  𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑙(𝑑)). 
 
4.2. Translation 
It should not come as a surprise that translation is the problematic term in Convention T, since it is the 
only notion that makes an appeal to the semantic content of the languages in question. This appeal to 
content is not reducible to phonological notions, so it is the main obstacle to a formulation of 
Convention T. The first suspect is the translation function 𝑡𝑙.  
 
4.2.1. Translation and interpretation 
Distinguish between translation and interpretation. Informally, translation can be seen as a relation 
between two languages, interpretation as a relation between a language and the world. Formally we can 
conceive of a translation as a (partial) function 𝑓 on expressions. If 𝑥 and 𝑓(𝑥) are of the same syntactic 
category, we say that 𝑓 is syntactically conservative; if 𝑓 is syntactically conservative and defined only 
over sentences, we say it is holophrastic; and if 𝑓 is holophrastic and preserves logical entailment 
                                                     
104 Gupta (2002, p. 57) rightly notes that strictly speaking, the definition as we’ve given it in in §3.2.4 will not 
logically entail the T-sentences, but only the definition along with some phonological theory (this was noted in 
§3.2.2, p.52). Gupta, a little surprisingly, goes on to suggest that the notion of implication in play in Convention 
T “plainly cannot be that of logical implication”. Maybe it’s better to read “cannot be that of plain logical 
implication”.  
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relations (if 𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦) then 𝐸(𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑦))), we say it is coherent. The notion of coherence can also be 
defined for non-holophrastic translations. If two translation functions 𝑓 and 𝑓′ are such that for every 
sentence 𝑠, 𝑓(𝑠) and 𝑓′(𝑠) are logically equivalent, we say that 𝑓 and 𝑓′ are equivalent translations. 
This is clearly an equivalence relation, and my discussion in what follows should be qualified as up to 
equivalence. Translations are mappings on strings, and the concepts of coherent and equivalent 
translations are definable in phonological terms. We can safely allow 𝑍 to include such mappings in the 
domain, without risk of being able to define truth generally. The domain of 𝑍 is thus a second-order 
phonological domain.  
In contrast with translation, the interpretation of a language is not merely phonological. For instance, 
the interpretation of the English name “Jerusalem” is a certain stone-clad city in the Middle East, and 
the interpretation of a sentence, e.g. “Jerusalem is in turmoil” is, or at least should somehow contain, 
its truth conditions. In any case a statement of the interpretation of a sentence is, or at least should 
somehow entail, a statement of its truth conditions. The interpretation of a language 𝐿 is therefore, for 
our purposes, nothing more nor less than a semantic theory for 𝐿. Interpretation, unlike translation, is 
not a merely phonological notion. To get an intuition of this, observe that a translation function 𝑓 from 
German to Polish may tell us that 𝑓(“𝐷𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑖ß”) =  “ś𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑔 𝑗𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑎ł𝑦”, but by itself it 
will not tell us under what conditions either sentence is true, namely, if and only if snow is white. By 
contrast if, being acquainted with snow and its color, I can’t tell whether “śnieg jest biały” is true or 
not, then I am not in possession of an interpretation of it. 
Alongside this essential difference between the notions, translation and interpretation are also connected 
at the navel. A truth-conditional semantic theory for a language 𝐿 is nothing but a truth definition in its 
metalanguage 𝑀.105 Let 𝑑 be such a definition. Then we say that the translation function 𝑓𝑑 induced by 
𝑑 is the function that maps each 𝐿 sentence 𝑠 into the alphabetically first sentence in 𝑀 that gives the 
truth conditions of 𝑠 according to 𝑑 (stands on the right-hand side of a T-sentence generated by 𝑠): 
(15)  𝑓𝑑(𝑥) =  𝜄1𝑦. ∃𝑧(𝑧 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(⋅ 𝑥 ⋅) ↔⋅ 𝑦 ∧ 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑧)), 
where ˹𝜄1𝑦. 𝜙˺ means ˹the alphabetically first 𝑦 such that 𝜙˺. Conversely, under the right conditions, for 
a translation function 𝑓 we say that 𝑑𝑓 is the truth definition induced by 𝑓.
106 The relation between 
interpretation and translation is related to the one between use and mention: 𝑓(𝑠), as used, expresses in 
𝑀 the interpretation of 𝑠; as mentioned, it is the translation of 𝑠 into 𝑀. 
                                                     
105 See §3.2.5. More precisely it is a satisfaction definition. Using a truth definition introduces some (Quinean) 
indeterminacy which I will not elaborate on.  
106 Here we need to look at non-holophrastic (but still coherent) translations. The base clause of 𝑑𝑓 is determined 
by 𝑓’s translations of the atomic formulas, and the domain restriction by 𝑓’s translation of a quantified atomic 
formula.  
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4.2.2. Correct translation 
The formulation of Convention T we ended up with included the symbol “𝑡𝑙” as an unanalyzed 
primitive. Since this is our troublemaker, we are called on to analyze it. We make it into a variable 𝑓 
ranging over string mappings, and modify accordingly the places in Convention T in which it occurred 
(see (13)):  
(16)   𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑓) = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒(⋅ 𝑥 ⋅) ↔⋅ 𝑓(𝑥), 
Convention T now reads:  
(17)  ∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔  𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓)). 
The variable 𝑓 needs to be bound in order for this to be a well-formed sentence, but It is not enough to 
simply insert a quantifier somewhere. For example, adding an initial universal quantifier yields an 
obviously wrong result:  
(18)  ∀𝑑∀𝑓(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔  𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓)). 
On this formulation no restriction is put on 𝑓, so any (coherent) translation will yield an adequate truth 
definition. For example, it is easy to construct a coherent mapping that takes, say, “der Himmel ist blau” 
to “snow is white”. But then by (18), there will be a materially adequate truth definition that entails: 
 “der Himmel ist blau” is true if and only if snow is white, 
which is wrong. Nor is there any other position in (17) in which we can put a quantifier over 𝑓 (not 
even if we unpack the biconditional). The source of the problem is not hard to find: it is not the 
unadorned notion of translation that does the job in Convention T, but the notion of correct or adequate 
translation. So let us introduce a predicate 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓), holding of string mappings if they embody an 
adequate translation. The correct modification of Convention T is then:  
(19)  ∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑) ↔ ∃𝑓(𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓) ∧ 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓))). 
In words: a truth definition is adequate if it stands in the appropriate phonological relation (𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑) 
to some correct translation function.  
 
It is senseless to speak of a correct or adequate translation between uninterpreted strings, so there is no 
option but to reintroduce the quantifiers over languages that I have been thus far suppressing. A 
translation is not correct or incorrect in itself, but only as a translation between a particular interpreted 
language and another. 𝐴𝑇𝐹 is not a unary predicate over mappings, but a ternary relation between a 
mapping, a source language and a destination language. The full Convention T becomes: 
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(C) Convention T: 
∀𝐿∀𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝐿, 𝑀) ↔ ∃𝑓(𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓) ∧ 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, 𝐿, 𝑀))). 
In words: a string is an adequate truth definition for 𝐿 in 𝑀 if and only if it stands in the phonological 
relation 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 to an adequate translation from 𝐿 into 𝑀.  
The only non-phonological concept here is 𝐴𝑇𝐹. The question is whether 𝐴𝑇𝐹 forces us to assign to 𝑍 
universal expressive resources if we want Convention T to apply across the board. This, in fact, seems 
to be the case. A straightforward analysis of 𝐴𝑇𝐹 will look like this:  
(20)  𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, 𝐿1, 𝐿2) ↔ (𝑥)(|𝑥|
𝐿1 = |𝑓(𝑥)|𝐿2), 
where ˹|𝑥|𝐿˺ is the interpretation function for a language 𝐿. Although translation is a merely formal 
notion, correct translation depends on the notion of interpretation. And since our variables 𝐿 and 𝑀 
need to range over all languages, 𝑍 becomes the impossible universal metalanguage. 
We might try to find a different definition of 𝐴𝑇𝐹, one that doesn’t rely on a full semantic theory of its 
arguments,107 but it is important to recognize that the problem does not really lie with the appeal to 
interpretation that 𝐴𝑇𝐹 presumably makes. 𝐴𝑇𝐹 only points the way. The real problem is more 
fundamental: it is the fact that, to begin with, 𝑍’s domain must include all interpreted languages. This 
is obvious since the very same string can be adequate as a truth definition for one language, but 
inadequate for another language, even when the languages have the same (uninterpreted) lexicon. It is 
a feature of the standard semantics of modern quantification that the truth of a quantified statements is 
understood in terms of the truth of their instances. Therefore, if 𝑍 is to apply generally, it must have all 
languages in its domain, making it a universal metalanguage. By Modus Tollens, 𝑍’s generality cannot 
be that of standard quantification. This shows that there is no way to express Convention T in a standard 
first-order language. We have to seek a departure from our standard regimentation scheme.  
 
4.2.3. Further reductions 
We can improve the situation by reducing the number of variables over interpreted languages in 
Convention T from two to one. The last formulation of Convention T that we arrived at was: 
 Convention T: 
 ∀𝐿∀𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝐿, 𝑀) ↔ ∃𝑓(𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓) ∧ 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, 𝐿, 𝑀))). 
                                                     
107 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓) relies only on synonymy between 𝑥 and 𝑓(𝑥), and synonymy is, arguably, weaker than the full 
interpretation of 𝑥 and 𝑓(𝑥).   
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What does it mean to quantify over interpreted languages? On standard regimentation, this means that 
all languages are distinct objects in the domain of the quantifying language. But what kind of objects 
are they? In §1.3.4 and §3.2.5 we identified a language 𝐿 with its interpretation function, or with the 
extension of its satisfaction predicate. Referring to all languages means having all of these functions or 
extensions in the domain. But this is not the only way to refer to languages. We have mentioned already 
that the interpretation of a language is identifiable with a truth or satisfaction predicate for it, or, on the 
model-theoretic approach, with something a little stronger; in any case, the interpretation of a language 
is given by a single sentence in the metalanguage.108  We can therefore identify a language 𝐿 with its 
truth definition 𝑑, which is just a string. In this case I write 𝐿 = ℒ𝑑. Of course, the string 𝑑, if 
uninterpreted, defines nothing; rather, we need to take 𝑑 as interpreted in an appropriate metalanguage. 
If 𝑀 is 𝐿’s metalanguage, we write 𝐿 = ℒ𝑑
𝑀 for the language defined by the string 𝑑 when interpreted 
as a sentence of a language 𝑀. I call this way of referring to languages mediated notation, since it refers 
to an object by referring to a representation of it. The mediated language name ℒ𝑑
𝑀 contains unmediated 
reference to the metalanguage 𝑀. If 𝑑 is the definition of 𝑀 in a metametalanguage 𝑀, then we can 
dispose of this, and write: 𝐿 = ℒ𝑑
𝑀 = ℒ𝑑
ℒ
𝑑
𝑀
. The unmediated reference to 𝑀 could be eliminated in th 
same way, but it becomes clear that can never achieve purely mediated notation for languages. These 
towers of mediated notations represent segments of the language hierarchy. The fact that no purely 
mediated notation is possible is simply the regress problem, exhibited phonologically (see §3.3).  
Because of the regress problem, we cannot get rid of all variables over languages. But we can get rid of 
all of them but one. There are two ways to do this. In the first, we replace the variable 𝐿 by a term in 
mediated notation, based on the variable over strings 𝑑: 
(21)  ∀𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, ℒ𝑑
𝑀 , 𝑀) ↔ ∃𝑓(𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓) ∧ 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, ℒ𝑑
𝑀 , 𝑀))). 
We can make this even simpler by considering, for a definition 𝑑, its induced translation function 𝑓𝑑. 
By the definition in (15), in conjunction with the characterization of ℒ𝑑
𝑀, 𝑓𝑑 will automatically be an 
adequate translation function from ℒ𝑑
𝑀 into 𝑀. So (21) is equivalent to:  
(22)  ∀𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, ℒ𝑑
𝑀 , 𝑀) ↔ 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓𝑑)). 
Moreover, from the definition of 𝑓𝑑 it follows that 𝑑 will entail all T-sentences that have 𝑓𝑑 translations 
on their right-hand sides. In other words, that 
                                                     
108 This follows directly from the finitude constraint of §1.3.3B.  
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(23) (𝑥)(𝑤𝑓𝑓0(𝑥) → 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑓𝑑))). 
The phonological condition 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓𝑑) is composed of two parts (see §4.1.3): the statement that 
the definition is formally correct 𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑑) and the schematic condition spelled out in (23).  (22) is 
therefore equivalent to: 
(D) Convention T (almost final formulation 1): 
∀𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, ℒ𝑑
𝑀 , 𝑀) ↔ 𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑑)). 
In words: a formally correct truth definition is materially adequate for the language that it defines. This 
formulation contains, aside from phonology, only a single variable over interpreted languages.  
(D) is a little surprising in view of how we are used to thinking about the task of finding a truth definition 
(e.g. in §3.2). Usually we are given a language 𝐿 and then we ask what conditions a metalanguage 𝑀 
has to satisfy in order to formulate a truth definition for 𝐿, and how this definition is to be formulated. 
But on the formulation in (D), we start from the metalanguage 𝑀 and give the conditions under which 
we can define a new language. I call this formulation the language-synthetic formulation of Convention 
T.  
 
The second way to reduce the number of quantifiers over languages to one is the language-analytic 
formulation. The task in mind here is to say, for a given language pair 𝐿 and 𝑀, under what conditions 
a definition 𝑑 is adequate in 𝑀 for 𝐿. Now in order for such a task to be stated precisely, the languages 
𝐿 and 𝑀 have to be given precisely, i.e. by definitions 𝑑1, 𝑑2 in a metalanguage for both of them, 𝑀. 
The language-analytic formulation of Convention T is then this: 
(E) Convention T (final formulation 2): 
∀𝑀∀𝑑𝐿∀𝑑𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, ℒ𝑑𝐿
𝑀 , ℒ𝑑𝑀
𝑀 ) ↔ ∃𝑓(𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓) ∧ 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, ℒ𝑑𝐿
𝑀 , ℒ𝑑𝑀
𝑀 ))). 
In words: a formally correct definition 𝑑 in a language 𝑀 is an adequate truth definition for a language 
𝐿 (where 𝐿 and 𝑀 are given in a metalanguage 𝑀) if and only if there is some adequate translation 
function 𝑓 such that 𝑑 entails all T-sentences that depend on 𝑓.  
We therefore have two precisely regimented formulations of Convention T, both of which have only a 
single initial universal quantifier over interpreted languages. This universal quantifier, it was argued, 
cannot be the standard universal quantifier. It remains to be explicated in the next chapter.  
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5 Abstract Generality and Indexicality 
 
5.1. Setting the task 
With the usual first-order quantifier, a universal statement is interpreted in terms of the satisfaction of 
the statement by every single object in the domain. Let’s call this real quantification. We have seen that 
there can be no domain which contains all languages. Therefore, the initial quantifier over languages in 
(both formulations of) Convention T cannot be a real quantifier. The problem of this chapter is to define 
a new universal quantifier to serve as the initial quantifier over languages in Convention T. This 
quantifier needs to allow Convention T to apply to languages generally, without thereby being 
committed to a domain of languages. We will call this abstract generality or abstract quantification. 
To gain some intuition of the difference between the two quantifiers, consider a universal statement:  
(1) ˹for every object 𝑥, 𝜙(𝑥)˺. 
We can interpret the quantifier (1) either as real or as abstract. Both interpretations can be glossed as 
saying that given some particular object 𝑎, it is the case that 𝜙(𝑎). The difference is in the significance 
we attach to the word “given” in the gloss. If (1) is understood as a real quantification, i.e. as ˹∀𝑥𝜙𝑥˺, 
then the word “given” is vacuous: any object 𝑎 (in the domain) is 𝜙. There is no sense in which 𝑎 needs 
to be given over and above simply being in the domain. For example, one obvious sense of an object 𝑎 
being given in a language 𝐿 is when 𝐿 has a name referring to 𝑎. In this sense of given, there is no 
(usable) language in which the real numbers are given to us all at once, since they outnumber the names. 
Yet we can say things about them using the real quantifiers, and in this sense the quantifiers transcend 
what can be given: they apply to what exists independently of any name for it. Abstract quantification, 
by contrast, should be understood otherwise than as assuming a standing domain of independently 
existing objects. If (1) is understood abstractly, then 𝜙(𝑎) can be inferred from it only once 𝑎 is really 
given, in some sense of the word. Saying more precisely what this sense is will be part of our burden. 
Let’s refer to our usual regimentation scheme, the one set up in §1.3.1, as standard regimentation, or 
standard semantics. There is no standard expressive device that does the work of abstract quantification. 
The language 𝑍 has therefore to constitute a departure from standard regimentation. But it is important 
to distinguish between essential and merely notational departures. Briefly, a non-standard language 𝐿 
constitutes a merely notational departure from standard regimentation if there is some standard 
language in which every sentence of 𝐿 has a synonym; otherwise 𝐿 is an essential departure. The trouble 
is that standard regimentation is a very powerful regimentation scheme. In the literature we find a great 
many departures from standard regimentation and its classical logic: from higher-order logic, to 
intensional semantics, to intuitionistic logic, etc. etc. But in most cases these departures are translatable 
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without remainder into a standard language; in fact, these languages are almost always given in a 
standard metalanguage. A language which can be thus brought back into the fold of standard 
regimentation is a merely notational departure. This is the “sticky hierarchy effect”.  
The expressive device of abstract quantification will have to be an essential departure from standard 
semantics. The fundamental philosophical notion on which the theory of this device will be based is the 
notion of the use of language. This chapter will consequently consist in a substantial digression into the 
theory of language use, i.e. pragmatics. I will recover a notion of abstract reference and abstract 
quantification from David Kaplan’s philosophical thesis of the direct referentiality of indexical 
expressions. Although I think Kaplan’s philosophical view of indexicals implies the desired notion, this 
is not the case with his formal theory. In §5.2 I will argue that Kaplan’s formal theory is in fact 
inadequate as a regimentation scheme meant to reflect the philosophical view. §5.3 will be a search 
after the missing piece, and this will provide us with a precise theory of abstract reference and abstract 
generality. In the next chapter we will adapt the results of this one to languages without indexicals. 
 
5.2. Conceptual reference, direct reference, and the failure of indexical 
semantics 
The term “indexical” comes to us from Peirce’s classification of signs. There have been several tentative 
theories of something like indexical expressions, most notably Russell’s “ego-centric particulars” and 
Reichenbach’s “token-reflexives”, but the theory’s accepted modern form is due in large part to 
Kaplan’s Demonstratives (1989a).109 Kaplan’s essay presents a detailed (though perhaps not very 
organized) exposition of a philosophical thesis concerning indexicals, namely the thesis that they 
possess a special mode of reference called direct reference. It also contains a formal system, a model 
theory, meant to reflect the philosophical thesis. My claim in this section is that Kaplan’s formal system 
fails to reflect his philosophical thesis. The reason, in brief, is that it constitutes a merely notational 
departure from standard regimentation, whereas reflecting direct reference requires an essential 
departure.  
Indexicality is to be understood against the background of intensionality. This holds both for the 
philosophical doctrine and for the formal semantics. In §5.2.1 I will present the basic idea of intensional 
semantics, and in §5.2.2 I will argue that intensional semantics is a merely notational departure from 
standard regimentation. The rest of the section will be devoted to indexicality: §5.2.3 will introduce 
pragmatics and indexicals in general, in §5.2.4 I will state the direct reference thesis, and in §5.2.5 the 
                                                     
109 Demonstratives was published only in 1989, but was written in the 1970s and was well-known long before it 
was published.  
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basic idea of Kaplan’s indexical semantics will be exhibited and it will be argued that it fails to capture 
the direct reference thesis.  
A brief methodological comment before we begin. Pragmatics and the theory of indexicality have been 
developed, and are usually practiced, as theories about natural language competence. The same (though 
to a lesser extent) goes for intensionality. In this essay I am not interested in modelling natural language 
competence, but in seeing what it takes (which expressive resources are required) in order to regiment 
various kinds of conceptual content. “Data” from ordinary language use is not, for me, empirical 
phenomena that my theory has to explain or predict, but clues about kinds of content that we need to 
know how to regiment. For example, indexical terms such as “now” and intensional operators such as 
“always” have intuitively clear and unquestionable meanings, yet on the face of it they elude 
regimentation in the standard extensional regimentation scheme. My problem is not to model the 
grammar that actually exists in the minds of speakers, but to see what kind of extensions to the standard 
regimentation scheme are needed in order to be able to express such notions precisely and responsibly. 
In practice, the difference between this problem and the one of modelling natural language competence 
amounts to two things. First, the data I rely on doesn’t need to be completely natural. It is not native 
speaker judgments that I am interested in procuring, but the agreement of my fellow theorists, in 
particular you, my reader. This means that I can give partial regimentations of my data with the intention 
of isolating the concept that seems to elude regimentation in the standard scheme. Second, the 
regimentations I will propose are not to be evaluated according to constraints of learnability or cognitive 
plausibility, which play an important role in linguistics. In particular, since I make no claim that the 
regimented form cognitively underlies the naturally given one, I don’t need to show how to derive the 
latter from the former by a series of computable transformations or movements.  
 
5.2.1. Intensional semantics 
The intensional framework comes to answer to perceived lacunae in standard regimentation. The first 
is that on standard regimentation we don’t feel we have a good representation of meaning, or linguistic 
content. The second is that certain notions, unproblematically expressible in natural language, are not 
captured. The most salient of these, perhaps, is the existence of so-called intensional operators.110 Let 
𝐿𝑝𝑟 be a standard extensional language containing “𝑎” and “𝑏” as sole individual constants and “𝑃” a 
unary predicate. The domain contains Obama (referred to by “𝑎”) and Trump (“𝑏”); “𝑃” means 
“president”. In 𝐿𝑝𝑟 sentences such as  
(2)  Trump is president 
                                                     
110 I don’t treat propositional attitudes in this work.  
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are regimented in a straightforward way: 
(3)  𝑃𝑏.111  
This sentence happens to be true (at the time of writing). Another sentence that happens to be true is: 
(4) The president is president. 
In 𝐿𝑝𝑟 this would be regimented as: 
(5) 𝑃(𝜄𝑥. 𝑃𝑥).112  
The following two (partially regimented) sentences have clear and unproblematic meaning:  
(6) It is always the case that Trump is president, 
(7) It is always the case that the president is president.113 
The first sentence of this pair is false, the second true. These sentences can’t be regimented in 𝐿𝑝𝑟 
because 𝐿𝑝𝑟 doesn’t have a term for “always”, and such a term, apparently, can’t be added to it, for two 
reasons. The first, minor, problem, is that we don’t have the syntactic category of an adverb (a non-
logical operator on sentences) in our syntax. This can be remedied without philosophical consequence 
by modifying the definition of 𝑤𝑓𝑓. Let “𝐴” regiment “always”. Then (6) and (7) should be regimented, 
respectively, as: 
(8) 𝐴(𝑃𝑏), 
(9) 𝐴(𝑃(𝜄𝑥. 𝑃𝑥)). 
However, this regimentation is faulty, and this is the major problem. “𝑃𝑏” and “𝑃(𝜄𝑥. 𝑃𝑥)”, the 
respective arguments of “𝐴” in (8) and (9), have the same extension (they’re both true). By the principle 
of compositionality (§1.3.4D), (8) and (9) therefore have the same truth value. But since (6) and (7) 
differ in truth value, (8) and (9) are not adequate regimentations of them.114  
Our standard extensional regimentation scheme does not, on the face of it, allow us to regiment the 
adverb “always”. This is good reason to modify it, since terms like “always” are both useful and 
intuitively unproblematic. The clue to which revision is needed is given in the observation that on closer 
inspection, it is not accurate to say that sentence (2) is true. For although it is true at the time of writing 
                                                     
111 Straightforward except, of course, for the fact that individual constants like functional expressions are 
contextual abbreviations, see §1.3.2. See also §5.2.4 below.  
112 Definite descriptions are to be understood, à la Russell, as abbreviations. See below. Notice that (5) (and also 
(3)) is ambiguous (see §1.3.2), but not in a way that will bother us.  
113 The partial regimentation consists in eliminating tense (the copula is to be read as tenseless) and in using the 
philosophical “it is the case” construction in order to make the logical form unambiguous.  
114 Compositionality makes it the case that every sentential operator will be a truth-function. This is why it’s 
pointless to add the syntactic category of adverb.  
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this chapter, 2017, it was not true, e.g., in 2016. Sentences are therefore not true or false simpliciter, but 
true or false at a time. Our semantic theory should be such as to assign truth-values to sentences relative 
to a time. Accordingly, let us define a language of a new kind. Let 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  have the same lexicon and syntax 
as 𝐿𝑝𝑟. The difference is that the interpretation function of 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  gives semantic values relative to a 
temporal parameter. For example, the semantic clause for the string “𝑃𝑏” will be:  
(10) |𝑃𝑏|𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑝 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡. 
As desired, “𝑃𝑏” is now not true or false in itself but true at 𝑡2 = 2017 and false at 𝑡1 = 2016. 
Predicates have their extensions relative to time: 
(11) |𝑃|𝑡 = {𝑥: 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡}. 
The points against which expressions are evaluated are generally called indices, and the metalinguistic 
variable that ranges over them is the index parameter. 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  has only a temporal index parameter, but 
there may be many index types, such as place (consider “it’s raining”), subject (“turnip is tasty”), and 
so forth. Kaplan glosses indices as circumstances of evaluation.115 “𝑃𝑏” is true if evaluated with respect 
to 𝑡2 and false if evaluated with respect to 𝑡1. Since no actual act of evaluation is required to take place, 
maybe it is better to say, more simply, that “𝑃𝑏” is true with respect to 𝑡2 (and not “if evaluated”).   
It is straightforward to define an operator that will regiment “always” in 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼 . Intuitively, a sentence is 
always true if it is true at all times. Let 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, the collection of all times, be the set {𝑡1, 𝑡2}. Then we can 
define: 
(12) |˹𝐴(𝜙)˺|𝑡  = 1 ↔ ∀𝑡∈𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
′ (|𝜙|𝑡
′
= 1).116 
These operators are called index-shifting operators. For every 𝑡 we have: 
(13) |𝐴(𝑃𝑏)|𝑡 = 0, 
(14) |𝐴(𝑃(𝜄𝑥. 𝑃𝑥))|
𝑡
= 1, 
as desired (though see below). We can place relations on the temporal domain (e.g. precedence), and 
define further temporal notions in 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  (e.g. “before”). In this way intensional languages allow us to 
express in a formally correct way a wide range of contents that elude standard regimentation.  
 
                                                     
115 Kaplan (1989a, p. 494). It might be a little confusing at first that the term “index” is used in the theory of 
intensionality and emphatically not in the theory of indexicality. Montague (1968) introduced the term “index” in 
his attempt to formalize a theory of indexicals, but his theory was not ripe for it. Montague’s theories were very 
influential in intensional semantics, and “index” came to belong to the terminology of that field.  
116 This is a contextual definition, see §1.3.2.  
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Intensionality also provides us, ostensibly, with an improved notion of linguistic meaning. In 
extensional semantics the only object we can associate with an expression is its extension. Sentences 
strictly speaking don’t have extensions, but for uniformity we posited objects that stand for their truth 
values and thought of these objects as extensions. Except for their strings, on an extensional framework 
there is no difference between expressions with the same extension, or sentences with the same truth 
value. Intuitively, the fact that two different sentences happen to be both true is not a fact of great 
semantic importance, and this is an intuition that extensional semantics apparently fails to capture. In 
intensional semantics we can isolate an object which more closely resembles the intuitive meaning, or 
content, of an expression. We saw that in 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  extensions are evaluated relative to a time. We can define 
the unrelativized semantic value of an expression, called its intension or content, to be the function that 
takes an index 𝑡 to the extension of the expression at 𝑡: 
(15)  |𝑃| = 𝜆𝑡. |𝑃|𝑡. 
The intension of a sentence “𝑃𝑏” is a function from times to truth values, which can loosely be identified 
with the collection of times relative to which the sentence is true: 
(16)  |𝑃𝑏| = 𝜆𝑡. (1 𝑖𝑓 
|𝑃𝑏|𝑡 = 1 
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
) ≅ {𝑡: |𝑃𝑏|𝑡 = 1}. 
The intension of a sentence is sometimes called a proposition. Above I gave “𝐴” a contextual definition, 
but it can also be defined as a function on the intension of 𝜙, which is why it is also called an intensional 
operator. That function is the intension of “𝐴”: 
(17) |𝐴| = 𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑡. (
1 𝑖𝑓 ∀𝑡′(𝑖(𝑡′) = 1)
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
) ≅ {𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒}. 
In this way intensional semantics provides us with an explication of the intuitive idea of linguistic 
content. Intensional systems in the literature are often much more complicated, with many interacting 
index types, various intensional operators, and other sophistications. The sketch above captures, 
however, its fundamental feature, that of explicating intensional operators using quantifiers over special 
entities.117  
 
                                                     
117 There are other ways to approach intensionality, but this is the most popular and the one at the basis of Kaplan’s 
indexical semantics. See von Fintel and Heim (2011) for a rich variety of developments and applications of the 
basic principle. My focus is on semantics, but there is also much to say about intensional logic. See Fitting (2015) 
(SEP entry).  
The kind of special entity used most often in the literature is not times, but possible worlds. This makes no 
difference as far as the formal system is concerned. Notice that either way, propositions and the sentences that 
express them turn out not to be truth bearers at all. Even a sentence which has the same truth value at all times, 
e.g. “𝐴(𝑃𝑏)”, are not strictly speaking true or false, since they are not of the right kind. See §5.2.5 for more on 
this.  
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5.2.2. Internalization and mediated content  
Intensional semantics, as developed above, is a merely notational departure from standard 
regimentation. Let 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟 be a standard extensional language, such that its domain is the union of the 
domain of 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  with the collection 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, and its vocabulary is like that of 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  except that to the atomic 
predicates we add an argument place for time, and we add a predicate 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑥) which holds only of 
times. The interpretation of the extra argument is time of evaluation, so that, for example, we have:  
(18) |𝑃(𝑥, 𝑦)| = 1 ↔ 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑦. 
It is easy to see that every expression of 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  is correctly translatable into 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟. The sentences:  
(19)  𝑃𝑏, 
(20)  𝐴(𝑃𝑏), 
have the following translations:  
(21)  𝑃(𝑏, 𝑥), 
(22)  ∀𝑥(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑥) → 𝑃(𝑏, 𝑥)). 
The observation that sentences such as “Obama is president” are neither true nor false as they stand is 
now captured by the fact that their translations into 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟, here (21), are not sentences at all but open 
formulas. Intensional semantics is therefore only a notational variant on standard regimentation, and 
not an essential departure. More generally, if 𝐿∗ is a language that purports to be a departure from 
standard regimentation, but is given in a standard metalanguage 𝑀, then we can often define a standard 
object language 𝐿∗ which has a translation for every sentence of 𝐿
∗. We simply take the expressive 
resources used in 𝑀 to give the semantics of 𝐿∗, and include them in 𝐿∗. This strategy I call 
internalization (of the metalinguistic resources).118 Internalization is important since it shows clearly, 
in the object-language, what expressive resources are required for the regimentation of a certain notion. 
Take the three languages of this section: 𝐿𝑝𝑟, 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  and 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟. Comparing 𝐿𝑝𝑟 and 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟 shows immediately 
that regimenting intensional operators involves ontological commitment to indices. In 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  this 
commitment is not avoided but only hidden away in the metalanguage.119 If we want to preserve the 
convenience of 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼 , we can define abbreviations in 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟 which emulate it: 
                                                     
118 The procedure is a little more involved than how I sketched it, but still pretty straightforward. See Cresswell 
(1990) for an extended treatment of the relation between intensional and internalized languages (“internalized” is 
my term, not his). See also Schlenker (2003, §3, Appendix II). Schlenker’s target in that paper is indexicality, not 
intensionality. The internalized language is usually more expressive than the notational departure.  
119 In §3.2.4 we preferred a first-order definition of truth with more sets in the first-order domain to a second-order 
definition. This can be viewed as a case of internalization.  
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(23)  𝑃𝑖𝑥 ↔ 𝑃(𝑥, 𝑦), 
(24)  𝐴(𝑃𝑖𝑥) ↔ ∀𝑦𝑃(𝑥, 𝑦). 
This lets us use the expressions of 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  within 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟 with the same meanings.  
 
This procedure takes care of intensional operators, but leaves us without a satisfactory general notion 
of content. In 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  we could speak of the intensions of certain expressions (see (15), (16)), and this 
explicated for us the philosophical notion of linguistic content. These objects can be defined in the same 
way in 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟. For example, there is no problem in defining the set of times 𝑥 for which the 𝑤𝑓𝑓 “𝑃(𝑏, 𝑥)” 
is true. As before, this will give us the set of times in which Trump is president. But now this set doesn’t 
appear to explicate a notion of linguistic content more informative than extension.  
Since linguistic content will be important for us in the sequel, it is important to come up with some way 
to approach it. The content of sentences and formulas in standard languages are, respectively, truth and 
satisfaction conditions. But conditions (though said in the plural) are not a kind of object in any obvious 
sense. If we want to speak of the content of an expression, we find ourselves at a loss for objects. This 
is a difficult problem, and I suggest that we settle for less than an object that really captures the content 
of an expression. Instead of content proper, I propose that we make do with statement of content. In 
other words, instead of reifying truth conditions into objects, we take statements of truth conditions as 
a substitute (an ersatz, in Lewis’s term). These statements are sentences, or strings, and so 
unproblematic objects. For example, the content (substitutes) of “𝑃(𝑥, 𝑦)” and “𝑃(𝑎, 𝑡1)” will be the 
right-hand sides of their respective semantic clauses: 
(25)  |𝑃(𝑥, 𝑦)| = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑦, 
(26)  |𝑃(𝑎, 𝑡1)| = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 2016. 
The content of an expression in an object-language 𝐿 is therefore a string, interpreted in its 
metalanguage 𝑀. This is the mediated approach to content.120 
 
5.2.3. Pragmatics 
In 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼 , sentences such as 𝑃𝑏 are not true or false. But this is strange, since sentences such as “Trump is 
president” are asserted all the time. Assuming that the assertion aims at truth, this calls for explanation. 
The explanation, as I am presenting it, does not belong to the theory of content but to the theory of 
                                                     
120 Compare the mediated notation for languages introduced in §4.2.3. Note that we don’t take any string which 
is the right-hand side of a true equivalence, but a string which is the right-hand side of an equivalence which 
follows from the semantic theory. For example, unless “Hesperus = Phosphorus” follows from the semantic theory, 
the content of “Hesperus” and of “Phosphorus” will turn out different.  
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assertion. This is a lacuna in intensional semantics that calls for another departure from standard 
regimentation, pragmatics. A further linguistic phenomenon that intensional semantics fails to deal with 
is the behavior of indexical expressions such as “I” and “now”. Sentences such as “I am president” are 
not true or false as they stand, but with respect to whoever utters them. This relativity is, or should be, 
of another kind from the relativity to circumstance of evaluation that is the defining feature of 
intensional semantics, as we will see.  
Both of these facts – the assertability of propositions and the behavior of indexicals – are facts about 
language use. The science of language use is called pragmatics. This is a basket term that includes under 
it many different theories and approaches. I will focus on one strand of it, Kaplan’s theory of indexicals. 
The guiding intuition in pragmatics is that not only the extension of expressions, but also their very 
content, can depend on external factors. Consequently, it is postulated that words have another kind of 
meaning alongside extension and content: a character. Strawson, in a paper that helped shape pragmatics 
as a science, makes the case that linguistic meaning cannot be mere reference. He writes: 
To give the meaning of an expression… is to give general directions for its use to refer to or 
mention particular objects or persons; to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general 
directions for its use in making true or false assertions. It is not to talk about any particular 
occasion of the use of the sentence or expression. The meaning of an expression cannot be 
identified with the object it is used, on a particular occasion, to refer to. The meaning of a 
sentence cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, on a particular occasion, to make. 
For to talk about the meaning of an expression is [to talk]… about the rules, habits, conventions 
governing its correct use… (1950, p.327).121 
 
According to this view the truth-bearer in pragmatics cannot be the sentence, but has to be some object 
which is sensitive to the occasion of use. Language is used in a variety of ways, but in order to fix ideas 
let’s take the conversation as the paradigm case. Again, conversations are many and varied, but for 
simplicity we can restrict attention to situations in which two competent speakers of a shared language 
take turns asserting declarative sentences to one another. Call this simplification the conversation 
heuristic. On this heuristic we can identify an instance of language use with the act of voicing of a 
sentence in the shared language as part of a conversation. Such an act we call an utterance, and this will 
now be our truth-bearer in this chapter.  
                                                     
121 Ironically, that very same paper ends with a rather discouraging statement for the development of pragmatics. 
Strawson there says about standard semantics that it doesn’t “give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary 
language; for ordinary language has no exact logic”.  
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A pragmatic theory will take the form of a truth or satisfaction theory for utterances. Sometimes I will 
call this a pragmatic semantics.122 As in the case of standard semantics, we want the theory to be finitely 
statable, and since there are infinitely many possible utterances, its statement should rely on the way 
utterances are composed from basic elements. We want to rely as much as possible on the already 
existing semantic theory for sentences, so we analyze utterances into pairs consisting of the sentence 
uttered and the circumstances of utterance, encapsulated in an object called the context (of use): 
(27) 𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑥) 𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∃𝑦∃𝑧(𝑤𝑓𝑓0(𝑦) ∧ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑧) ∧ 𝑥 = 〈𝑦, 𝑧〉).123  
A pragmatic truth predicate is therefore a binary relation between sentences and contexts. More 
generally, and in continuity with our previous habits, we can think of a pragmatic theory as a function 
from strings and contexts, which we write |𝛼|𝑐, to extensions. As before, true utterances are stipulated 
to have the number 1 as their extension. My interest here is not with pragmatics in general but only with 
one branch of it: the theory of indexical expressions, especially as conceived by David Kaplan.124 If a 
lexeme 𝛼 is such that for some contexts 𝑐1, 𝑐2, |𝛼|
𝑐1 ≠ |𝛼|𝑐2, I say that 𝛼 is an atomic indexical. Any 
expression containing an atomic indexical is an indexical expression. I will disregard demonstratives, 
and focus on what Kaplan calls “pure indexicals”, which don’t depend on an act of demonstration for 
their content.125  
 
5.2.4. Direct reference 
It is not Kaplan’s formal theory of indexical semantics that I’m after, but his (I think underdeveloped) 
philosophical thesis about the special indexical mode of reference. Kaplan’s philosophical thesis 
regarding indexicals is that they are directly referential. Other expressions we can call descriptively or 
conceptually referential.126 
                                                     
122 Sometimes indexical semantics, or theory of indexicals, or simply semantic theory when the object-language 
has indexicals.  
123 By analyzing utterances into sentence-context pairs I aim to sidestep a debate between Kaplan and (later 
followers of) Reichenbach concerning the nature of the pragmatic truth-bearer. Briefly, Kaplan thinks that logical 
validity can be defined only for sentence-context pairs and not for utterances, because utterances are concrete 
dated particulars and therefore cannot figure in two positions in a logical argument (see Kaplan (1989a, p.522), 
more recently Perry (2017, §3)). I take sentence-context pairs to be idealizations of the concrete dated utterance 
events, for use in semantic theory, in the way that physicists often work with points having mass, even though 
points cannot have mass. For this line, see Garcia-Carpintero (1998, pp.539ff).  
124 The source for this theory is Kaplan (1989a) (which was written in the 1970s). Henceforth references to Kaplan 
(1989a) will be given without the publication year.  A relatively recent, short and reasonably precise introduction 
to indexicals is Schlenker (2011). 
125 Kaplan p.491.  
126 Kaplan contrasts direct reference with sense-mediated reference, in Frege’s sense of “sense”. I’m not sure what 
that sense is, but Kaplan thinks of it as conceptual in nature (though this might not be Frege’s concept of 
“concept”). See p. 505fn31.  
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Conceptual reference is the kind of reference that characterizes standard languages. A good place to 
observe this is the case of proper names or individual constants. Recall that, strictly speaking, in 
standard languages as I have defined them there are no individual constants (see §1.3.2). The proper 
regimentation of, say, a proper name such as “Trump”, would use a one-place predicate “𝑇” which 
holds only of Trump.127 The sentence 
(28) Trump is president,  
would then be regimented, using Russell’s technique, as a complex sentence saying that there is a single 
thing satisfying 𝑇, and that thing is president: 
(29) ∃𝑥(𝑇𝑥 ∧ (𝑦)(𝑇𝑦 → 𝑥 = 𝑦) ∧ 𝑃𝑥).  
If we wanted to obscure things by emulating the surface grammar of (28), we could introduce a 
contextual abbreviation which would make (29) look like a simple predication: 
(30) 𝑃(𝜄𝑥. 𝑇𝑥). 
And if we wanted to conceal the logical form of our regimented sentences even more, we could 
abbreviate the inner expression by a pseudo-individual-constant “𝑏”: 
(31)  𝑃𝑏. 
We can say, somewhat loosely, that 𝑏 conceptually refers to Trump: 
(32) |𝑏| ≅ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑝, 
meaning that the systematic contribution that the contextual abbreviation “𝑏” makes to semantics 
consists in the individual Trump. Conceptual reference, on this way of construing it, is achieved by a 
combination of quantifiers and predicates.  
At this point you might want to object as follows. The regimentation (29) of the unregimented (28) 
required a considerable change in form. In particular, a unique existence claim is added which is 
nowhere to be seen in (28). We resort to this regimentation procedure because we’ve willfully banished 
individual constants from our regimentation scheme. But this choice was not forced upon us. Many 
presentations of first-order logic, equivalent to our own, include individual constants as undefined 
primitives in the language. On such presentations (31) is not an abbreviation but an bona fide sentence 
which closely mirrors the syntax of (28). Why make things more complicated than they are? 
The answer to this is that if we do include individual constants in our object-language, (32) stops being 
a loose way of speaking and becomes a regular semantic clause in the metalanguage. In this case it is, 
                                                     
127 This is Quine’s procedure in (1981, p.149ff). 
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in a sense, presupposed that there is a unique object in the domain referred to in the object-language by 
“𝑏” and in the metalanguage by “Trump”. Otherwise we could not use the equality sign. But this is 
precisely what (29) adds to the ostensibly simple predication in (28). The difference is that in (29), the 
unique existence claim is explicitly stated in the object-language, whereas if we construe (31) as 
unabbreviated, it is implicit. Worse, if “Trump” is construed as an individual constant in the 
metalanguage, then a unique existence claim is implicit in the metalanguage as well. Allowing genuine 
individual constants would only hide their conceptual nature, not do away with it.128 
 
The key feature of conceptual reference is its dependence on an ontology and ideology which are given 
in advance of the particular use of the language. Conceptual reference is thereby made independent of 
the circumstances of use. By contrast, a term refers directly if it refers not in virtue of its conceptual 
content, but through some kind of special relation between the act of uttering it and its referent. The 
precise nature of this relation is a matter of dispute. On Peirce’s threefold classification of signs, an 
indexical sign is one that denotes by virtue of some kind of existential relation, such as physical 
contiguity or causal connection. The usual example is the smoke signaling the fire, but this example is 
of no great use to us.129 Russell also had a theory of something like indexical expressions which he 
called “egocentric particulars”, reference to which is grounded by the epistemological relation of 
acquaintance. Logically, Russell held that only objects with which we are directly acquainted can be 
referred to through genuine individual constants (“logically proper names”); all other objects were to 
be referred to through descriptions, which is to say by combining quantifiers and predicates. Russell’s 
strictures on what counts as direct acquaintance eventually precluded him from acknowledging most 
things as objects of acquaintance, making his theory unattractive, but later writers use a milder notion 
of acquaintance to ground direct reference.130 I don’t wish to commit to either Peirce’s or Russell’s view 
of the relation between indexicals and their referents. I will refer to this relation, neutrally, as contact.131  
                                                     
128 This is another case of internalization.  
129 See Burks (1949), also Atkin (2015), for discussion of Peirce’s theory of indexicals. Perry (2017) seems to 
think that if I use “you” to refer to the person I’m addressing, (in this case you, dear reader,) then this reference is 
(partly) in virtue of a real relation between us, involving causation and perception. Unfortunately, he doesn’t 
elaborate (as this isn’t his topic), but it is unclear in which way causation is involved, and whether perception is 
really needed. For example, I am not perceiving you at the moment, and any causal relation between you and 
occurrences of “you” in this footnote is in the wrong direction. Nonetheless, I’m sure I’ve succeeded in referring 
to you. So it isn’t clear whether and how perception and causation are really involved in referring to an addressee. 
130 See Russell (1910-11), (1972, pp. 28ff). See Evans (1982) for a later defense of acquaintance theory.  
131 This term I take from Posy (2017), who uses it in order to attribute something like a direct reference view to 
Kant. There is a substantial literature on direct vs. descriptive reference which I will not refer to in a systematic 
way. Most of it is concerned with reference in natural language, and says little to my own concerns (see §5.2). 
For a recent comprehensive treatment of reference with many, well, references, see Hawthorne and Manley 
(2012).  
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The difference in mode of reference between indexicals and non-indexicals implies a difference in the 
kind of meaning. The kind of meaning that governs direct reference is called character, whereas the 
reference of non-indexicals is determined by their content. This difference should not, on the face of it, 
affect the objects referred to. It is not the case that indexicals refer to special objects, to which conceptual 
reference is impossible. Rather, we can assume that any object referred to directly can be referred to 
conceptually (though not necessarily in the same language). This fact we call the reality of indexicals.  
 
Direct reference is a philosophical thesis. But if it is to be more than just an epiphenomenon, it should 
take part in turning the wheels by placing constraints on a formal semantic theory for indexicals. In 
Kaplan I find two features of indexicals that can be made into such formal constraints: the definability 
of the notion of pragmatic validity; and the prohibition on monsters.  
A sentence is pragmatically valid (𝑃𝑉) if true whenever uttered.132 The typical example is: 
(33)  I am here now.133  
Pragmatic validity is, according to Kaplan, to be distinguished from the superficially similar phenomena 
of necessity and eternity. Though true in every utterance, pragmatically valid sentences are not always 
or necessarily true. To see this, consider that a sentence ˹𝜙˺ is always (necessarily) true if and only if 
the sentence ˹𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝜙˺ (˹𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝜙˺) is true simpliciter. But we can certainly think up false 
utterances of: 
(34)  I am always here (now), 
(35)  I am necessarily here now. 
Therefore, pragmatic validity is distinct both from necessity and from eternity.  
The pragmatic validity of a sentence is due to the indexicals in it.134 When uttered, the indexicals in (33) 
refer (either through existential relation, or acquaintance, or what have you) to the speaker of the 
utterance, the time of the utterance and the place of the utterance, respectively. By anatomy and physics, 
the speaker will have to be situated in precisely the place of the utterances at the time of utterance. 
Therefore the truth conditions of (33) will always be fulfilled.  This is a feature of indexicality that a 
                                                     
132 “Pragmatically valid” is not Kaplan’s term. He thinks of such sentences as logically true, relative to his special 
model theory for indexicals. See p. 509.  
133 Although this is the typical example, it is not really pragmatically valid, since its negation can be used truly, 
for example in written notes or recorded messages. On the conversation heuristic it does come out valid. More on 
this below.  
134 Actually, there are pragmatically valid sentences that do not involve indexicals essentially, for example “there 
have been utterances of English sentences”. Another kind is expressible in French: “Je ne te tutoie jamais” (See 
Zimmerman (1997)). I won’t address them here.  
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formal semantic theory should express. It is therefore a requirement on such a theory that it be able to 
define a predicate 𝑃𝑉 applying to all and only pragmatically valid sentences.  
The second formal constraint that the thesis of direct reference places on formal theories of indexicals 
is the prohibition on monsters, as follows. Above we saw that pragmatic validity is distinct from 
necessity or eternity. But can’t it be just a further kind of intensional notion? After all, there are 
sentences that are always but not necessarily true and vice versa, but we model this within intensional 
semantics by adding another index type, not by calling for a new kind of semantic system. Likewise, 
we might explicate pragmatic validity by a new index type – contexts. However, according to Kaplan 
there is an important formal difference between intensional and pragmatic notions: there can be no 
pragmatic operators in the object-language. If pragmatic validity were an intensional notion, we could 
define a pragmatic validity operator analogous to “always” and “necessarily”, which when applied to a 
sentence ˹𝜙˺ yields another sentence which is equivalent to 𝑃𝑉(˹𝜙˺). The thesis of direct reference 
requires that such operators be impossible. Kaplan isn’t very clear on the reason, but something along 
the lines of the following seems to be in play. Pragmatic operators would make the truth of an utterance 
they occur in independent of the things that stand in contact with that utterance. For example, imagine 
that such a pragmatic validity operator ˹Π𝜙˺ exists. Then  
(36)  Π(𝐼 𝑎𝑚 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑤), 
is invariably true. In particular, the objects with which an utterance of (36) comes in contact play no 
role in this. The indexicals in it therefore do not refer directly. Such operators on characters Kaplan 
calls monsters, 135 and although he doesn’t treat them in this way, I will make the indefinability of 
monsters the second criterion for the adequacy of a theory of indexicals.  
Let me note that in Kaplan’s own writings the prohibition on monsters is never given as an organized 
piece of philosophy. It is not even clear whether his claim is empirical or a-priori.136 Empirical evidence 
has been adduced against it for the case of natural language.137 The empirical question will not concern 
me: if there are monsters in natural language, then to that extent the indexicals in natural language are 
not directly referential. My intention is to isolate direct reference as a philosophical notion, and in this 
I concur with Kaplan’s intuition that pragmatic operators should not be definable. However, as we shall 
                                                     
135 Kaplan, p.510.  
136 The confusion is visible in quotations such as this: “I am not saying we could not construct a language with 
such operators, just that English is not one. And such operators could not be added to it.” (p.510, italics in the 
original) 
137  See especially Schlenker (2003) and the references in Schlenker (2011). 
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see, the prohibition on monsters will be the undoing of Kaplan’s own formal semantics for indexicals, 
and the clue to my revision of it that will eventually lead us to a notion of abstract reference.138  
To sum up, the philosophical thesis of direct reference makes the following demands on formal semantic 
theories that presume to embody it: (a) They need to be able to define pragmatic predicates, in particular 
the predicate of pragmatic validity; (b) They shouldn’t be able to define operators in the object-language 
that express these predicates, in particular there should not be a pragmatic validity operator. We can 
crystallize these requirements into a two-step test:  
(G) The direct reference test: given a pragmatic semantic theory, 
a. Define the pragmatic validity predicate 𝑃𝑉, i.e. find a formula 𝛿 in the metalanguage such that, 
for example, 𝛿("𝐼 𝑎𝑚 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑤") holds, whereas 𝛿("𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 𝑖𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑤") doesn’t; 
b. Show that a pragmatic validity operator is not definable in the object-language, i.e. an operator 
Π such that ˹Π(𝜙)˺ is true whenever 𝑃𝑉(˹𝜙˺). Such an operator is successfully defined if, for 
example, ˹Π(𝐼 𝑎𝑚 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑤)˺ turns out true (in every context), while 
˹Π(𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 𝑖𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑤)˺ turns out false. The theory passes the test if it is shown that it is 
impossible to define it successfully. 
I submit that a formal theory expresses the philosophical thesis of direct reference only if it passes this 
test. Unfortunately, Kaplan’s own system, which is also the standard in the industry, fails the test.  
 
5.2.5. Kaplan’s indexical semantics 
Kaplanian indexical semantics amounts, formally, to adding another parameter, on top of the index 
parameter, to the semantic function. This parameter represents the context of use. Let 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼𝑃  be like 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼  
but such that the semantics is now a three-place function|𝜙|𝑐,𝑡.139 Alternatively, we can internalize 
intensionality along the lines of §5.2.2 to get a language 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟
𝑃  with only a context parameter in the 
semantic function. We add to this language, on both versions, the indexicals “𝐼”, “𝑛𝑜𝑤” and “ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒”. 
To the metalanguage we add the functional expressions “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐)”, “𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)” and “𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑐)” that 
refer to the features of the context, which serve as the semantic values of the indexicals: 
(37) |𝑛𝑜𝑤|𝑐 = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐), 
                                                     
138 See Israel and Perry (1996) for a defense of monsters, which is however tightly linked to Perry’s conception 
of linguistic content. Rabern (2013) makes a case that the usual objectual quantifiers should strictly speaking be 
thought of as monsters. This observation is significant, and will to a certain extent be borne out by my own 
considerations, especially of the next chapter. An illuminating early discussion is Thomasson (1975). Predelli 
(2014) discerns a three-way equivocation of “monster” in Kaplan. This distinction makes sense for English, but 
is arguably not relevant to the formal system developed here.  
139 It may have more than one index parameter. 
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(38) |𝐼|𝑐 = 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐), 
(39) |ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒|𝑐 = 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑐). 
The assertability problem mentioned above can be easily solved. The problem was that on the one hand 
sentences such as “Trump is president” were not true or false in themselves, but true or false only as 
evaluated with respect to time; and on the other hand they get to be asserted all the time. The answer is 
that when asserted, they are evaluated with respect to the time of assertion. This answer can be 
represented in two ways. We may stipulate an assertion principle, which states that the semantics of an 
asserted sentences is |𝜙|𝑐,𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐). This is a rule for interpreting assertions, and it is more suitable for the 
uninternalized 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝐼𝑃 . Alternatively, we may prescribe a rule of regimentation which adds the indexical 
“𝑛𝑜𝑤” to every sentence upon assertion. The proper way to regiment “Trump is president” as an 
assertion is: 
(40) 𝑃(𝑏, 𝑛𝑜𝑤).140 
The unrelativized semantic values of indexicals are called characters. In the formal system, they are 
represented as functions from contexts to intensions (for 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝑃𝐼 ) or from contexts to extensions (for 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟
𝑃 ): 
(41)  |𝐼| = 𝜆𝑐. |𝐼|𝑐 = 𝜆𝑐. 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐). 
For uniformity let’s say that all expressions, even non-indexicals, have characters: 
(42)  |𝑃| = 𝜆𝑐. |𝑃|𝑐 = 𝜆𝑐. {〈𝑥, 𝑦〉: 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑦}. 
If the context parameter in the statement of the character is vacuous, as in (42), we say it is a stable 
character; otherwise, as in (41), a proper character. Sentences too have characters: 
(43) |𝑃(𝐼, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = (𝜆𝑐. 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 |𝐼|𝑐 ∈ |𝑃|𝑐) ≅ {𝑐: 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐) 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)}. 
 
This is, in a nutshell, the basic idea in Kaplan’s formal system of indexical semantics. Unfortunately, it 
doesn’t pass the direct reference test. Recall, the test has two clauses. Clause (a) demands that we define 
the pragmatic validity predicate 𝑃𝑉 in our system. Informally, a sentence is pragmatically valid if every 
utterance of it is true. The definition for 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟
𝑃  is obvious:  
(44)  𝑃𝑉(𝑠) 𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∀𝑐(|𝑠|𝑐 = 1). 
We can show that the sentence: 
                                                     
140 This is why propositions are not truth bearer. Truth for them is an inherently pragmatic notion. If, as Kaplan 
(e.g., p.489, p.499) and Lewis (1986, pp. 92ff) maintain, “the actual world” is an indexical expression, then this 
applies also to propositions as sets of possible worlds.  
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(45)  I am here now  
turns out pragmatically valid, and  
(46)  Obama is here now 
 doesn’t. That (45) is 𝑃𝑉 follows at once from our conversation heuristic: taking utterances as acts of 
voicing sentences ensures that the utterer will always be present at the place of utterance. Therefore in 
every context 𝑐, the speaker will be in the place at the time of 𝑐, which is precisely what it takes to make 
(45) true. An utterance of (46) will be false in any context 𝑐 such that Obama is not present in the place 
at the time of 𝑐; for example, if Trump were to utter (46) in the White House in 2017 (and Obama would 
be elsewhere), then his utterance would be false. The fact that this context is a possible one, and 
therefore a member of the domain of contexts, entails that (46) is not pragmatically valid. This is as 
desired.  
Clause (b) of the test is to show that a pragmatic validity operator is not definable for the object-
language, i.e. no operator Π such that ˹Π(𝜙)˺ is true just in case 𝑃𝑉(˹𝜙˺). Unfortunately, on our system 
it is quite straightforward to define such an operator, based on the definition of 𝑃𝑉: 
(47)  |˹Π(𝜙)˺|𝑐 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∀𝑐′(|˹𝜙˺|𝑐
′
= 1). 
Regardless of when and where and by whom they are uttered, the sentence  
(48)  Π(𝐼 𝑎𝑚 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑤) 
will be true, and  
(49)  Π(𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 𝑖𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑤) 
will be false. “Π” is a pragmatic validity operator in the language 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟
𝑃 , i.e. a monster. Kaplan’s system 
therefore fails the second clause of the direct reference test. 
What is the significance of this failure? The prohibition on monstrous operators is a consequence of the 
philosophical doctrine that indexicals refer directly (§5.2.4). Consequently, a formal system on which 
such operators can be defined, like 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟
𝑃 , does not capture the philosophical doctrine. It doesn’t 
distinguish, as Kaplan says with regards to other systems, between “the distinct conceptual roles played 
by contexts of use and circumstances of evaluation”.141 Kaplan himself did not define a pragmatic 
validity operator in his system, but such an operator is readily defined in it, in a completely analogous 
                                                     
141 See Kaplan, p.512. Kaplan says this about two dimensional logics which he contrasts with his own system. But 
the contrast he’s after is to be found only in the informal presentation.  
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way to how the corresponding intensional operators are defined.142 The reason is that the collection of 
contexts is exactly on a par with the collections of times, places and worlds, so contexts are real objects 
in the domain of the metalanguage, in the range of the usual quantifiers. What, short of an ad-hoc 
restriction, should stop us from using such quantifiers to define context-shifting operators in the object-
language? The distinction between indexicality and intensionality, character and content, is just a 
difference in label. If we want to uphold the direct reference thesis in our formal semantics, we need to 
represent contexts differently than as standard (real) objects in the domain.  
 
5.3. Abstract reference 
Our task is to mount a new construal of the context parameter 𝑐, one which will do justice to the direct 
reference thesis. This means that our interest lies no longer in the pragmatic language 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟
𝑃  (henceforth 
simply 𝐿𝑃), but in a metalanguage for it 𝑀𝑃. We saw that conceiving 𝑀𝑃 in a straightforward way as a 
standard language, with the context parameter 𝑐 as a standard variable, is not the right way to go. What 
we are looking for is not a new language, but a new kind of language, a new regimentation scheme.  
Our standard scheme, first-order extensional logic, is very general. There are many different first-order 
languages, differing with respect to the objects that they refer to and the concepts that they express. The 
regimentation scheme doesn’t tell the difference between kinds of objects: frogs, numbers, times and 
possible worlds, from a logical point of view they are all just objects. Whatever kind of object you can 
find, and whatever you wish to predicate of it, there is a standard language that will let you do it. This 
is a sense in which our standard language hierarchy is unbounded. Nevertheless, it has its limits. 
Standard regimentation countenances only objects and predicates, quantification over those objects, and 
truth-functional connection of formulas. Intensionality seems at first sight to transcend these limits, but 
if intensional languages are defined in terms of intensional objects such as times and possible worlds, 
then we see that they constitute only a notational departure from the standard. Our hierarchy is not only 
unbounded, it is sticky.  
However, if the direct reference thesis is true, then the previous section shows that indexicality resists 
being tamed in this way. In showing that Kaplan’s system fails the direct reference test we made no 
assumption about what kind of object contexts are. The only thing that was assumed is that they are 
objects in the full first-order logical sense: that which is referred to by the variables and quantified over 
by the quantifiers of standard languages. This is the assumption that we need to reconsider. What is 
required is a new logical category, and a conception of contexts that makes them part of that category. 
                                                     
142 To get a definition of the pragmatic validity operator in Kaplan’s system, look at his own definition of ˹□𝜙˺ in 
p.545, and replace the set of worlds by the set of contexts (adjust the variables accordingly).  
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5.3.1.  Three questions 
Such a new conception will have to answer three guiding questions: 
(H) Three Questions: 
a. A metaphysical question: What kind of thing is a context, if it isn’t an object in the standard 
sense of the word? In particular, what is the essential difference between a context and an index? 
The tension here is that a satisfactory answer to a “what kind of thing” question would normally 
specify the constitution of the thing in terms of previously understood objects using logical or 
set-theoretic construction. For example, the concept of (uninterpreted) sentence is defined in 
terms of strings of phonemes; and a proposition, often, in terms of sets of possible worlds, etc. 
But if such a definition is available for contexts, why aren’t they just another kind of object?  
b.  A (meta-)semantic question: What is the relation between the parameter 𝑐 and contexts? A 
standard variable refers individually to objects in a domain (relative to an assignment function). 
Given a domain of contexts, what prevents the context parameter from referring to them 
individually in the standard way?  
c. A formal question: In view of the answers to the previous questions, what are the formal 
properties of 𝑐? How should it be allowed to combine with other expressions to form sentences, 
and what are the logical properties of the sentences it occurs in? What is the semantics of 
sentences containing 𝑐? Our answer to this question should pass the direct reference test from 
§5.2.4.  
 
Our philosophical guiding thread will be the thesis of direct reference. Here is part of Kaplan’s summary 
to have before our eyes: 
In the case of [the indexicals], the linguistic conventions which constitute meaning consist of 
rules specifying the referent of a given occurrence of the word ([less abstractly, an utterance]), 
in terms of various features of the context of the occurrence. Although these rules fix the 
referent and, in a very special sense, might be said to define the indexical, the way in which the 
rules are given does not provide a synonym for the indexical. The rules tell us for any possible 
occurrence of the indexical what the referent would be, but they do not constitute the content 
of the occurrence. Indexicals are directly referential. The rules tell us what it is that is referred 
to.  Thus, they determine the content (the propositional constituent) for a particular occurrence 
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of an indexical. But they are not a part of the content (they constitute no part of the propositional 
constituent).143 
 
Kaplan is struggling here to clarify the distinction between content and character. He makes in this 
passage three contrasts: first he says that the characters of the indexicals “[specify] the referent”, “fix 
the referent”, and “define the indexical”, but in a way that “does not provide a synonym for the 
indexical”;144 second, that they are rules that “tell us for any possible [utterance] of the indexical what 
the referent would be,” though “they do not constitute the content of the [utterance]”; finally, that “they 
determine the content… but they are not a part of the content” of an utterance. However, these contrasts 
are not part of his technical apparatus. The distinction between content and character, index and context, 
belongs only in the informal gloss.  
The purpose of the present section is to offer a framework which formally captures Kaplan’s contrasts 
in the quote above. The procedure will be this. First (§5.3.2) I will consider Kaplan’s own understanding 
of context, on which contexts are not essentially dissimilar to indices. I will argue (§5.3.3) that this 
understanding misses the mark, but will extract from it its intuitive core, which is the necessary presence 
of a linguistic agent in a context of use. This leads us to consider in depth the notion of linguistic agency. 
This notion is explained using the idea of content generation, though the specific sense of this idea has 
to be made precise (§5.3.4). Briefly, content generation and linguistic agency will be explicated in terms 
of the division of ontological commitment between the metalanguage, in which characters are stated 
generally, and the object-language in context, in which indexicals are used. The agent of a context takes 
upon himself the ontological commitment to the references of the indexicals, thereby relieving the 
metalanguage of it. In this way characters have a special mode of reference which doesn’t imply 
ontological commitment, which I dub abstract reference. This mode of reference lets us take apart the 
very concept of object into its conceptual constituents, and put them together again in a different way. 
The result is what I shall call abstract objects (§5.3.5). Contexts will be such things, but not only. Finally 
(§5.3.6), I will lay out a syntax, semantics and logic for abstract objects and show that the resulting 
system passes the direct reference test.  
 
5.3.2. Contexts as speaker-time pairs 
In order to see what contexts are, let’s observe what contexts do. They were introduced in §5.2.3, when 
we recognized that pragmatics mandates a change of truth-bearer, from the sentence to the instance of 
use of a sentence. Adopting the conversation heuristic, we narrowed this down to the event of utterance 
                                                     
143 Kaplan, p.523; italics in the original. I change “occurrence” to “utterance” in what follows.  
144 See p. 518 for “providing a synonym”. 
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of a sentence.  An utterance we agreed to analyze into the pair consisting of the sentence uttered and 
the circumstances of utterance, which we collectively called context:  
(50)  𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑥) ↔ ∃𝑠∃𝑐(𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑠) ∧ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑐) ∧ 𝑥 = 〈𝑠, 𝑐〉). 
By the vague term “circumstance of utterance” what is meant is any fact about the occasion of utterance 
which might affect the truth value of the uttered sentence. In the case of indexical theory, these are facts 
about the reference of indexicals.  
On the conversation heuristic, the speaker and the time determine completely all the other contextual 
facts about the utterance: the place of the utterance (“here”) is the place of the speaker at the time of 
utterance; the addressee (“you”) is whomever the speaker is addressing at that time; etc. Consequently, 
it seems we can represent contexts simply as pairs consisting of speakers and times: 
(a) The ordered-pair definition:  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑥) ↔ ∃𝑠∃𝑡(𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑠) ∧ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑡) ∧ 𝑥 = 〈𝑠, 𝑡〉).  
As before, if 𝑐 = 〈𝑠, 𝑡〉, we put 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐) = 𝑠 and 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐) = 𝑡.145 All other atomic indexicals such 
as “here” and “you”, as well as indexical expressions such as “my wife” and “the town I was born in”, 
are then definable in terms of speaker and time: 
(51)  |ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒|𝑐 = 𝜄𝑥. 𝑖𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐), 𝑥, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)), 
(52)  |𝑚𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒|𝑐 = 𝜄𝑥. 𝑊𝑖𝑓𝑒(𝑥, 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)), etc. 
This approach, which we can call the ordered-pair approach to contexts, is essentially Kaplan’s. 
Actually, Kaplan’s contexts include also a place and a possible world component, so they constitute 
centered worlds.146 I will stick to speaker-time pairs for simplicity.  
What makes the speaker and the time of utterance the center of a context, in terms of which all the other 
indexicals can be defined? The answer is that an utterance is an act, and the speaker-time pair constitute 
the agent (in the narrow sense) of the act. I say “in the narrow sense” since usually we would identify 
the agent with the speaker only. But this would not determine the context, as the same speaker can be 
associated with several utterances. An agent in the narrow sense is the speaker qua agent of this very 
utterance, i.e. a speaker at a time, or a time-slice, or a stage, of a speaker (on the assumption that a 
speaker makes at most one utterance at a time).  The speaker, which is often associated with several 
utterances, we call the agent in the proper sense.147  
                                                     
145 “𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑥)” is a predicate, and the uncapitalized “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐)” is a function; and likewise for "𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑥)” 
and “𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)”.  
146 See, e.g., Liao (2012) on centered worlds and their problems.  
147 The notion of speaker in the proper sense will not play a part in what follows, but it’s good to have it in mind 
to compare with agent in the narrow sense. 
87 
 
The relation between a context and an agent can be brought out by comparing contexts to indices. 
Indices are glossed as circumstances of evaluation, contexts as circumstances of use. Take, for example, 
the sentence “it is raining”. This English sentence can be evaluated against a time and place in which 
no English speakers, or even any speakers, exist. But it cannot be used in such a time and place. A 
context, unlike an index, has to have an agent, a linguistic subject on the scene. Let’s formulate this 
insight as our first discovery about contexts: 
(b) The agent on the scene insight: A context is centered around a linguistic agent. 
 
5.3.3. From speaker-time pairs to linguistic agency 
As it stands, the ordered-pair approach cannot serve as a theory of contexts even for the Kaplanian 
semantics of §5.2.5. The reason is that if we understand contexts as speaker-time pairs, we lose the 
power to define pragmatic validity. For let 𝑐∗ = 〈𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎, 1900〉, and accept that Obama was born in 
1961. Our test case for pragmatic validity is: 
(53)  I am here now.  
But now: 
(54)  |(53)|𝑐
∗
= 0. 
From which it follows that: 
(55)  ¬𝑃𝑉((53)). 
So on the ordered-pair approach, 𝐿𝐼𝑝𝑟
𝑃  fails clause (a) of the direct reference test.  
Even if the idea of a speaker at a time captures what it is to be a linguistic agent, a speaker-time pair 
doesn’t capture the idea of a speaker at a time. This was noticed by Kaplan.148 His answer, which as far 
as I can tell has not been improved on, is to limit the contexts to those speaker-time pairs in which the 
speaker occupies some (and therefore one) spatial position at the time of the context. This means a 
revision of our definition of context: 
(c) The naïve situatedness definition:  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡(𝑥) ↔ ∃𝑠, 𝑡(𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑠) ∧ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑡) ∧ 𝑥 = 〈𝑠, 𝑡〉 ∧ ∃𝑦(𝑖𝑛(s, 𝑦, 𝑡))).  
The condition that was added corresponds to Kaplan’s Clause no. 10 in his definition of an interpretation 
(model) of a pragmatic object-language.149 Pairs that conform to (c) are called proper contexts in the 
                                                     
148 Kaplan, p. 509.  
149 p.544. His formulation is superficially different because his contexts include place and world parameters.  
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literature, 150 and pragmatic validity is defined relative to the collection of proper contexts. With this 
modification, “I am here now” turns out pragmatically valid, as desired. Let’s call this refinement the 
proper context approach.   
The situatedness definition (c) is an improvement on the original pair definition (a) since it accounts for 
the example of the first clause of the direct reference test. But as proper contexts are still standard 
objects, by the argument in §5.2.5, it fails the second clause. The reason that it does, I submit, is that a 
speaker-time pair doesn’t capture the philosophical notion of linguistic agency, even if we can be sure 
that the specified speaker occupies a place at the specified time. To see this, observe that it doesn’t even 
pass the first clause, though it does account for the example. The added condition in (c), the situatedness 
condition, is blatantly ad-hoc. In order for (53) to come out true in all contexts, we added a condition 
which amounts to saying that contexts are such that (53) should come out true in all of them. Other 
kinds of pragmatically valid sentence would require adding further conditions to the definition. To wit, 
Kaplan adds another such clause (no. 9) for the sentence “I exist”. And if there are further pragmatically 
valid sentences, for example “I am speaking now”, they would need further special conditions.151 
Effectively, Kaplan’s procedure amounts to including all of the pragmatically valid sentences, more 
precisely their translations in the metalanguage, into the definition of context. It sheds no light on what 
it is that makes them pragmatically valid in the first place. Such a definition offers no substantial 
elucidation of the notion of linguistic agency.  
What is it that makes (53) pragmatically valid in the first place? Why accept that the speaker always 
occupies the place of utterance at the time of utterance? This is not a particularly deep or 
incontrovertible fact; it is a consequence of our agreement to limit our investigation to spoken 
conversations between humans, what we called “the conversation heuristic” in §5.2.3. But if this is a 
mere heuristic, then we shouldn’t include it in our definition of context, (c). Rather, we should think of 
it as a (strictly speaking false) theory of contexts, one that we accept only as a simplifying assumption, 
a heuristic: 
(d) The naïve situatedness heuristic: 𝑖𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐), 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑐), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)). 
You might want to object that (d) is no less ad-hoc than Kaplan’s clause no. 10. I agree. But now it is 
clear that the ad-hocness belongs to the conversation heuristic and not to indexical semantics in 
principle.  
The conversation heuristic is just one possible simplifying theory that we can adopt. We can also 
imagine other sets of axioms expressing different simplifications that help us study indexicality from 
                                                     
150 E.g. in Schlenker (2011, p.1565) and Predelli (2011, p.291).  
151 Since proper contexts, on the present definition, include contexts in which the speaker is silent, “I am speaking 
now” does not come out pragmatically valid, though on the conversation heuristic it should.  
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other angles. What is crucial is not to mistake these heuristics for genuine analyses of the concept of 
context. Indeed, it has long been recognized that the negation of (53) sometimes gets to be used truly, 
if we include non-conversational instances of language use such as recorded messages and written 
notes. (53), it turns out, is not pragmatically valid after all.152 Generalizing even further we see that even 
assuming a speaker and a time is but a simplifying heuristic, at least if by a speaker we mean a human 
individual. After all, we shouldn’t on philosophical grounds rule out the possibility of language use by 
collectives, angels, machines, or what have you, in time or outside of it.153 What seemed like a definition 
of context in (a) turns out too to be a mere heuristic: 
(e) The ordered-pair heuristic: ∃𝑎∃𝑡(𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑎) ∧ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑡) ∧ 𝑐 = 〈𝑎, 𝑡〉). 
 
Mistaking the heuristics (d) and (e) for metaphysical truths is what obscured the source of the failure of 
Kaplan’s system to be an adequate theory of direct reference. Once we drop the heuristics, definitions 
(a) and (c) cease to be applicable, and all that we are left with is the informal insight in (b): that contexts 
are centered around linguistic agents. This is the insight that should guide us in looking for a new 
conception of context. But we know by now that the search should not be for another logically standard 
kind of object to represent the linguistic agent. We are looking for a basic understanding of linguistic 
agency, or subjectivity.  
 
5.3.4. Linguistic agency and the abstractness of characters 
Linguistic agency is the capacity for language use. Languages, according to the definition in §1.3, 
consist of phonology and semantics. A phonological string ceases to be noise and becomes linguistic 
once it is endowed with meaning, or content. Linguistic agency is the capacity to endow phonological 
strings with meanings, or in other words, the capacity for content generation. To say that a context 
contains an agent essentially is to say that it is a site for content generation.154  
The word “generation” denotes, literally, an action or process that takes place at or over a certain time. 
To say that something is generated is to say, among other things, that it does not exist prior to the time 
of generation. But this is only metaphor. Generation for us can’t mean, say, some psychological or 
                                                     
152 Kaplan mentions this at p.491fn but waves the problem away. See Predelli (2011) for a treatment and a good 
literature survey. Predelli, as well as many of the authors he cites, basically accepts the pragmatic validity of (53) 
and Kaplan’s definition of proper context. In order to account for the occasional truth of “I am not here now”, he 
modifies the semantics so as to include improper contexts. On my view, once we look at language use more 
generally, the notions of pragmatic validity and proper contexts shift accordingly and there is no place for 
improper contexts.  
153 Kaplan (p. 553), as a “note on possible refinement” of his framework, considers disembodied (though not non-
existent) linguistic agents. 
154 See Kaplan (1989b), esp. ch.3, for contexts as sites for content generation.  
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neurological process carried out in the heads of individual speakers. Making pronouncements on 
psychological processes requires empirical observation, and we are here working from the armchair.155 
The object of the present investigation is semantics, so we need to cash out the temporal metaphor in 
semantic terms. To say that content is generated, I repeat, is to say that it does not exist prior to the 
moment of generation. Our task in this section is to de-metaphorize “prior”. 
Let’s deal first with intensional languages (as developed in §5.2.1). In intensional languages, with every 
well-formed expression there is associated an object, an intension, as its content. Intensions are 
mathematical functions from a domain of indices (times, possible worlds, etc.) to extensions. In 
intensional semantics, however, content is not generated. It is there, so to speak, to begin with. We can 
say that the content of a non-indexical expression is a standing fact. The notion of content generation 
applies specifically to indexical expressions. It is their contents that are “generated” by the agent in the 
context; in other words, it is their contents that do not exist “prior” to the context. For example, the 
pragmatic-intensional language 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝑃𝐼  (§5.2.5) contains the term “𝐼”. If Trump is the speaker in some 
context 𝑐2, then the content of “𝐼” in 𝑐2 will be a constant function from times to Trump, or simply 
Trump:  
(56)  |𝐼|𝑐2 = 𝜆𝑡. 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐2) ≅ 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑝.  
To say that contents are generated in context is to say that the content |𝐼|𝑐2 does not exist outside 𝑐2. 
The idea here is obviously not that Trump himself does not exist in the time preceding 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐2). The 
sense of “prior” that we are seeking is logical or semantic, and has nothing to do with the context feature 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐). The point is that the possibility of referring to Trump using “𝐼” in 𝑐2 depends only on 
properties of 𝑐2, and in particular on the identity of 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐2). It therefore does not depend on the 
standing domain of 𝐿𝑃: for “𝐼” to refer to Trump, the domain of 𝐿𝑃 doesn’t have to have Trump as 
member.156 This is what it means for the content of “𝐼” to be generated in 𝑐2.  
But here is the sting. Let’s make two observations. First, indexicals have characters, and the characters 
of indexicals, unlike their contents, do not depend on the context of utterance. Like the contents of non-
indexicals, they are ungenerated standing facts about 𝐿𝑝𝑟
𝑃𝐼 . Second, on the standard Kaplanian 
framework presented in §5.2.5, the character of an indexical expression is a mathematical function from 
contexts to contents:  
(57)  |𝐼| = 𝜆𝑐. |𝐼|𝑐 = 𝜆𝑐. 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐).  
                                                     
155 Working from the armchair is something different from the (perhaps empirical) method of psychological 
introspection. We are engaged in the former.  
156 In our case, since 𝐿𝑃 also happens to have an individual constant "𝑏” for Trump, then Trump is also in its 
standing domain. But this isn’t necessary. 
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Mathematical functions are such that their existence implies the existence of their arguments and values. 
This means that where the character |𝐼| exists, so do its values. One of its values is the content |𝐼|𝑐2. 
But then, putting these two observations together, |𝐼|𝑐2 exists independently of (“prior” to) 𝑐2. In other 
words, it is not generated in 𝑐2, contrary to what was said in the previous paragraph. This points to a 
basic incongruity between the philosophical idea of content generated at a context, and the technical 
apparatus of representing characters in terms of standard mathematical functions. Kaplan thinks of this 
apparatus as a matter of convenience,157 but in this case the tool is not apt to the task. Using a 
mathematical function introduces a subtle fallacy of reification into the framework, and subtle though 
it may be, it is opens a crack wide enough for monsters to crawl in.  
If we want to do justice to the idea of linguistic agency as content generation, we need to find a different 
way to think of characters. Such a way is close at hand. Recall the difficult passage from Kaplan, quoted 
in §5.3.1. Kaplan there describes characters as “rules specifying the referent” of an indexicals, without 
“providing a synonym”. Recall also Strawson’s words quoted in §5.2.3, about an expression’s meaning 
(in the sense of character) being “general directions for its use to refer”. Following these two leads, I 
suggest that we think of characters as belonging to the domain of the practical: as practical directives, 
or imperatives, or instructions for an agent how to generate content. The assumption here is that 
practical directives do not by themselves involve theoretical, and in particular ontological, commitments 
(except by virtue of heuristics of the kind sketched in §5.3.3). It is only when in fact carried out by an 
agent that such directives serve to generate ontological commitment.158 
Our starting point (§5.3.2) was the contrast between circumstances of evaluation (indices) and contexts 
of use. The basic insight (b) was that contexts involve an agent in some essential way that indices don’t. 
This contrast is reflected in the difference between intensions as mathematical functions and characters 
as practical directives. A directive, unlike a theoretical statement, requires an agent on site to carry it 
out. The existence of a directive doesn’t automatically imply the existence of an agent which can 
implement it, or the existence of the product of such an implementation. In systems in which this 
property of directives is important, a mathematical function is not a good model for them. If we take 
characters (e.g. (57)) to be practical directives and not mathematical functions, then it is not the case 
that their existence implies the existence of the contents (e.g. (56)) that agents generate by following 
them. This fact, that characters do not imply the existence of the objects that they determine, we can 
call the abstractness of characters.  
                                                     
157 Kaplan: “it is convenient to represent characters by functions from possible contexts to contents” (p.505).  
158 The fact that practical directives don’t carry ontological commitment is not often explicitly recognized in 
philosophy, but it does surface occasionally. For example, the practical nature of Euclid’s geometrical postulates 
is sometimes interpreted in this way when compared to Hilbert’s corresponding axioms. See Mueller (1981, p. 
14f); compare Chihara (2003).  
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In making sense of content generation I relied on the intensional approach to content (§5.2.1). In §5.2.2 
I made some effort to convince you that this approach is inadequate. What does content generation 
mean for extensional languages? On such languages we can no longer say that with every expression 
there is associated an object as its content, and so there is no obvious candidate for being the “generated” 
content in the case of indexicals. But we can still make sense of content generation, and in particular of 
the abstractness of characters, in terms of direct ontological commitment to the arguments and values 
of intensions. In these terms, to say that characters are abstract and that content is generated in context 
is to absolve the metalanguage 𝑀𝑃 of ontological commitment to the arguments and the values of the 
intensions that would have served as contents on an intensional counterpart. Formally, with every 
context 𝑐 we associate a domain 𝐷𝑐 of objects, reference to which is generated in 𝑐. To say that 
characters are abstract is to say that we can’t assume these objects to be part of the standing domain of 
𝑀𝑃. This yields the same result as before: “𝐼” in 𝐿𝑃 at 𝑐2 can refer to Trump even if Trump is not a 
member of the domain of 𝑀𝑃.  
This implies the following, perhaps surprising, change in the logic. if the referent of an indexical 𝛼 does 
not exist 𝐷𝑀
𝑃
, then a fortiori it does not exist in 𝐷𝐿
𝑃
. The quantifiers of 𝐿𝑃, however, range over its 
standing domain. This means that the law of existential generalization ˹𝜙(𝛼) → ∃𝑥𝜙𝑥˺ does not hold 
in 𝐿𝑃 for 𝛼 an indexical. Indexicals call for a kind of free logic, though not for the reasons for which 
free logic was originally devised.  
The abstractness of 𝑀𝑃 has one consequence which is particularly important to our on-going concern 
(the concept of truth and the language of Convention T): Truth for 𝐿𝑃 cannot in general be defined in 
𝑀𝑃. Consider the T-sentence in 𝑀𝑃 for the 𝐿𝑃 sentence “I am president now”: 
(58) |𝑃(𝐼, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)|𝑐 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐) 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐). 
The significance of the fact that characters are abstract is that the expressions “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐)” and 
“𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)” do not refer in the usual sense to the speaker and the time of 𝑐. In order for the indexicals 
“𝐼” and “𝑛𝑜𝑤” to refer in 𝑐2 to Trump and to 2017, it is not necessary for Trump and 2017 to be objects 
in the domain of the metalanguage 𝑀𝑃. The expressions “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐)” and “𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)” are unsituated 
instructions directed at a prospective situated agent, telling that agent how to generate content, in terms 
of the feature of the agent’s situation; in Kaplan’s terms, they are instructions on how to “fix the 
referent” of “𝐼” to the speaker of the context. From this it follows that the sentential character 
“𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐) 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)” is not a judgment, but only an instruction for making a 
judgment in context; in Strawson’s words, it is a “general direction for the use” of the sentence 
“𝑃(𝐼, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)” in making an assertion. A pragmatic semantics in 𝑀𝑃 for an object-language 𝐿𝑃 does not 
imply a truth predicate. We say that 𝑀𝑃 is an abstract metalanguage for 𝐿𝑃.  
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5.3.5. Abstract objects 
The aim of our investigation is to answer the three questions stated in §5.3.1B. The metaphysical 
question (a) was:  
What kind of thing is a context, if it isn’t an object in the standard sense of the word?  
The (meta-)semantical question (b): 
What is the relation between the parameter 𝑐 and contexts? 
With the notion of abstractness (of 𝑀𝑃) in hand, we are ready to provide answers.  
The concepts to be developed as answers are those of an abstract object and of abstract reference. 
Abstract objects are to be distinguished from real objects, which are the usual objects found in domains 
of standard languages and in context domains 𝐷𝑐. Before we look into abstract objects, we need to have 
some characterization of real objects before our eyes. A comprehensive theory of the concept of object 
is well beyond the scope of this work. I’ll say just what I need to say to make my meaning clear. Briefly, 
I take it to be constitutive of real objects that they can be individuated, and individuation depends on 
what I will call unity and constitution, or constitutional distinctness. An object can be individuated 
relative to a language or a context only if both its unity and its constitution are given in that language 
or context. Abstract objects are such that their unity and constitution come apart.159  
 
As I’ve stressed a while back, I’m here speaking of real objects in a logical, not a metaphysical, sense. 
Many metaphysically different kinds of things are real objects for some language or another: planets, 
wars, numbers, concepts, possible worlds, etc. A real object is something that is referred to by a singular 
term, i.e. by a variable or by an indexical. Singular terms appear in two kinds of atomic formulas: 
predications ˹𝑃(𝛼, 𝛽, … )˺ and identity statements ˹𝛼 = 𝛽˺. These linguistic forms provide a clue to the 
notions of unity and constitution.160 They are slippery notions and I will not explicate them in any 
generality. Let me limit the discussion to composite objects, and in particular to container objects such 
as tuples, since other composite objects can usually be reduced to them.161 The simplest container 
objects are collections, and the difference between unity and difference is best displayed with relation 
to them.162 The unity of a container object is the fact that a concept can be predicated of it (or withheld 
                                                     
159 The issue is intimately related to, but not the same as, the issue of identity; also the notion of a sortal concept. 
See Lowe (2017) for a brief but lucid and (relatively) comprehensive introduction, and references therein.   
160 Lowe (2017) speaks of a principle of individuation of objects as a combination of a principle of unity and a 
criterion of identity (p. 993). He doesn’t link unity to predication as I do.  
161 If there are objects which are not composite, it might be that unity and difference cannot come apart for them.  
162 The unity of collections is sometimes referred to as totality.  
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from it) as of a single thing, disregarding the plurality of its components. For example, the collection 
𝐴 =  {𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑦, 𝐷𝑒 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑒, 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎, 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖} has never been a president, though every one of its 
members have been. In this way the predicate “president” applies to 𝐴’s members, but not to 𝐴 (and 
vice versa for its negation). Collection unity is the simplest, and consists merely in taking the plurality 
of a collection’s members as a single object, i.e. in denoting it using a singular term. The constitution 
of an object generally is that by which it can be distinguished from and counted with other objects. For 
collections, constitutional distinctness amounts to a difference in their memberships and nothing else. 
For container objects more complicated than collections, such as tuples, we would include organization 
as well, i.e. the order of the members.  
To say that unity and constitutional distinctness, or individuation for short, constitute objecthood, is to 
say that they ground the existence of the individuated objects in a domain of discourse. In other words, 
if for some principled reason a language 𝐿 cannot express unity and constitution for some objects, then 
these objects are not members of 𝐷𝐿. For example, proper classes with respect to the language of 𝑍𝐹 
set theory 𝐿𝑍𝐹 lack the appropriate unity in 𝐿𝑍𝐹, and therefore are excluded from membership in the 
domain of 𝐿𝑍𝐹. This is in spite of the fact that the constitutional distinctness of proper classes is given 
in 𝐿𝑍𝐹: every one of the members of a proper class is a member of 𝐿𝑍𝐹’s domain.
163  
Initially, we would like to say that if the members of a collection are not objects in a domain 𝐷𝐿, then 
neither should the collection be. But we can stipulate cases to the contrary. For example, let 𝑎 = {0,1}, 
𝑏 = {0,2}, and let 𝐿 be a language with ∈ as the sole non-logical predicate (with the usual 
interpretation), and let 𝐷𝐿 = {0, 𝑎, 𝑏}. Then 𝑎 and 𝑏 are distinct in 𝐿, though the difference in their 
membership is not given in 𝐿. This seems to show that a difference in membership is not sufficient for 
constitutional distinctness, or that constitutional distinctness is not sufficient for individuation. But this 
is not the case. All that this example shows is that being able to express a difference in membership 
between two sets in a language 𝐿 is not necessary for expressing the distinctness of the sets in 𝐿. The 
distinctness of 𝑎 and 𝑏 relative to 𝐿 was a fact stipulated by us, and the stipulation was grounded in a 
difference of membership, although this difference was expressed not in 𝐿. A distinction between two 
collections must always be grounded by some difference in membership, be it expressible in the 
language under discussion or not. By contrast, if a distinction can in principle not be made between two 
objects of a given kind, only then should we say that they cannot be counted as objects in a given 
domain. If you can’t be counted, you can’t be counted as an object.164  
                                                     
163 Cantor famously distinguishes between consistent and inconsistent multiplicities. The latter are such that it is 
impossible to think of them “as a unity, as ‘one finished thing’“ (Cantor’s letter to Dedekind, in van Heijenoort 
1967, p. 114).  
164 Urelemente in set theory apparently exhibit such a distinction without a difference. But this is only apparent. 
Urelemente are needed in set theory if set theory is used, not as foundations for mathematics (in which case 
Urelemente are disposable), but as a theory of collections of arbitrary (real) objects. The theory of collections 
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To sum up, objecthood for container objects amounts to membership and unity, and, sometimes, also 
organization. If for some principled reason either membership or unity for a certain collection 𝑎 is not 
given in a language 𝐿 or a context 𝑐, then 𝑎 is not a member of, respectively, 𝐷𝐿 or 𝐷𝑐.  
 
Let’s apply these remarks to the case at hand. Objecthood, we say, depends on unity and constitutional 
distinctness. Consequently, the absence of unity and constitutional distinctness implies failure of 
objecthood. Usually, we would leave it at that. But our recent notion of an abstract pragmatic 
metalanguage, coupled with contexts as sites for content generation, allows us to conceive of a special 
situation in which unity and constitution for a certain kind of object are both available, though in 
different languages. This gives rise to the notion of an abstract object, as follows. 
Contexts can be regarded as containers. To see this, consider that the only role of contexts for us is to 
provide reference for the indexicals. Consequently, we can think of a context 𝑐 as a container for all of 
the objects that stand in contact with the agent, i.e. as a long tuple of context features.165 Does the tuple 
need to be so long? Can’t we define all its members in terms of speaker and time, as we did in §5.3.2?:  
(59)  𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑐) = 𝜄𝑥. 𝑖𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐), 𝑥, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)), 
(60)  𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒(𝑐) = 𝜄𝑥. (𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐) 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑥 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑐)), etc. 
According to the direct reference thesis, we shouldn’t be able to. The problem with these definitions is 
that, since they are formulated in 𝑀𝑃, they imply that the referents of the indexicals exist in the domain 
of 𝑀𝑃. But this contradicts the abstractness of 𝑀𝑃, according to which the members of 𝐷𝑐 are not 
(necessarily) members of the domain of 𝑀𝑃. Therefore, the context tuples have to include all context 
features and not just speaker and time.  
The objecthood of tuples depends on their membership (in order) and their unity. However, in the case 
of contexts these two things come apart. Let 𝑐1 be some context. Then 𝑐1 is the tuple consisting of all 
the things that can be referred to (indexically) in 𝑐1. In other words, 𝑐1 consists of all the things that 
have both unity and constitutional distinctness relative to 𝑐1. But then, if we accept the principle 
according to which a container cannot contain itself, then 𝑐1 itself is not one of those objects. 
Consequently, 𝑐1 does not have unity and constitutional distinctness relative to 𝑐1. There will therefore 
not be an indexical 𝛼 such that an utterance of 𝛼 in 𝑐1 refers to 𝑐1. Now trivially the constitution (ordered 
                                                     
abstracts from the particular individuals to be collected, but it doesn’t want to abstract from their individuation, 
since its main use is in counting them in advanced way, and individuation is required for counting. Once we turn 
to apply set theory to a specific domain as a calculus of collections, say when we want to count the real numbers, 
then we have to bring their differences into account. See Potter (2004, §3.8) for this point of view.  
165 “Contact” is the term I used non-commitally for the relation between objects and an agent that underlies the 
direct reference of indexicals, see §5.2.4.  
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membership) of 𝑐1 is available in 𝑐1: we can refer in 𝑐1 to every member of 𝑐1 using the right indexical. 
It is therefore the unity of 𝑐1 which is missing in 𝑐1.  
In 𝑀𝑃 we get the converse. 𝑀𝑃 is used to state characters, expressions such as 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐), which refer 
to the speaker of the context. The context parameter 𝑐 is a singular term that refers to contexts in 𝑀𝑃. 
So the unity of contexts is given in 𝑀𝑃. However, as we saw in §5.3.4, the members of the different 
contexts, for example their speakers, are not (in general) members of the domain of 𝑀𝑃. In other words, 
the constitution of contexts is unavailable in 𝑀𝑃. 
The picture we have is that contexts do have both unity and difference, but not together in the same 
language or context. The membership of a context 𝑐1 is given in 𝑐1, while its unity is given in the 
abstract 𝑀𝑃. I call this kind of object an abstract object. The context parameter 𝑐 can be called an 
abstract variable, and the relation between 𝑐 and the contexts abstract reference. This goes also for 
characters: the expression “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐)” refers abstractly to speakers of contexts. The concept of 
reference, like the concept of object, undergoes a kind of fission: abstract reference pertains to the 
character of an indexical as the rule of reference; direct reference pertains to indexicals in context and 
yields the actual reference. Abstract reference, on this view, is the complement of direct reference.  
 
The notions of abstract objects and abstract reference are our respective answers to the metaphysical 
and the metasemantic questions from above. In the next section I will lay out the formal properties of 
the abstract variable, and they will provide an answer to the third question. Before we proceed, let me 
make two more points about abstract objects.  
That a context 𝑐1 is an abstract object means two things: that it is not an object in its associated domain 
𝐷𝑐1;  and that it is referred to abstractly in 𝑀𝑃, through the abstract variable “𝑐”. But then it is only an 
abstract object relative to the context 𝑐1 (itself) and the abstract variable “𝑐”. 𝑐1 might, per accidens, 
also be a real object relative to some other domain. For example, nothing tells against the existence of 
the context 𝑐1 in the standing (conceptual) domain of 𝐿
𝑃 (and consequently also in the domain of 𝑀𝑃), 
referred to by some non-indexical individual constant. Or there might be a context 𝑐2 that contains 𝑐1 
as a member, so that 𝑐1 can be referred to directly, through an indexical, in 𝑐2. To say that contexts are 
abstract objects is not to say that they are a new kind of object, but that they are an object in a new way. 
Maybe it is better to say that they are objects abstractly. The fact that contexts can also be referred to 
in the standard way we can call the reality of contexts principle.166  
                                                     
166 Recall the reality of indexicals principle from §5.2.3.  
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We need some way to speak about the content that is “generated” in a context. In §5.2.2 the mediated 
approach to content was proposed as a way to represent content for extensional languages. The idea 
was that the content of an expression 𝛼 in a language 𝐿 will be referred to by the statement, in a 
metalanguage for 𝐿, of the semantic value of 𝛼. But in the case of indexicals we can’t use such 
statements from the abstract metalanguage 𝑀𝑃, since real reference and truth-conditions for 𝐿𝑃 
expressions are not available in it (see the closing of §5.3.4). However, by our recent reality of contexts 
principle we may assume that for every context 𝑐 there is some non-abstract metalanguage 𝑀𝑐, the 
domain of which will include both 𝐷𝑐 and the standing domain of 𝐿𝑃. In 𝑀𝑐 we can formulate real 
content statements for 𝐿𝑃 at a context 𝑐. I call 𝑀𝑐 a surveying metalanguage (for 𝑐).  
 
5.3.6. The abstract variable 
The third guiding question in §5.3.1B was the formal question:  
What are the formal properties of the abstract variable 𝑐?  
The task now is to give the syntax and the semantics of 𝑀𝑃 in light of our recent discussion, and 
especially in light of the developments of the concepts of character and context from the two previous 
sections. In addition, we want to see whether it passes the direct reference test from §5.2.4 (spoiler: it 
does).  
The usual variable in standard languages expresses real objecthood, which by the previous section 
implies unity and constitutional distinction. Unity is expressed by the fact that the variable is a singular 
term, a potential subject of predication. Constitutional distinctness is made available by the existence 
of several different variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2, etc. For instance, in a binary predication ˹𝜙(𝑥1, 𝑥1)˺ the two relata 
have to be the same individual, while in ˹𝜙(𝑥1, 𝑥2)˺ they may be distinct. In this way the expression of 
the possibility of distinctness (though not of its actuality) is built into the syntax, and even the notation, 
of the variable.167 By contrast, the notion of abstract object is such as to allow unity but, in principle, 
no distinction. There should be no syntactic possibility of using two different abstract variables in the 
same sentence, e.g. to refer to two distinct contexts 𝑐1 and 𝑐2. There is only one abstract variable. 
Accordingly, I make a notational modification and, instead of the Latin lowercase “𝑐” evocative of the 
usual variable, use the symbol “@”.168  
                                                     
167 See Fine (2003) for a discussion of this point which, however, leads Fine to a quite different place (to Fine 
(2007)).  
168 This symbol is sometimes used to denote the actual world (e.g. Menzel (2006)). Lewis (1970) argues that 
“actually” is an indexical term referring to the world of the context (more or less; in 1970 Kaplan’s distinction 
between index and context was still brewing); see also Lewis (1986), Kaplan (1989b, p.594f). Notice that if “@” 
indeed refers to the actual world, and if actuality is indeed indexical, then “@” can only refer to the actual world 
abstractly (in my sense). This is because the metalanguage, both in Lewis and in Kaplan, contains no indexicals. 
98 
 
Apart from the abstract variable itself, 𝑀𝑃 has terms that refer to the context features. Which features 
we can say a context has depends on our full metaphysical theory of contexts and linguistic agents. We 
don’t have a full theory. We do have a basic characterization of contexts according which contexts are 
centered around linguistic agents; and a characterization of linguistic agents according to which what 
they do is endow strings with content. Minimally then, 𝑀𝑃 should have a term for the function of 
endowing strings with content, i.e. for a semantic interpretation function |𝑠|@ with one standard variable 
ranging over strings and one abstract variable over contexts. This expression represents the use of the 
string 𝑠 by the agent of the context @. Beyond the basic characterization of contexts, we also indulged 
in certain heuristic assumptions about contexts, in particular their possession of certain features such as 
speaker, time, etc. With this in mind we can let 𝑀𝑃 contain the singular terms 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@), 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(@), 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@), etc. These, together with the real variables, are the only genuine singular terms of 𝑀𝑃 
(ignoring the term “1” in locutions such as ˹|𝑠|@ = 1˺). The syntactic theory of 𝑀𝑃 (the definition of 
𝑤𝑓𝑓) is exactly like that of standard languages (see §1.3.3), except that atomic formulas are now defined 
to include abstract singular terms. (There is no quantifier over @.) 
 
So much for the syntax of 𝑀𝑃. The semantics is a little more complicated, since in 𝑀𝑃, unlike in 
standard languages, the norm of the language doesn’t converge with the central concept of its theory of 
meaning. I’ll explain. Standard regimentation is inherently assertoric in force, and the constitutive norm 
of assertion for it is truth. Note that by talking about assertion I don’t mean a speech act. The main 
purpose of standard regimented languages is to express theories, and this is done in the assertoric or 
indicative mood. A theory is successful if it is true. This is the sense in which the norm of standard 
languages is truth. It so happens, as we’ve seen, that the concept of truth (or satisfaction) is also the 
central concept of the theory of meaning for standard languages. This is, of course, no mere accident. 
The concept of truth is constitutive of standard languages.169  
But with 𝑀𝑃 things are less comfortable. First, sentences in 𝑀𝑃 are not truth-bearers. This is because 
𝑀𝑃 is not assertoric in force. Sentences in 𝑀𝑃 in general are rules for generating (assertoric) content, 
and rules are not assertions. Therefore truth is not the norm of 𝑀𝑃. Second, since 𝑀𝑃 sentences don’t 
have truth-conditions, there’s no sense in thinking of truth conditions as their meanings. Some other 
concept will have to fulfill that role. Finally, there is no reason to assume at the outset that there will be 
a single concept that fulfills both duties, of being a norm and of constituting meaning, in the way that 
truth does for standard languages.  
                                                     
169 Dummett (1959) is the classical place for the connection between truth as the norm of assertion (its success 
condition) and truth as constitutive of meaning. See also §2.3.2.  
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The meaning theory for 𝑀𝑃 is a statement of what happens when a sentence of 𝑀𝑃 is applied to a 
context. I call it application semantics.170 An 𝑀𝑃 sentence (a rule) is applied to a real, non-abstract, 
context (is acted on by the context’s agent), to yield an item of content. I’ll present application semantics 
by showing it for a particular context instead of by giving general definitions. Let 𝑐1 be a context in 
which the speaker is Obama (= 𝑎), the place is the White House (= ℎ), and the time is 2016 (= 𝑡1). I 
use square brackets to denote the “action” of applying an 𝑀𝑃 expression, and a paired arrow subscripted 
with the context’s name to signal the result of the application.  
(I) Application semantics for 𝑴𝑷 in 𝒄𝟏 
(a) [@] ⇉𝑐1 𝑐1; 
(b) [𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)] ⇉𝑐1 𝑎, and likewise for all other context features; 
(c) For any string 𝑠, [|𝑠|@] ⇉𝑐1 |𝑠|; 
(d) If ˹𝜙(𝛼1, … 𝛼𝑛)˺ is a sentence containing abstract singular terms 𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛, then 
[𝜙(𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛)] ⇉𝑐1 𝜙([𝛼1], … , [𝛼𝑛]). 
Think of the paired arrow as symbolizing the generation of content. On its left-hand side, in square 
brackets, is written an abstract expression (a character). Subscripted to the right of the paired arrow, the 
context in which the character is applied is designated. On the right-hand side is a statement of the 
generated content. The statement of 𝐿𝑃 content at 𝑐1 is expressible neither in 𝑀
𝑃 nor in 𝐿𝑃, but only in 
a surveying language 𝑀𝑐1 (see the last paragraph of §5.3.5). The right-hand sides of the application 
clauses are therefore expressions in 𝑀𝑐1. In words, clause (b) says that the abstract expression 
“𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)”, applied to the context 𝑐1 in which Obama is the speaker, generates reference to Obama; 
clause (c) says that the abstract expression ˹|𝑠|@˺, applied to 𝑐1, generates reference to the reference of 
𝑠; clause (d) implies, for example, that the abstract expression “|𝐼|@ = 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)”, applied to 𝑐1, 
results in the identification of the reference of “𝐼” with Obama, or in other words in the endowment of 
the string “𝐼” with its meaning: |𝐼| = 𝑎. 
 
This is the meaning theory for 𝑀𝑃. What about the norm of 𝑀𝑃? We can tell that the norm of standard 
languages is truth by the fact that truth is what characterizes successful theories, i.e. sentences that we 
endorse. Likewise, we will get a clue about the norm of 𝑀𝑃 if we inspect the sentences of 𝑀𝑃 that we 
endorse. Sentences that we endorse I call, for now, correct. I write ˹𝑀𝑃 ⊩ 𝜙˺ to say that ˹𝜙˺ is correct 
in 𝑀𝑃. The first group of correct sentences constitute the pragmatic theory for 𝐿𝑃:  
(61)  𝑀𝑃 ⊩ |𝐼|@ = 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@), 
                                                     
170 Strictly speaking, it is neither a semantics nor a theory. 
100 
 
(62)  𝑀𝑃 ⊩ |𝑎|@ = 𝑎, 
(63)  𝑀𝑃 ⊩ |𝑃(𝐼, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)|@ = 1 ↔  𝑃(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@)). 
These are the sentences that ascribe characters to indexicals. They are the analogues to sentences such 
as “|𝑊𝑠| = 1 ↔ 𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑤 𝑖𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒” in standard semantics. To say that (61) is correct (and not, say, 
“|𝐼|@ = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@)”) is to say that “𝐼” refers to the speaker of the context (and not to the time of 
utterance). The pragmatic theory consists of all sentences of the form: 
(a) 𝑴𝑷 semantics: 𝑀𝑃 ⊩ ˹|𝜙| = 1 ↔ 𝜓˺. 
where 𝜙 is well-formed in 𝐿𝑃 and 𝜓 is like 𝜙 except that all indexicals are replaced by the corresponding 
context features, i.e. “𝐼” by “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)”, etc.171  
I use the symbol ⊨ to denote truth in non-abstract languages. For example, I write ˹𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ 𝜙˺ to mean 
that ˹𝜙˺ is true in the surveying language 𝑀𝑐1  (˹𝜙˺ is true about the context 𝑐1). For example, the 
following sentences are the results of applying (61)-(63) to 𝑐1 using (I): 
(64)  𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |𝐼| = 𝑎, 
(65)  𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |𝑎| = 𝑎, 
(66)  𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |𝑃(𝐼, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = 1 ↔  𝑃(𝑎, 𝑡1). 
When we apply an 𝑀𝑃 expression to a context, the result is expressed by a sentence in the metalanguage 
surveying the context.172 We can abbreviate uses of (I) by the following principle: 
(b) The Commitment Rule: 𝑀𝑃 ⊩ 𝜙 ⇒ 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ [𝜙]. 
In words: if a sentence is correct in 𝑀𝑃, then the result of its application to a context is a true sentence 
(in the surveying metalanguage, about the context). In particular, the contrapositive tells us that if an 
application results in a falsity, then the applied sentence is incorrect. Consequently, the application of a 
correct 𝑀𝑃 sentence will always result in true sentences. We therefore say of correct sentences that they 
are a-priori. This is the norm of 𝑀𝑃.  
This is one group of a-priori sentences: the pragmatic theory. Two further groups are the sentences 
belonging to phonological theory and to logical theory. Since contexts are essentially centered around 
agents, and agents essentially are that which endows strings with meanings, phonology is an essential 
part of a context. It’s not that the domain of the context contains strings necessarily. The domain of the 
context contains the objects that the agent of the context can refer to directly. Strings are not necessarily 
such objects. Strings are the objects through which the agent refers to whatever he or she refers to. 
                                                     
171  This is, if you like, the T-schema relativized to indexicals.  
172 We are adopting the mediated approach to content of §5.2.2.  
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Phonological facts are therefore facts about the context, not facts expressible within the context; as 
such, they are facts expressible in the surveying language. To say that these facts are a-priori is in effect 
to assume that all agents share a phonological constitution.173 
That logical theory is a-priori is obvious and I will not elaborate on it. For later use it is important to 
put down the principle of substitutivity of identicals. In 𝑀𝑐1 we get, as a special case, the substitutivity 
of coreferring terms: 
(c) Substitutivity of coreferring terms: 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |𝛼| = |𝛽| ⇒ 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |𝜙(𝛼)| = |𝜙(𝛽)|. 
The form that this principle takes here is of importance for what follows.  
Finally, if we accept certain methodological heuristics (see §5.3.3), then the following too is a priori: 
(d) Naïve Situatedness Heuristic: 𝑀𝑃 ⊩ 𝑖𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@), 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(@), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@)). 
An application of this yields: 
(67)  𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ 𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ, 𝑡1). 
Summing up, the a-priori sentences are: the pragmatic semantic theory for 𝐿𝑃; phonological theory; 
logical theory; and the methodological heuristics.174 They are a gerrymandered group, and to that extent 
the norm of 𝑀𝑃 is less a coherent unity than truth is for standard languages. I leave discussion of that 
to a later date and proceed to show that this semantics passes the direct reference test.  
 
Clause (a) of the test requires to define the pragmatic validity predicate. We say that a sentence 𝑠 of 𝐿𝑃 
is pragmatically valid if it is true a-priori, i.e. if ˹𝑀𝑃 ⊩ |𝑠|@ = 1˺. To see that this works, let’s show 
that “I am here now” is pragmatically valid and “Obama is here now” isn’t: 
1. 𝑃𝑉(𝑠) 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑀𝑃 ⊩ |𝑠|@ = 1       Definition 
2. 𝑀𝑃 ⊩  𝑖𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@), 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(@), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@))     (d) 
3. 𝑀𝑃 ⊩ |𝑖𝑛(𝐼, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)|@ = 1 ↔ 𝑖𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@), 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒(@), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@)) (a)  
4. 𝑀𝑝 ⊩ |𝑖𝑛(𝐼, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)|@ = 1       2,3  
5. 𝑷𝑽("𝒊𝒏(𝑰, 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆, 𝒏𝒐𝒘)")       1,4  
                                                     
173 A sensus communis? 
174 In 𝐿𝑃 we also had non-indexical expressions (𝑃, 𝑎, 𝑏), and this means that in 𝑀𝑃 we have their non-abstract 
translations. Since true sentences involving them will generate sentences true in every context, they are also a-
priori sentences.  
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To see that “Obama is here now” is not 𝑃𝑉, let’s imagine a context 𝑐2 in which Trump (= 𝑏) is the 
speaker, the White House (= ℎ) is the place, and 2017 (= 𝑡2) is the time. (We also assume that the 
White House houses at most one person at a time): 
6. 𝑀𝑐2 ⊭ 𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ, 𝑡2)       Fact about 𝑐2 
7. 𝑀𝑐2 ⊨ |𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = 1 ↔ 𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ, 𝑡2)     (a),(b) 
8. 𝑀𝑐2 ⊭ |𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = 1       6,7 
9. 𝑀𝑃 ⊮ |𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)|@ = 1       8, (b)  
10. ¬𝑷𝑽("𝒊𝒏(𝒂, 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆, 𝒏𝒐𝒘)")       1, 9 
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Clause (b) of the test requires to show that a pragmatic validity operator for 𝐿𝑃 is impossible. A 
pragmatic validity operator Π is such that ˹Π(𝜙)˺, when used, is true if and only if ˹𝜙˺ ∈ 𝑃𝑉. We show 
that the assumption that such an operator is used in 𝑐1 contradicts our previous result.  
11. 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |˹Π𝜙˺| = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑉(˹𝜙˺)       Assumption 
12. 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨  |Π𝑖𝑛(𝐼, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑉("𝑖𝑛(𝐼, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)")   11 
13. 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |Π𝑖𝑛(𝐼, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = 1       5, 12 
14. 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |𝐼| = |𝑎|        (64),(65) 
15. 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |Π𝑖𝑛(𝐼, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = |Π𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)|    14, (c) 
16. 𝑀𝑐1 ⊨ |Π𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)| = 1     13, 15 
17. 𝑃𝑉("𝑖𝑛(𝑎, ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑛𝑜𝑤)")        11, 16 
18. But 17 contradicts 10. Therefore there is no operator 𝑨𝑷 fulfilling 11. 
⊠ 
This completes the demonstration that the pragmatic system 𝑀𝑃 is adequate to the thesis of direct 
reference.  
 
5.4. Summary and discussion 
In §5.2 we set up the notion of direct reference and argued that an objectual indexical semantics (one 
that treats contexts as real objects) cannot do justice to it. §5.3 proposed an alternative. The thought was 
to let the concept of context of use inform a departure from the standard formal framework. An 
inspection of this concept revealed its dependence on the concept of a linguistic agent, which in turn 
we equated with the capacity for content generation. This latter we cashed out in terms of ontological 
commitment. The fact that contexts of use are centered around linguistic agents was implemented in 
the formal system using the notion of reference devoid of ontological commitment: abstract reference. 
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This gave rise to the notion of an abstract object: an object referred to from a perspective in which it 
has no reality. Finally, we gave the rules for the operation of this formal system and saw that it is passes 
the direct reference test, hence adequate to the philosophical doctrine of direct reference.  
Before we move on to adapt this system to the problem of the concept of truth in regimented languages, 
let me make some remarks and suggestions for further work. First, it is important to understand exactly 
how the test was won. The crucial difference between Kaplan’s objectual pragmatics from §5.2.5 and 
our abstract system is that in Kaplan’s system the law of substitutivity of identicals (c) fails for contents. 
Its failure on Kaplan’s system is analogous to its failure for extensions on intensional semantics (see 
(6) and (7) in §5.2.1). In the latter case the source of the failure is the implicit relativization of the 
extension to a non-extensional parameter, the index. In Kaplan’s case the source is the relativization to 
a non-intensional parameter, the context. This parameter (in both cases) can be quantified over, and this 
is what lets monsters in in Kaplan’s case. Kaplan was alive to the fact that direct reference hates 
monsters, but since he was unable or unwilling to depart from objectual semantics, there was nothing 
he could do to stop them from coming in. By contrast, on our system we have autonomy of content: in 
a context, language is oblivious to character and we have full substitutivity of identicals. A monstrous 
operator is one the content of which depends on facts about character. Where content is autonomous 
such operators cannot be defined.  
There are questions concerning indexicality that are central in the literature and which I have not 
addressed. One of the central philosophical questions in this area concerns the essentiality of indexicals, 
the question whether what they express is expressible by non-indexical means. Some writers argue that 
indexicals express perspectival contents that are inexpressible otherwise, and, of course, others object. 
I believe the present understanding of indexicality can contribute to this debate, but I will leave this to 
another occasion.175 A different issue is raised by empirical linguistics. Some linguists claim to find 
empirical evidence for the existence of monsters in natural language. Whatever impact this evidence 
has on the foregoing is indirect, and certainly deserves exploration (on another occasion).176  
                                                     
175 The loci classici for the essential indexicality thesis are Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979). See Cappelen and 
Dever (2013) for a survey and a sustained critique, also Magidor (2015). Cappelen and Dever expressly dissociate 
the idea of essential indexicality from the question of monsters in Kaplan-style semantics. I think my system can 
be used to mount an essential indexicality thesis that is impervious to their attacks. Such a thesis might not, 
however, do all that Perry and others might want from it. (Incidentally, Perry does not accept the prohibition on 
monsters. See Israel and Perry (1997).) 
176 See Schlenker (2011) for presentation and references. Notice that the existence of monsters in natural language 
is not incompatible with the thesis of direct reference as understood above, but only with natural language being 
directly referential. In any case, the reported monsters usually (if not only) come up in the analysis of propositional 
attitudes. Propositional attitudes are usually analyzed in intensional terms, but there are reasons to think that they 
too require a different treatment, one that digs even deeper into the concept of a linguistic agent. In view of 
Schlenker’s evidence, we could make it a condition on such a treatment that it explain the presence (or the 
appearance) of monsters in propositional attitudes. 
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It might be illuminating to compare the present system with other systems that do similar things. I am 
especially thinking of Kit Fine’s logic of arbitrary objects, and Bas van Fraassen’s supervaluationist 
semantics.177 In both cases a semantics is put forth to support a logic for objects which fall short of full-
fledged existence. But in both cases the semantics is defined in terms of really existing objects, and the 
language is a merely notational variant on standard languages.178 Abstract objects, on my account, do 
not in themselves fall short of full-fledged existence. Their abstractness inheres in the mode of referring 
to them.  
My use of “abstract object” is different from the dominant one. In the literature, abstract objects are 
most often defined as being non-spatiotemporal and causally inefficacious.179 The central examples are 
mathematical objects such as numbers and sets, and content objects such as concepts and propositions. 
Theories of these objects have the same logical status as theories of any other object. The fact that an 
object is abstract, on the usual view, is unrelated to its being an object in the logical sense. On my 
reading, the abstractness of an object is a disruption in its very objecthood.  
Let me end this digression with two difficult issues about 𝑀𝑃 which I will leave open. We saw that 
sentences of 𝑀𝑃 are a-priori, but that the a-priori was a gerrymandered bunch. Phonological theory was 
a-priori because of how we defined language (in §1.3.1); logical theory is a-priori since it abstracts from 
content; the heuristics were a-priori by stipulation. But what grounds the pragmatic clauses, the 
assignments of characters to expressions? In what sense is it a-priori that the character of “I” is 
“𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)”? Kaplan (and others) often speak in terms of conventions of language. I don’t know 
what the relevant notion of convention is here, but the idea of convention fits in well with the practical-
normative nature of characters.  
A related question is: what is the metalanguage of 𝑀𝑃? Which language can we formulate the 
application semantics (I) in, seeing that we can’t express it, as we are used to, in terms of a mathematical 
function on contexts? There is something inherently practical, as opposed to theoretical, about 𝑀𝑃. This 
is why it constitutes an essential departure from standard semantics (though this will only be proven 
once we formulate Convention T in it). By the weak effability thesis of §4, this makes it the language 
of the ineffable.180   
                                                     
177 See Fine (1985), van Fraassen (1966).  
178 Fine says as much himself, e.g. (1983, p.57). 
179 See Rosen (2017) (SEP entry).  
180 Maybe this explains Strawson’s extravagant remark, at the end of his influential paper on meanings as rules of 
use, to the effect that “natural language has no exact logic” (1950, p.344). Strawson’s attitude is probably what 
leads Jason Stanley to say that “[w]hereas the notion of rule of use is vague and mystical, Kaplan’s notion of the 
character of an expression is not only clear but set theoretically explicable in terms of fundamental semantic 
notions” (2012, p.893). It is undoubtedly the proliferation of set-theoretical explications in the philosophy of 
language that tempt Stanley to make his own extravagant remark, that “advances in [the philosophy of language] 
make even the most unaccomplished of its practitioners vastly more sophisticated than Kant”.  
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6 Abstract Generality and Convention T 
 
In this essay we are only peripherally concerned with indexical terms such as “I” and “now”. The 
discussion of indexicality was for us a means, a ladder leading to the notion of abstract reference. It is 
this notion that we are interested in, since it will enable us to formulate Convention T coherently. But 
first we need to see how to extend its reach beyond the indexical words. Some philosophers and linguists 
acknowledge a form of covert indexicality exhibited by various kinds of expressions that are not 
classically considered indexical. In §6.1, I will briefly present covert indexicality. In §6.2 the idea of 
covert indexicality will be used in order construe standard regimented languages as thoroughly 
indexical, and the language of Convention T, 𝑍, as an abstract metalanguage in the sense of §5.3. In 
§6.3 Convention T will be formulated.  
 
6.1. Covert indexicals 
Proper names are not indexicals in the usual sense, but a popular view in philosophy is that their mode 
of reference is similar to that of indexicals in being non-descriptional. This view is associated with 
Kripke, who argues that proper names are rigid designators (𝑅𝐷).181 In terms of intensional semantics, 
a rigid designator is a singular term that has the same reference in all indices: 
(1)  𝑅𝐷(𝑠) 𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∃𝑥∀𝑖(|𝑠|𝑐,𝑖 = 𝑥).182 183 
But this definition doesn’t really capture non-descriptionality, since it might happen that the definiens 
holds of some string in virtue of its descriptive characteristics.184 Kripke distinguishes between de jure 
rigid designators, for which (1) holds “by stipulation”, and de facto rigid designators, for which (1) 
might hold in virtue of their descriptive content.185 Since he is probably not concerned with regimented 
languages, it is not entirely clear what he means by “stipulation”. One way to read him is to say, with 
Stanley, that a singular term is a rigid designator de jure if it fulfills (1) in virtue of “the semantical 
rules of the language unmediately [linking] it to [its] object”.186 Semantic rules, on the usual picture, 
                                                     
If my foregoing procedure was correct, then Kaplan’s set-theoretic explication of character is in fact inadequate 
to the philosophy that motivates it. There is, after all, a certain amount of (philosophical) sophistication left in 
Kant which is not made obsolete by the (technical) sophistication of contemporary philosophy.  
181 Kripke (1980, p. 48).  
182 This is a definition of “obstinately rigid designators”, since on it 𝑠 denotes 𝑥 even if 𝑥 doesn’t exist in 𝑖. See 
Salmon (1982, p.4). 
183 In order to keep in harmony with the literature, I revert provisionally to using the usual indices and contexts. 
184 For example, the phrase “the president in 2016” turns out rigid, though it is descriptional. See Kaplan p.494f 
for an example with possible worlds.  
185 Kripke (1980, p.21fn). 
186 Stanley (2017, p.922).  
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state characters and not contents; an unmediated linking would then be one in which the context and 
index parameters are vacuous, for example: 
(2)  |𝑎|𝑐,𝑖 = 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎. 
From (2) and (1) we get that “𝑎” is a rigid designator. Let’s call this the stipulatory approach to 
nondescriptionality. In terms of the abstract metalanguage 𝑀𝑃, a stipulatory meaning clause for the 
proper name “Obama” would read:  
(3)  |𝑎|@ = 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎. 
 
The stipulatory approach doesn’t capture another important component of Kripke’s philosophy of 
proper names, which he calls the causal or historical chain picture of reference.187 According to this 
picture, an utterance 𝑢 of a proper name refers to an object 𝑜 if and only if one of two conditions hold: 
either 𝑢 stands in a certain relation to a preceding utterance which refers to 𝑜; or 𝑢 refers to 𝑜 directly, 
through some kind of contact. We can abbreviate this and say that there is a naming tradition going 
from 𝑜 to 𝑢. Where 𝑢 = 〈𝜙(𝛼), 𝑐〉, such that 𝜙(𝛼) is a sentence containing a proper name 𝛼, we say 
that there is a naming tradition for 𝛼 going from 𝑜 to the context 𝑐. We call 𝑜 the origin of 𝛼 in 𝑐, in 
symbols: 𝑙𝑡𝑜(𝛼, 𝑐) = 𝑜. The causal-historical chain picture of reference can be seen as a theory of 
meaning for proper names:  
(4)  |𝑎|𝑐,𝑖 = 𝑙𝑡𝑜("𝑎", 𝑐). 
In words: the reference of “𝑎” in context 𝑐 (relative to index 𝑖) is the origin of the naming tradition that 
reaches up to the use of the string “𝑎” in the context 𝑐.  
Both on the stipulatory approach to proper name reference and on the linguistic tradition approach, 
proper names are rigid designators. On the linguistic tradition approach they are also indexical (i.e. 
context-dependent). Since they are not among the expressions classically counted as indexicals, they 
are sometimes referred to as covert or hidden indexicals.188 The function 𝑙𝑡𝑜(𝑠, 𝑐) is then a context 
feature like 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑐). This is the covert indexicality approach to non-descriptionality.  
There are two important differences between classical (“overt”) and covert indexicality. First, the 
classical indexicals such as “now” usually vary in content across contexts, even when the speaker stays 
the same. The content of covert indexicals, on the other hand, though context-dependent, exhibits much 
less variability. A covert indexical will usually have the same content, not only for the same speaker, 
                                                     
187 Kripke (1980, p. 139).  
188 See Haas-Spohn (1995) for an extended treatment of hidden indexicality in predicates and proper names. Haas-
Spohn’s book is a meticulous and far-reaching analysis of the philosophical significance of hidden indexicality.  
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but for all speakers of a speech community for many generations. If proper names are indeed indexicals, 
then their indexicality is much more coarse-grained than that of the classic indexicals. The second 
difference concerns the context feature that they designate. The overt indexicals correspond to fixed 
features that are part of the structure of the context: speaker, time, etc. They are given by unary functions 
on the context: 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@), etc. By contrast, the denotations of the proper names are all 
given by the same binary function 𝑙𝑡𝑜(𝛼, @), which takes a string, the proper name itself, as argument. 
Perhaps it is less natural to call this function a feature of the context, but in a technical sense that’s what 
it is.189  
 
Beside proper names, natural kind predicates are also sometimes taken to be covertly indexical. The 
usual examples are substance terms such as “gold” and “water” and biological species terms such as 
“tiger”. Putnam (1975) put forth the thesis that the extensions of natural kind predicates depend on the 
history of their use rather than on any descriptive content. On this thesis, the meaning of a predicate 
such as “gold” (“𝐺”) depends on a linguistic tradition formed in the presence of an object or of stuff 
belonging to a certain natural kind of substance, gold.  This object or stuff is the origin of the tradition. 
The predicate “𝐺” applies to some new object or stuff whenever the latter belongs to the same kind as 
the origin. If 𝜙 is a natural-kind predicate, we write 𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑡𝑜(˹𝜙˺, 𝑐) for the origin of the linguistic tradition 
for 𝜙 that leads up to the context 𝑐. Then on the covert indexicality picture of natural kinds, the abstract 
semantic clause for “𝐺” is: 
(5)  |𝐺(𝑥)|𝑐 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑡𝑜("𝐺", 𝑐).190 
This is the covert indexicality approach to natural kind terms.  
The question now arises whether we cannot extend the idea of covert indexicality to predicates that are 
not natural kind terms, for example “president”, and eventually to the whole (non-logical part) of 
language, including the quantifier domains.191 The thesis that says that this is possible is the ubiquitous 
indexicality thesis. Putnam seems to suggest as much at some points,192 but his arguments are not 
sufficiently explicit or general, and he never gives a criterion for deciding when a word is amenable to 
such a treatment (much less an analysis of why). There are good reasons to think that natural kind terms 
                                                     
189 The idea of hidden indexicality is traced back to Putnam (1975), who focuses on natural kind terms (see below).  
Putnam speaks of an “unnoticed indexical component” (p.234), and apparently means only that certain words are 
indexical that weren’t traditionally thought to be such. Haas-Spohn has a more substantive distinction: covert 
indexicals are those that depend for their content on the world of the context, whereas overt indexicals depend on 
the other features (see §3.2 in her book). (Contexts are for her, like for Kaplan, tuples containing possible world.)  
190 See Haas-Spohn (1995), §3.3 for a similar definition.  
191 See Stanley and Szabo (2000) for a discussion of context-based quantifier domain determination. 
192 E.g. in (1975, p.244): “[W]e might doubt that there are any true one-criterion [descriptional] words in natural 
language…”. And a little later: “Not only does the [covert indexicality account] apply to most nouns, but it also 
applies to other parts of speech”.  
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are especially fit for a covert indexicality treatment (to the exclusion of other terms), but since natural 
language is not my object of investigation, I will leave the question open.193 
 
6.2. Bringing it all back home  
Which is the right approach to non-descriptional content – the stipulatory or the covert indexicality one? 
Let’s look at an argument by Kaplan against the covert indexicality approach for proper names in natural 
language. Recall the two differences between classical and covert indexicality. First, the context-
dependency of a covert indexical is coarse-grained: among the utterances of a single speaker, and even 
of a whole linguistic community, a difference in context will usually not make for a difference in 
denotation. Second, classical context features are various unary functions on the context, while the 
context feature for covert indexicals is a single binary function taking a context and a string. This 
suggests that the context dependence in the case of covert indexicals is of a different kind than in the 
case of the classical indexicals. It resembles the kind of context dependence that language exhibits 
regardless of indexicality, just from the fact that I rely on context in order to determine which language 
a certain sound or visual mark is to be interpreted in (and that the sound or mark are linguistic in the 
first place). The context dependence of indexicals Kaplan calls semantic, and the kind pertaining to 
language in general presemantic.194  
When I hear the string “I” uttered, I depend on the context in order to determine that what I’ve heard is 
the English first-person singular pronoun. This is a presemantic context dependence. I then look a 
second time into the context to see who the utterer is, in order to assign him or her to the uttered string 
as its reference. This second context dependence is brought about by the semantics of the first-person 
singular pronoun. By contrast, upon hearing the string “Obama”, once I’ve determined which lexicon 
it belongs to, no further inspection of the context is needed in order to determine the reference. Context 
is only appealed to presemantically. The term “Obama”, according to Kaplan’s claim, is no more 
indexical than, say, “president”. If Kaplan is right, then Kripke’s causal-historical chain picture is not 
there to explicate the lexical meaning of a proper name, but only the way in which it received its 
meaning. It is a thesis of diachronic semantics, or presemantics. It is therefore by stipulation that proper 
names are non-descriptional (and a similar argument would go through for natural kind terms).  
 
                                                     
193 See, e.g., Abbott (1989). Haas-Spohn (1995) seems to endorse a ubiquitous indexicality thesis (see esp. §3.9), 
but her concept of indexicality might not be fully directly referential, since it depends on a fallible epistemological 
relation to the referents (§4.1).  
194 See Kaplan, p. 562. Later, Kaplan uses the term metasemantic (1989b, p. 574). 
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This argument, if sound, refutes the covert indexicality approach and with it the ubiquitous indexicality 
thesis for natural language. But it opens the way to an analogous thesis for regimented language. The 
success of the argument depends on how we draw the line between the semantic and the presemantic. 
Thinkers such as Kaplan, Putnam and Kripke take themselves to be modeling natural language 
competence. The assumption here is that a language user has an underlying mental representation of the 
meaning of the expression used, and that it is empirically discoverable what this representation is, at 
least to a certain approximation.  The ways to discover what the underlying representation is are the 
tests and diagnostics of the trade, the trade here being, I guess, empirical semantics. Kaplan, Putnam 
and Kripke write at a time in which these methods are not yet very developed, so their procedure is lax 
by modern standards. Still, if they do take themselves to be engaged in empirical semantics, then 
Kaplan’s claim that proper names are context-dependent only in a presemantic way can be interpreted 
as a prediction that the relevant tests and diagnostics would make it implausible that the underlying 
representation of a proper name include a representation of its linguistic tradition (and a fortiori for 
natural kind predicates, and a multo fortiori for other predicates).195  
Since our own project is not the modeling of natural language competence, but the investigation of 
regimented languages, we may draw the boundary between the semantic and the presemantic along 
another line. Regimented languages are artificial devices for the precise and accountable expression of 
conceptual content. A regimented language is not used in order to communicate content between two 
speakers, but in order to express content tout court, regardless of who the user is, regardless even of 
whether there is any user. One of the central aims of language regimentation is to disconnect discourse 
as much as possible from subjective circumstances such as user and time of use. This is why regimented 
languages usually contain no indexicals. The only context-dependence of regimented languages is of 
the presemantic kind. This is a context-dependence that we can’t shake off. We can, however, exploit 
it.  
We want to adapt the abstract semantic framework of §5.3 to our standard regimentation scheme. This 
framework was developed with indexicals and semantic context dependence in mind, but since there 
are no indexicals in regimented languages, we can decide to treat their presemantic context dependence 
as if it were a semantic context dependence. Presemantic context dependence, in the case of regimented 
languages, is not a dependence on a historical linguistic tradition, but on the “act” or “event” of 
regimentation. By “act” of regimentation I don’t mean any real act taking place at a particular time by 
                                                     
195 How plausible is it to say that the New Reference Theorists take themselves to be practicing empirical 
semantics? For them it is still less “natural language” and more “ordinary language”, less a cognitive faculty and 
more a guide to our ordinary intuitions, which are the best clue we have to metaphysics. Forty years later, Stanley 
(2017, p.920) writes that “[t]he fact that natural-language proper names are rigid designators is an empirical 
discovery about natural language”. This might be an overstatement (see, e.g., Geurts (1997), Elbourne (2005) for 
dissenting views), but it is a telling one. It tells the story of the empiricization that the philosophy of language has 
undergone in the past 30 years. 
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particular people. These details are irrelevant for regimented languages. The presemantic context 
dependence of regimented languages is a dependence on the definition of the language. And it is this 
definition that is now proposed to be construed as semantically, and not presemantically, context 
dependent. On this proposal the entire non-logical content of a regimented language, including its 
domain, is (covertly) indexical. Only the logical features of the language will be considered 
presemantic. The line between the presemantic and the semantic is drawn along the line between 
regimentation scheme and regimented language.196  
The notion of context relevant for regimented languages is not one that contains speakers, times or 
places as features. These belong to the conversation heuristic, and regimented languages are not 
designed for conversation. What remains of the concept of context once we have purified it of 
everything inessential is the bare notion of linguistic agency, and this notion, once we’ve distilled it 
into its conceptual core, is just the idea of language use. Once we’ve made these purifications and 
distillations, there remains no difference between context, agent, and language. The abstract variable 
“@” will here refer, abstractly, to the regimented languages themselves.   
There are no longer any non-indexical terms in our languages. In 𝐿𝑝𝑟, for example, the terms “𝑎”,”𝑏” 
and “𝑃” become indexical. If they are indexical then the abstract metalanguage does not have to express 
interpretations (contents) for them, and can accordingly be very thin. The only vocabulary it will have 
will include the logical and phonological (structural-descriptive) lexicon, and the abstract variable @ 
with its context feature expressions. This is precisely the language 𝑍 that we have been after since 
Chapter 4. The variable @ in 𝑍 ranges abstractly over all standard languages, i.e. over the entire 
language hierarchy; since it is abstract, it does so without in principle being able to distinguish between 
languages, and therefore without having them as individuals in its domain. In this way 𝑍 applies to all 
languages without being able to define truth for them.  
Since it can’t distinguish between its object-languages, it has a uniform pragmatic-semantic theory for 
all of them, which takes the form of a generic character statement for each predicate. The interpretations 
of terms in a regimented language are not fixed by a historical linguistic tradition, but by the 
regimentation conventions in force in that language. The character of a string 𝑠 is given by the 
expression ˹𝑟𝑔𝑚(𝑠, @)˺. A predicate “𝑃”, for example, will now have a single uniform character, and 
whether it expresses the concept of being a president, or of being a philosopher, or anything else, is 
determined in context by the regimentation decisions that hold for that context. The general form of a 
character statement for a predicate is:  
                                                     
196 Notice how, since predicates and quantifiers are now indexical, the difference between direct and conceptual 
reference (recall §5.2) is obliterated. 
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(6)  𝑍 ⊩ |𝑃𝑥|@ = 1 ↔ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑟𝑔𝑚("𝑃", @).197 
 
Since 𝑟𝑔𝑚 is the only context feature that we will use, we can abbreviate it and write ˹@𝑠˺ for 
˹𝑟𝑔𝑚(𝑠, @)˺. This notation suggests that we can conceive of the abstract variable not as a singular term, 
but as an operator on strings. Its philosophical interpretation is as a use operator: it takes a string and 
“returns” a use of it. I scare-quote “returns” because in some cases, most notably when 𝑠 is a sentence 
string, using it doesn’t result in any object. This leads to the following anomalous feature of 𝑍: the 
syntactic category of an expression of the form ˹@𝑠˺, for 𝑠 a string, depends on the syntactic category 
of the string 𝑠. For example, the following are well-formed (and can serve as generic character 
statements for their syntactic categories): 
(A) Generic character statement: 
(a) 𝑍 ⊩ |𝑠|@ = @𝑠    (if 𝑠 is a singular term), 
(b) 𝑍 ⊩ |𝑠(𝑥)|@ = 1 ↔ 𝑥 ∈ @𝑠  (if 𝑠 is a predicate), 
(c) 𝑍 ⊩ |𝑠|@ = 1 ↔ @𝑠   (if 𝑠 is a sentence). 
In words, (A)(a) says that the singular term “𝑠”, in the language @, refers to the object that “𝑠” refers 
to according to how the language @ is defined. This might look trivial or circular.198 But this is only an 
illusion of circularity, due to a “flattening” of levels in abstract discourse. (A), after all, is not a 
declarative sentence but a rule to be followed in a particular context. To see it in action, let’s specify a 
context. Specifying a context does not anymore consist for us in naming speakers and times, but in 
defining a regimented language. We can take one of the languages we’ve already used earlier in the 
essay (§5.2.1): 
Regimentation statement for 𝑳𝒑𝒓: 
Let 𝐿𝑝𝑟 be a standard language, containing “𝑎” and “𝑏” as sole individual constants and “𝑃” a sole 
unary predicate. The universe contains Obama (referred to by “𝑎”) and Trump (“𝑏”); “𝑃” expresses 
presidenthood. More precisely, we can say that “𝑃(𝑥)” is true of all and only presidents.  
 
We can now apply the generic character (A) to the context 𝐿𝑝𝑟. See §5.3.6(I) for the rules of application. 
Recall that the results of an application of a character to a context, the content generated, is stated in a 
surveying metalanguage. Here this is the language in which the regimentation statement for 𝐿𝑝𝑟 is given. 
The application clause of the generic character for the string “𝑎”, for the context 𝐿𝑝𝑟, is: 
                                                     
197 The main result of Haas-Spohn (1995) is a similar definition of formal character (§3.9). She is concerned with 
natural language and has a non-abstract pragmatics.  
198 Recall Kripke’s (1980, p. 68f) critique of Kneale’s (1962, p.629f) suggestion that the meaning of a proper 
name, say “Socrates”, is “the individual called ‘Socrates’”. 
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(7)  [|𝑎|@ = @𝑎] ⇉𝐿𝑝𝑟 |𝑎| = 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎 . 
Here we see that the circularity that we worried about is only apparent. The character statement seems 
circular in its abstract statement since on both sides of the equality sign we find the string 𝑎. Abstractly, 
a character statement says that a string means in context what it means in context. Once applied to a 
concrete context, however, the appearance of circularity disappears when the second occurrence of “a” 
is replaced by a name in the metalanguage for what “a” means in the object language.  
 
We can start to connect the pieces. The task we set ourselves in chapter 5 was to find or develop a 
device of generality that would not carry ontological commitment. This device is the abstract variable 
@. With it, the language 𝑍 can refer to all languages of the standard language hierarchy in abstraction 
from their contents. We don’t need to assume a universal domain of languages. On this picture 
languages, as contexts were in §5.3.5, are abstract objects. The unity of a language 𝐿 is given abstractly 
in 𝑍, and its constitutional distinctness (ontology and ideology) is given in 𝐿 itself, though without unity. 
In the case of contexts, we also made use of the notion of a surveying metalanguage, one from which a 
real (non-abstract) semantics can be expressed for a context. In the case of languages, this coincides 
with the usual notion of metalanguage. This is, then, our answer to the question of the language 𝑍. 
 
6.3. Convention T regimented 
The abstract variable @ doesn’t need a quantifier to bind it. Its semantics of application provide 
universal applicability without assuming a standing domain of objects. Whenever situated in a concrete 
linguistic situation, whether a context of utterance or a regimented language, and only when so situated, 
the application of sentences of 𝑍 can be carried out. This is the sense in which an abstractly general 
statement applies to an object only once that object is in fact given, and not, as in real universal 
quantification, regardless of whether it is given or not (see §5.1).  
A language is defined by stating its domain and the meanings of its terms. This is called a regimentation 
statement (see §6.2(a) for an example). If we were to formalize a regimentation statement, it would look 
exactly like a definition of satisfaction (as in §3.2.4G), except that the purpose of a regimentation 
statement is not to analyze some language given in advance, but to set up a new one by stipulation. Let 
𝑑 be a regimentation statement (a definition of satisfaction). By §3.2.4G, 𝑑 has the following form:   
(8)  𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∀𝑟(𝜙𝑑𝑟 → 𝑟(𝑥, 𝜎)), 
where 𝜙𝑑 is the complex condition on the relation 𝑟 modeled after the inductive definition of 
satisfaction (see §3.2.4). The language that is thereby defined, when considered as an object, is the 
smallest relation 𝑟 that satisfies 𝜙𝑑. The string that picks this object out we abbreviate as ℒ𝑑: 
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(9)  ℒ𝑑 = ˹𝜄𝑟. ∀𝑥∀𝜎(𝑟(𝑥, 𝜎) ↔ ∀𝑟
′(𝜙𝑑𝑟
′ → 𝑟′(𝑥, 𝜎)))˺. 
A string can only pick out an object when interpreted. We let the symbol “ℒ𝑑
𝑀” designate the object that 
the string ℒ𝑑 picks out when interpreted in a language 𝑀. ℒ𝑑
𝑀 is simply the object-language defined in 
𝑀 by the string 𝑑. This is the mediated notation for languages that we’ve used in §4.2.3.  
The expression ℒ𝑑
𝑀 picks out an object depending on 𝑀. Therefore 𝑀 has to be given in order for the 
expression to be used. But if given, then it is given by a further regimentation statement, formulated in 
a metametalanguage 𝑀. The same reasoning can be carried out for 𝑀, and we find ourselves in an 
infinite regress, so that no language can ever be given. We can put an end to the regress by referring to 
the metalanguage using the abstract variable @.199 The symbol ℒ𝑑
@ refers to the object referred to by 
the string in (9), except that the language in which the string is to be interpreted is @, i.e. it is not yet 
given. Only when ℒ𝑑
@ is applied to some particular language will it yield an object. This object will be 
an object-language for the language to which ℒ𝑑
@ is applied. And the regimentation statement 𝑑 will of 
itself be an adequate truth definition for it. Thus, for a language that we have regimented, the 
regimentation statement yields of itself an adequate truth formulation. This is the first formulation of 
Convention T: 
(B) Convention T (abstract version) 
(a) Language-synthetic formulation: 
∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, ℒ𝑑
@, @) ↔ 𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑑)).200 
For an example, take the regimentation statement for 𝐿𝑝𝑟 in §6.2(a). It was given informally, but we 
could formalize it into a formally correct sentence 𝑑𝑝𝑟 in some suitable metalanguage 𝑀𝑝𝑟. Then by 
(B)(a) we would have: 
(10)  𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑𝑝𝑟, ℒ𝑑𝑝𝑟
𝑀𝑝𝑟 , 𝑀𝑝𝑟). 
In words: the regimentation statement for the object-language is of itself an adequate truth definition 
for that language. The synthetic formulation is thus a statement of the philosophical point that the 
concept of truth is constitutive of language.201  
A point to notice here is that an application of the abstract Convention T to the case of some particular 
object-language results, not in a statement in the metalanguage, but in a statement about the 
metalanguage. This is because 𝐴𝑇𝐷 is a predicate that applies to a truth definition, and the truth 
                                                     
199 See below, §7.3.  
200 𝐹𝐶𝐷𝑒𝑓(𝑑), I remind you, means that 𝑑 is formally correct (see §4.1.2). 
201 See §2.3.2, §5.3.6.  
114 
 
definition is what applies to sentences in the object-language. Convention T, applied, results in a 
statement in the metametalanguage.202  
 
Often we are interested, not in the definition of an object-language in a metalanguage, but in whether 
one language 𝑀 is in a position to define truth for another language 𝐿, such that both languages are 
given independently in advance. The language-synthetic formulation doesn’t apply to this case since it 
applies only when the object-language is given in terms of the metalanguage. Now if 𝐿 and 𝑀 are given, 
then they are given by regimentation statements 𝑑𝑀 and 𝑑𝐿 in a common metalanguage. The second 
formulation of Convention T gives the conditions under which a definition 𝑑 is an adequate truth 
definition in 𝑀 for 𝐿:  
(b) Language-analytic formulation: 
∀𝑑𝐿∀𝑑𝑀∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, ℒ𝑑𝐿
@ , ℒ𝑑𝑀
@ ) ↔ ∃𝑓 (𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, ℒ𝑑𝐿
@ , ℒ𝑑𝑀
@ ) ∧ 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓))). 
Let’s see this formulation in action by considering the (special) case in which 𝑀𝑝𝑟 is both the object-
language and the candidate metalanguage.203 In this case we put 𝑀𝑝𝑟 in 𝐴𝑇𝐷 and in 𝐴𝑇𝐹 in both 
argument places. Applying the abstract character (B)(b) to the context 𝑀𝑝𝑟, we get: 
(11) ∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝑀𝑝𝑟, 𝑀𝑝𝑟) ↔ ∃𝑓 (𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, 𝑀𝑝𝑟, 𝑀𝑝𝑟) ∧ 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓))). 
The identity mapping 𝑖𝑑 is trivially an adequate translation in this case, in symbols: 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑖𝑑, 𝑀𝑝𝑟, 𝑀𝑝𝑟). 
Since all adequate translations are equivalent (see §4.2.1), we can put 𝑖𝑑 for 𝑓 in the definiens: 
(12)  ∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝑀𝑝𝑟, 𝑀𝑝𝑟) ↔ 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑖𝑑)).  
In words: a truth definition in 𝑀𝑝𝑟 for 𝑀𝑝𝑟 is adequate if it stands in the required phonological condition 
to the identity translation. Unpacking 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 (see §4.1.3) and assuming 𝑑 is formally correct, we 
have:  
(13)  ∀𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝑀𝑝𝑟, 𝑀𝑝𝑟) ↔ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑑) ∧ ∀𝑥 (𝐸(𝑑, 𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑖𝑑)))) 
                                                     
202 Tarski says precisely this in CTFL, p.188f, in the footnote appended to Convention T. Unfortunately, his 
English translator Woodger missed this point, and puts “metatheory” instead of “metametatheory”. The Polish 
and the German versions have two metas (each). See also CTFL p.175 (which Woodger translates correctly).  
203 For readability I stop using mediated notation in favor of the language names directly. 
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In words: a truth definition in 𝑀𝑝𝑟 for 𝑀𝑝𝑟 is adequate just in case it is consistent and it entails all 
disquotational T-sentences (disquotational T-sentences is what you get when you take the identity 
mapping as your translation function).  
From the reasoning of the liar paradox (§2.3.1) we get: 
(14)  ∀𝑑(∀𝑥(𝐸(𝑑, 𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑖𝑑))) → ¬𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑑)). 
In words: any definition that entails all disquotational T-sentences is inconsistent. Since all adequate 
translation functions are equivalent, this implies: 
(15)  ¬∃𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝑀𝑝𝑟, 𝑀𝑝𝑟)). 
This is a statement to the effect that 𝑀𝑝𝑟 cannot define truth for itself. Abstracting, we get the general 
result known as Tarski’s indefinability theorem: 
(16) ¬∃𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, @, @)). 
In this way the indefinability theorem follows from Convention T (see §3.1).  
 
One last comment before we close off this chapter. Chapter 5 was presented as the search for an essential 
departure from standard regimentation. We had good reason to believe that Convention T required such 
a departure (because of the effability problem), but saw that it was hard to come by (because the sticky 
hierarchy principle). Indeed, intensionality was argued to be a merely notational departure (§5.2.2), and 
on the usual treatment, so was indexicality (§5.2.5). However, indexicality on the usual treatment was 
not even adequate to its own purpose, that of capturing direct reference. It is the thesis of direct reference 
that led us to take apart some of the fundamental notions of standard regimentation and put them back 
together in a different way, which we called abstract semantics. But is abstract semantics an essential 
departure from standard regimentation, or will we be able to find a standard language that expresses the 
same content? The direct reference thesis does not answer this question.  
In this section we have found the answer. Since Convention T can be formulated in abstract semantics 
in full generality, and since we know that Convention T cannot be formulated in standard semantics in 
full generality, abstract semantics is an essential departure from standard regimentation. The difference 
between 𝑍 and the standard languages is not a difference in mere ontology or ideology, but a difference 
in mode of discourse. I call the standard languages theoretical languages, since their primary function 
is to state theories, linguistic representations of the non-linguistic world. The abstract language 𝑍 I call 
the methodological language (in homage to Tarski’s “methodology of the deductive sciences”). It is 
used to represent theoretical languages, but with prescriptive rather than descriptive force.   
116 
 
7 Tarski’s Revenge 
 
 
The device of abstract reference and the distinction between theoretical and methodological discourse 
lead to the successful resolution of the unity problem from §3.3. I will spell this out in §7.1. The rest of 
this chapter will be devoted to sketching further developments and answers to other objections. The 
way in which the unity problem is resolved suggests a revision in how we conceive of the task of concept 
analysis. §7.2 sketches this revision, which I call the two-pronged approach. §7.3 answers the regress 
objection (from §3.3) and §7.4 resolves the issue of the diallele which haunted us since the beginning 
of the work (see §1.3.4, §3.2.1). §7.5 lists some further issues that will not be addressed in this work. 
 
7.1. The indexical reply to the unity objection 
Let’s review once more the dialectic of Part One. Our task was to analyze the content of the concept of 
truth, and the problem was that our basic assumptions led to there being many incompatible analyses. 
The first assumption was that the content of a concept is the same as its conditions of application to an 
arbitrary object, and that therefore that an analysis should take the form of a definition. The second 
assumption was that the basic truth-bearers are sentences in regimented languages. This choice had an 
important consequence: since sentences are relative to a language, a truth definition would also, at least 
at first sight, be relative to a language. The concept of truth would thereby receive many different 
definitions, which by the first assumption would mean many incompatible analyses. In chapter 2 we 
hoped to avoid this relativity with the aid of the naïve conception of truth. The naïve conception is 
compatible with the existence of a universal language. Limiting our discussion to universal languages 
would have been a well-motivated move which makes language relativity benign. Unfortunately, the 
naïve conception, along with the possibility of universal languages, was found to be untenable.  
This is where the stratified conception came in (chapter 3). Dropping the requirement of semantic 
closure from the naïve conception yielded Convention T, the material adequacy criterion for definitions 
of truth. Following Tarski, we then described a procedure for coming up with an adequate definition of 
truth for a given language 𝐿. The task of Part One was thereby achieved: a definition of truth was found. 
But since a universal metalanguage was not possible, there was no way to get away from the relativity 
of truth to language. There was no one definition that we could say gives the content of the concept of 
truth. This was the unity objection to the stratified conception.  
To this we replied that it is Convention T, the criterion for material adequacy of truth definitions, that 
provides the unity of the concept: a sentence is a definition of truth insofar as it conforms to Convention 
117 
 
T. One way to understand the relation between Convention T and the definitions is on the model of the 
relation between intension and extension in semantics. Intensions are functions from circumstances of 
evaluation (indices) to extensions, and they explain how the same expression can have different 
extensions. They provide the unity of the meaning of the expression, as it were, across its different 
extensions. Applying this model to the case of truth, we can think of the different languages as so many 
circumstances of evaluation, and of Convention T as a kind of informal function from a language to a 
truth definition.204 This was the intensional reply to the unity objection. However, the intensional reply 
ran up against the effability objection: since there is no universal metalanguage, there is no language in 
which to formulate Convention T so that it will apply across the board to all languages. This was the 
effability objection to the intensional reply, or Tarski’s revenge paradox, and with it we closed Part 
One.  
Part Two was a search for a reply to the unity objection that would sidestep the effability objection. The 
strategy was to come up with a new expressive device that will let Convention T range over all 
languages without the ontological commitment that attends standard universal quantification. The first 
step (chapter 4) was to formalize Convention T in order to isolate the place in which the new device is 
needed. There were two such places: a (single, initial) quantifier over interpreted languages, and a 
ternary predicate 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, 𝐿1, 𝐿2) that says of a string mapping 𝑓 that it is an adequate translation 
function from a language 𝐿1 into a language 𝐿2. The next step (chapter 5), and the heart of Part Two, 
was the development of abstract indexical semantics. The guiding thread was to establish a logical 
difference between the concept of an index, or a circumstance of evaluation, as used in intensional 
semantics, and a context of use as needed for indexicality. The properties of contexts gave rise to a new 
abstract semantics, which expresses generality without ontological commitment. This allows us to 
mount an indexical reply to the unity objection, on which languages are considered as contexts of use, 
and not, as on the intensional reply, as circumstances of evaluation. Convention T can then safely be 
seen as that which provides the unity of the concept of truth. The principal task of Part Two, and with 
it the central goal of this essay, I therefore consider fulfilled. There remains the issue of the predicate 
𝐴𝑇𝐹 of adequate translations. I will discuss it below (7.2.3).205  
                                                     
204 This applies more directly to the general strategy for constructing truth definitions, but Convention T is the 
more central item of Tarski’s account.  
205 This essay, I’ve stressed in the introduction, should not be seen as an exegetical piece on Tarski. Nonetheless, 
it might shed light on Tarski exegesis. See David (2008) for an interpretation of CTFL based on a very similar 
idea to the main claim of this essay, though with less detail. Another interpretation of Tarski consonant with the 
present approach is Hodges (1986). 
There are many solutions to the liar paradox that presume to avoid or mitigate the revenge paradox. Among these 
there are several that make use of the notions of indexicality and context-dependence. The most notable, perhaps, 
are Parsons (1974), Burge (1979), Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Simmons (1993), Juhl (1997) and Glanzberg 
(2004). See Gauker (2006) for a critique of their common ground. There are some deep differences between these 
approaches and the present essay. First, these writers are all concerned with paradox in natural language (though 
without a precise statement of what that is). Second, though they all appeal to context dependence, they don’t 
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7.2. The two-pronged approach to concept analysis 
The indexical reply calls for a revision of how we understand concept analysis. Convention T, we 
agreed, conferred conceptual unity on the myriad definitions of truth. In order to complete the picture 
we have to say something more about how it provides this unity, or what it is in general to provide the 
unity of a concept.  
The purpose of conceptual analysis is to lay bare the content of the concept analyzed. According to the 
view we started out with, this means providing a clear statement of the conditions under which the 
concept applies to an arbitrary individual (or individuals, in the case of relational concepts). In order 
for the statement to be clear, i.e. admit of no ambiguity or indeterminacy, it has to be given in a 
regimented language 𝐿. An analysis therefore takes the form of a definition, a sentence of this form: 
(1) 𝑃𝑥 ↔ 𝜙(𝑥), 
where “𝑃” is replaced by a name of the concept (a string not in 𝐿) and 𝜙 by a formula of 𝐿 which holds 
of all and only the objects falling under 𝑃. Since the string replacing “𝑃” is not in 𝐿, neither is the 
definition. Let 𝐿+ be a language like 𝐿 with the addition of 𝑃 to its ideology. We think of 𝑃 as, to begin 
with, uninterpreted. We define the import of a definition to be the set of its logical consequences: 
(2) The import of a definition 𝑑 = {𝑥 ∈ 𝐿+: 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑥)}. 
The members of the import of 𝑑 are the sentences analytic to the concept 𝑃 (relative to 𝑑). We can 
equate the content of a concept with its import. For example, if we define: 
(3) 𝐵𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑥) ↔ 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑥) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑥) ≥ 18 ∧ ¬∃𝑦𝑊𝑖𝑓𝑒(𝑦, 𝑥), 
then (4) is analytic to the concept bachelor relative to (3), and (5) isn’t (for 𝑎 some individual constant): 
(4) 𝐵𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑎) → 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎), 
(5) 𝐵𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑎) ∧ 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎). 
Notice that if we take the import of (3) and replace each occurrence of “𝐵𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑥)” with its 
definiens, what we get is the set of logical truths of 𝐿. This is reassuring in view of the deep connection 
between logic and analyticity that writers on the subject have always emphasized. But it is also 
surprising: if the content of a concept is no more than the set of logical truths, then what new information 
is uncovered by an analysis? The sentences analytic to a concept (relative to a definition 𝑑) are, if we 
                                                     
offer an analysis of the concept of context. Nonetheless, there are certain interesting and not always obvious 
affinities between the approach presented here and, especially, Parsons, Glanzberg and Gauker. I leave it to a later 
date to expose these affinities.  
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accept 𝑑, exactly the logical truths. Analyticity is therefore nothing more than logical truth, conditional 
on the acceptance of a definition. It is this condition, the acceptance of the definition, that makes concept 
analysis informative. But if this is the case, then the definition cannot be all there is to concept analysis. 
In addition, we have to accept it as an analysis of the right concept. This acceptance is itself a judgment 
to the effect that the proposed definition is materially adequate. And such judgment needs to be 
performed against a previously specified criterion. What is missing in our view of concept analysis is 
an account of this criterion.  
Let’s look at a simple case first. Consider the concept of an ordered pair, or more precisely, the relation 
of 𝑥 being the ordered pair of 𝑦 and 𝑧, in symbols: 𝑥 = 〈𝑦, 𝑧〉.206 A successful definition will provide a 
necessary and sufficient condition under which an arbitrary triad stands in this relation. For number 
theory, the following definitions both provide an adequate application condition: 
(6) 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 = (𝑥 + 𝑦)2 + 𝑥, 
(7) 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 = 2𝑥 ⋅ 3𝑦.207 
But they will differ in import. Sentence (8), for example, is analytic of the concept of ordered pair 
relative to definition (6) but not to (7): 
(8) 〈4,4〉 = 68. 
Can it be that two incompatible definitions are both adequate to same concept? The reason that we 
consider both (6) and (7) to be successful is that on both of them the characteristic property of the 
ordered pair holds, which is that the individuation of pairs depends on the order of their members. 
Formally, they all entail the following sentence 𝑐𝑝: 
(9)  ∀𝑥∀𝑦∀𝑧∀𝑤(〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 = 〈𝑧, 𝑤〉 ↔ 𝑥 = 𝑧 ∧ 𝑦 = 𝑤). 
Any definition 𝑑 which entails 𝑐𝑝 is an adequate definition. If a definition entails, in addition, other 
sentences independent of 𝑐𝑝, no harm is incurred. Such sentences are what Quine calls the don’t 
cares.208 However, we can’t use 𝑐𝑝 as a definition, since it doesn’t have the right form. It doesn’t state 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary object to be an ordered pair, but only for two ordered 
pairs to be identical. 𝑐𝑝 is not a definition, but it can be used to state an adequacy criterion for 
definitions:  
(10)  𝐴𝑃𝐷(𝑑) ↔ 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑐𝑝). 
                                                     
206 The following is informed by Quine (1960, §53).  
207 More strictly: 𝑧 = 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 ↔ 𝑧 = (𝑥 + 𝑦)2 + 𝑥, etc.  
208 (1960, p.238).  
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Here “𝐴𝑃𝐷” abbreviates “adequate definition of ordered-pair”. In words: a definition is adequate if (the 
sentence expressing) the characteristic property of ordered pair is included in its import. Since 𝑐𝑝 is 
formulated only in terms of logic and the definiendum, the criterion is applicable to any proposed 
definition of ordered pair, in any language. It does not presuppose set theory, or arithmetic, or anything 
else. It is in virtue of their conformance to (10) that the particular definitions (6) and (7), and any of the 
many others that are in use, are definitions of the concept of ordered pair. We call (10) the character of 
the concept of ordered-pair, and the various (adequate) definitions various explications of its content. 
We saw above that different definitions of ordered pair have different imports, different sets of analytic 
sentences. The character picks out the part of the import that will be common to all adequate definitions, 
the essential import: 
(11) Essential import of the concept of ordered-pair: {𝑥: 𝐸(𝑐𝑝, 𝑥)}. 
The sentences that belong to the essential import of a concept are called properly analytic of the concept. 
Quine’s don’t-cares are those analytic sentences (relative to a definition) that are not properly analytic.  
Both definitions (6) and (7) are materially adequate to the concept of ordered-pair, and there are many 
others, but many definitions aren’t, for example: 
(12) 〈𝑥, 𝑦〉 = 𝑥2 + 𝑦2 + 𝑥.   
Conceptual analysis consists, not in the definition by itself, but also in the judgment that the definition 
is adequate. This step is what sanctions the identification of the analytic sentences with the logical 
truths. Definition (6), say, is a successful analysis of the concept of ordered pair inasmuch as it goes 
along with the recognition that, e.g., (12) is not a successful analysis. In general, neither a definition on 
its own nor a character on its own can be called an analysis of a concept. We need both. The definition 
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. It tells us how to use the 
concept. The role of the character is to connect the definitions with that which is to be analyzed, to 
present them as analyses of this concept. The definitions work from the bottom up, so to speak, and the 
character works from the top down. This is the two-pronged approach to concept analysis.  
 
The character, we say, is that which presents the definition as materially adequate, or as the definition 
of the right concept. But who says that the character itself captures the right concept? What promises 
its material adequacy?  
When we say that we are out to define a concept, for instance the concept of truth, we are assuming that 
the concept is in some way given to us prior to the investigation, and that the definition we are looking 
for seeks to capture this previously given concept. But if a definition is called for, then this is because 
the concept is given in a way that is deficient – vague, or confused, or somehow unreliable. Let’s call 
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this deficient presentation of the concept the intuitive grasp. The intuitive grasp of a concept is like 
unregimented discourse: it contains ambiguities and indeterminacies of both form and substance, but it 
enjoys a certain epistemological primacy in that it is given and not made. However, if the concept is 
given in this deficient way, how can it be used in the assessment of a definition’s adequacy? I take it to 
be one of Tarski’s main achievements to realize that there is an intermediate station between the 
intuitive grasp and the regimented definition: the character of a concept.209  
We can think of the character of a concept as a regimentation of its intuitive grasp. This makes the 
question of whether a definition conforms to it or not well-defined. However, how do we determine the 
faithfulness of the character itself to the intuitive grasp? How should we decide between two competing 
characters? There is no question of looking for yet another criterion of material adequacy as an 
intermediate station between the intuitive grasp and the character, for we will find ourselves with the 
same problem for the new criterion. In the case of truth, the two candidates to decide between are the 
naïve conception and Convention T. Here the decision is easy. Although the naïve conception is 
perceived by many to be closer to the intuitive grasp than Convention T, it is simply untenable. And 
since Convention T is nothing but a straightforward weakening of the naïve conception, it can contain 
nothing counter-intuitive that the naïve conception lacked. If theorists object to Convention T, it is only 
because they think they can do better.  
The grounds to accept Convention T is, as its name suggests, conventional. We, who are engaged 
together in the enterprise of truth, agree for it to serve as the character of the concept of truth. Whether 
we thus agree only for lack of a better alternative or for a more positive reason is irrelevant. For the 
validity of Convention T, an agreement between us is enough.210  
 
                                                     
209 Tarski of course didn’t use the term ‘character’. Sher (1999) comments that in regimenting Convention T “the 
material task itself is construed as a formal task” (p.150). This is an apt description. 
210 See Patterson (2012, pp.46ff,p.110) for the history of “convention” in Convention T. Also illuminating is 
Tarski’s description of his task in his 1966 definition of the logical notions. There he says that his approach “has 
a normative character: we make a suggestion that the term be used in a certain way”. This suggestion is 
“independent of the way in which [the term] is actually used”, but also “in agreement… at least with one usage 
which actually is encountered in practice” (in Tarski and Corcoran (1986, p. 145)).  
I mentioned that the character of a concept to its intuitive grasp is like that of regimented to unregimented 
discourse. But this is no more than an analogy. We should not identify the intuitive grasp of a concept with the 
unregimented use of the concept’s term. An intuitive grasp can have many sources, for example historical 
tradition. Reading Tarski we see quite clearly that the intuitive grasp of truth for him is firmly rooted in the 
tradition beginning with Brentano’s engagement with Aristotle’s conception of truth and reaching Tarski through 
Twardowski and Kotarbiński. See Tarski (1944, §3); Woleński and Simons (1989); Murawski and Woleński 
(2008). 
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7.3. Reply to the regress objection 
We are in a position to solve the regress problem.211 First, let’s notice an elaboration that our framework 
introduces into the use-mention distinction. The defining feature of the methodological metalanguage 
𝑍 is the abstract variable @. It refers abstractly to the theoretical language being used, in the way that 
the character 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(@) refers abstractly to the time at which the indexical “now” is being used. This is 
a special mode of reference to language. The distinction between use and mention of language is 
famous, indeed a mainstay of analytic philosophy of language, but it is not usually noticed that it is not 
a two-way, but actually a four-way distinction. First and second, there is the obvious distinction between 
mentioning an expression as a mere string and mentioning it as interpreted. To say that the word “cats” 
ends with an “s” is an instance of the first kind, and to say that it denotes cats is an instance of the 
second. Third, the word “cats” is something we can use. I did so just now, in the bold-faced occurrence. 
Thus the word “cats” in the bold-faced occurrence is used, not mentioned. But in the recent underlined 
occurrence, the word is mentioned again, and described as being used. This is the fourth item of the 
distinction. To sum up, the four modes are: we can either use a word, or mention it; and we can mention 
it either as a mere string, as interpreted, or as being used. Doing the latter is the function of the abstract 
variable @. Between these four modes, the modes of using an expression and of mentioning it as 
interpreted are real, in the sense that they carry semantic commitment to whatever is being expressed 
(e.g. cats); and the modes of mentioning as a mere string and mentioning as being used are abstract, in 
not carrying such commitment. Although I need to know a language in order to use a word; and I need 
to have a semantic theory in order to mention a word as interpreted; I need neither in order to mention 
a word as being used. I can overhear a conversation in which the sentence “koty jedzą myszy” is uttered 
and presume that the word “koty” is therein being used without having an inkling as to what it means. 
Not so if I wanted to use the word, or refer to it as interpreted (for example, by commenting “that’s 
true”). The abstract variable allows us to mention an expression with regard to its meaning (not as a 
mere string) without taking on the related expressive commitments. It does this by relaying those 
commitments to the speaker.212 
How does this relate to the regress objection? We can see the connection by looking at Quine’s (1969b) 
notion of ontological relativity, which is explicitly based on Tarski’s stratified conception of truth. 
Quine there says that the ontology of a language is not given absolutely, but only in terms of some 
further language.213 Since the same will apply to this further language, we are in for a regress – precisely 
the regress objection raised against the stratified conception of truth. Quine isn’t worried. “In practice”, 
he says, “we end the regress… by acquiescing in our mother tongue and taking its words at face value” 
                                                     
211 See §3.3. The point of the solution was already given in §6.3. 
212 Mentioning a word as being used depends on the possibility of referring to an uninterpreted string. This is why 
it was crucial to isolate a semantically inert phonological medium. See §1.3.1, §2.2.4, §4.1.2.  
213 Quine actually speaks of theories. This is important, but not for our present concerns.  
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(p.49). Quine doesn’t elaborate on the idea of “acquiescing in our mother tongue”, but we can now give 
a more precise account of it. For consider the phrase “our mother tongue” (equivalently: “the home 
language”). This is an indexical expression (because of “our” or “home”). But Quine shouldn’t be read 
as referring specifically to his own mother tongue, English. Even French speakers can end the regress. 
What Quine means is that any theorist can end the regress by acquiescing in their home language. Quine 
is not using the indexical “the home language”, he is referring to its use, or equivalently, to its character. 
What’s more, the languages in question shouldn’t be thought of as being French or English, or any of 
what we’ve called “world languages” in chapter 2. For us (and also for Quine), it only makes sense to 
ask after the semantic commitments of a regimented language. So the phrase “the home language” refers 
to a context in which we are using a regimented language, and specifically to the language being used. 
Since we identify a context with a language (see §6.2), the phrase “the home language” is none other 
than the abstract variable @.  
What does it then mean to say that “in practice we end the regress by acquiescing in our mother tongue”? 
Recall our mediated notation for referring to languages (§4.2.3, §6.3). The mechanism there exploited 
the fact that a language must be given by a formula, and substituted reference to the defining formula 
(the regimentation statement) for reference to the language as object: “ℒ𝑑” referred to the language 
defined by the formula 𝑑. But since formulas are meaningless except in relation to a language, we had 
to specify the metalanguage in which the defining formula is given: “ℒ𝑑
𝑀” refers to the language defined 
by the string 𝑑 as interpreted in the language 𝑀. When we wanted to use mediated notation for 𝑀 as 
well, we stumbled on a good visualization of the regress problem, in the form of towers of superscripts 
such as “ℒ𝑑1
ℒ𝑑2
𝑀
 ”, etc. In practice, we ended the regress by plugging the abstract variable into the 
metalanguage position: “ℒ𝑑
@”. What we are doing when we do this is we mention the metalanguage as 
used, and in this way avoiding ontological commitment to it and avoiding the regress. To say that “in 
practice we end the regress by acquiescing” is just to say that we are always using some theoretical 
language or other, and that that language cannot mention itself and thus can’t give rise to the regress. 
This follows from the impossibility of a universal metalanguage. In other words, we have made the 
effability objection work for us: there is no language in which to formulate the regress objection.214  
 
7.4. Truth and meaning 
The concepts of truth and meaning were involved in a diallele: they were understood in terms of one 
another, in seeming violation of the requirement of non-circularity of definitions. Our way out was to 
                                                     
214 This, I think, answers Field’s (1974) worries about Quine’s ontological relativity thesis. Field ignores Quine’s 
remark about acquiescing, maybe because Quine doesn’t elaborate it.  
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devise a definition independent of either notion, doing the work of both (see §3.2.1, §3.2.5). Above in 
§7.2 we gave a sketch of an account of how it is that definitions give the contents of concepts: they do 
it by conforming to material adequacy conditions, or characters. Definitions of truth are such inasmuch 
as they conform to Convention T, the criterion of material adequacy for the concept of truth. One term 
in Convention T was not yet accounted for: the predicate 𝐴𝑇𝐹, expressing the concept of a correct 
translation function. In this section we will connect this last missing piece.  
Instead of going there directly, however, let us in passing take care of another objection made against 
Tarski’s stratified conception, which is sometimes called the modal objection. This objection is made 
clearly and explicitly in Pap (1954), and then more famously in Putnam (1985), and also in other 
places.215 The objection notes that the T-sentences for a language 𝐿, on the stratified conception, are 
theorems of the theory of truth for 𝐿, and therefore necessarily true. However, it is held, the 
interpretation of a language is a contingent matter. The problem can be viewed clearly in the following 
contrast: 
(13) The sentence “snow is white or snow isn’t white” is logically true.  
(14) If “or” had meant what “and” means, then the sentence “snow is white or snow isn’t 
white” would have been false. 
How can it be that a logically true sentence might have been false? This is a patent absurdity, and since 
it seems to be a consequence of the stratified conception, serves as a refutation of the latter. But the 
refutation turns on an equivocation with respect to the term “sentence”. For us a sentence is individuated 
by its interpretation, but a phonological string can be interpreted in different ways. In (13) logical truth 
is predicated of one sentence, and in (14) it is denied of another. It makes no sense to say of an 
interpreted sentence that it could have meant something else than it actually means, than it makes sense 
to say of the empty set that it could have had more members than it actually has. This is our reply to the 
modal objection.216 
The confusion behind the modal objection is important to expose. The objection takes it for granted that 
the interpretation of a language is a contingent matter, and therefore that statements of truth conditions 
are never necessary.  In some salient sense, this assumption is undeniably correct. Not only is the 
semantics of, say, English, not necessary, it is not even fixed in time, since words change their meanings 
all the time. But if this is so, then how can we accept necessary meaning statements? The answer is that 
there is another, deeper, equivocation here, this time with respect to the term “language”. Language is 
said in a great many ways: as a historical object, a cognitive object, a syntactic object, etc. etc. 
                                                     
215 For instance Heck (1997). See Patterson (2008c), Raatikainen (2008) for answers which resemble my own, 
and for more references.  
216 Compare Gupta and Belnap’s (1993) approach to the same problem, p.21.  
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Philosophers of language, lamentably, are hardly ever explicit about which concept of language they 
have in mind. In the present case the confusion is between an empirical object and a mathematical object 
that is used to model it. The concept of language in play in Tarski-style definitions is that of a 
mathematical object which can be used to model empirically given languages. To complain that 
statements about a language in this sense follow necessarily from its definition is like complaining that 
a mathematical model of a physical phenomenon entails its empirical consequences necessarily.  
 
Something like the intuition behind the modal objection does play a role, not in a critique of Tarski’s 
theory of truth, but of its use in empirical semantic theories. The thought that meaning can be explicated 
in terms of truth conditions suggests that Tarski-style truth definitions can be put to use as meaning 
theories for natural languages. Etchemendy (1988, §1.2) argues that a definition 𝑑1 can only be used as 
a meaning theory for an (empirical) language 𝐿 if we assume at the outset that it is an adequate truth 
definition for 𝐿. But then we can’t think of it as telling us anything about truth.217  
We can frame Etchemendy’s position in terms of the two-pronged approach to concept analysis.  The 
question concerns the interaction between the predicates 𝐴𝑇𝐷 (adequate truth definition) and 𝐴𝑇𝐹 
(adequate translation function). The definition of 𝐴𝑇𝐷 (Convention T) was: 
(15) 𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝐿, 𝑀) ↔ ∃𝑓(𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, 𝐿, 𝑀) ∧ 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓)). 
The relevant component of “𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑” was the fact that 𝑑 entails T-sentences that use the translation 
function 𝑓. The use of truth definitions in empirical theories of truth reverses the roles of truth and 
translation. For this purpose what we need is a definition of 𝐴𝑇𝐹, along the lines of: 
(16) 𝐴𝑇𝐹(𝑓, 𝐿, 𝑀) ↔ ∃𝑑(𝐴𝑇𝐷(𝑑, 𝐿, 𝑀) ∧ 𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑(𝑑, 𝑓)).218 
Etchemendy’s point is that the project of discovering the semantics of an empirical language is the 
project of asserting 𝐴𝑇𝐹 of some translation function, whereas the project of finding a truth definition 
is that of asserting 𝐴𝑇𝐷 of some definition. We can’t engage in both projects at the same time since in 
order to judge 𝐴𝑇𝐹, we already have to assume 𝐴𝑇𝐷, and vice versa.  
The stratified conception does, after all, imply a reciprocal relation between the concepts of truth and 
meaning (a diallele). This relation is not, however, the relation of reciprocal definition. That would 
render both concepts unusable. On the present analysis the relation between truth and meaning is that 
of reciprocal characterization. It is a diallele in character and not in content, and therefore a pragmatic 
                                                     
217 This is essentially Dummett’s (1959) point.  
218 I have made some simplifying assumptions. In particular, this predicate applies only to translations from 
languages to their metalanguages.  
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and not a logical circumstance. We can still use a truth definition, either for truth or for meaning, but 
not for both.  
 
7.5. In closing  
There is clearly much more to say about the stratified conception, but I will leave it to another occasion. 
In closing I will do no more than mention some open issues and directions for further development.  
 
(a) 
The first thing to look for when presented with an account of truth that presumes to do away with the 
paradoxes is a revenge paradox. This is a sound imperative, but it should be nuanced. The value of the 
semantic paradoxes is that they are like being struck with a hammer: they cannot be ignored. But just 
as the hammer should not be blamed, it is necessary to look for the deep problem, of which the 
paradoxes are just the symptom.  Accordingly, we should look for a more general way to state the 
imperative. A revenge liar paradox arise for solutions to the liar paradox that make use of expressive 
resources beyond those of the object-language. The more general imperative is therefore to state the 
language of the solution explicitly and see whether that language is included in the range of application 
of the solution. Anything less would make a theory nothing but a superficial approximation to a solution. 
In the terms of this essay, any solution should answer its own effability question.  
Formulated in this generality, we see that the predicament is even deeper and more far-reaching than 
we suspected at first. The effability objection to the stratified conception shows that even if we 
completely renounce the hope for semantically closed languages and embrace a full-out hierarchy of 
metalanguages, even then do we face a revenge problem. The challenge is then to formulate a theory 
that accounts also for the language of the theory, and the question is whether 𝑍 can represent its own 
application semantics, or whether we need to look for some further language. I confess that I don’t have 
a good answer at this point, but I will advance the following perhaps abstruse consideration. First, there 
is a sense in which 𝑍 does represent its own semantics. Let’s formulate the desideratum: 
𝑍 should be able to express the semantic concept of 𝑍, which is the application of an abstract 
expression, e.g. “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)”, to a context. A context is a real situation centered around a 
linguistic agent. The result of applying an abstract expression is reference to a real, non-abstract, 
object in the context.  For example, applying “𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)” yields reference to the speaker of 
the context.  
This desideratum is easily achieved. It is not a problem to say in 𝑍 that the application of, say, 
“𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟(@)” to a context yields the speaker of the context. However, the phrase “speaker of the 
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context” is itself said abstractly, so this statement in 𝑍 is trivial. We get the feeling that the heart of the 
idea of application, the move from abstractness to reality, is not captured by 𝑍’s statement of its own 
semantics. The problem is that to the extent that it is missing from 𝑍, it is missing also from the 
statement of the desideratum. That statement too, if it is to apply in full generality, must be stated 
abstractly. In short, there is no way to state generally what is missing from 𝑍.  
This is a slippery predicament, but let me mention a strategy for living with it. The idea is to consider 
particular non-abstract cases which reflect features of 𝑍, though without its absolute generality. This 
strategy is not new. It is in play in, for example, set theory, where reflection principles establish that 
certain sets exhibit (reflect) properties of certain proper classes. We can then prove results about these 
sets in a non-abstract way, and draw conclusions about the abstract proper classes. In the case of 𝑍, the 
reflections are be the theoretical, truth-defining, metalanguages of the hierarchy. Every such particular 
metalanguage lets us study truth and semantics in a concrete though restricted way. This is the reflection 
strategy, which I propose as a way to overcome the effability problem.219  
 
(b) 
It will be informative to explore the relations between the conceptual apparatus of the stratified 
conception (as developed here) and several similar or related philosophical theories. The language-level 
approach is not the only approach to truth based on stratification. Older and no less well-known are 
various type theoretic approaches. Such approaches are sometimes considered less objectionable than 
the language-level theory, since although they fragment the truth-predicate they keep the language in a 
single piece. A complete defense of the present stratified conception should show why a full-on 
language stratification is necessary, why we can’t get the same result for a cheaper price. The answer, 
in an intuitive sketch, is that a type-theoretic approach doesn’t have the means to avoid the regress 
problem. A metalanguage, on the language-level approach, is a vantage point from which truth is 
definable, and to which we can refer abstractly. The type-theoretic approach offers no such vantage 
point.220  
 
                                                     
219 Kreisel (1967) is a classical place in which this strategy is used. A less obvious instance is, I propose, Quine’s 
(1969c) notion of naturalized epistemology. I think a case can be made for construing Quine’s objection to 
classical epistemology in terms of the effability problem (though this is surely not how he would describe it). His 
proposal to study knowing subjects as empirical objects would then be an instance of the reflection strategy. 
Empirical linguistics might be considered a reflection in Quine’s sense.  
220 One example of such a “softer” hierarchy is Church (1976) (Church doesn’t claim that the type-theoretic 
hierarchy is superior to the language-level one). Church shows how to define truth in a type-theoretic language, 
but his definitions assume that the expressions are already interpreted. See also Glanzberg (2015) for a discussion 
of more and less objectionable hierarchies.  
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(c) 
Another issue is to get clearer about the notions of language and theory in play in the stratified 
conception and the relation between them. Logic deals with uninterpreted, merely formal languages. 
For these languages the notion of (non-logical) truth doesn’t come up. Truth only comes up for 
regimented, or formalized, languages. These are languages the content of which is completely specified, 
up to the domain of quantification. In practice we are often not interested in one completely specified 
language, but in a partially specified language which defines a class of completely specified languages. 
A useful and common way to partially specify a language is, starting from a merely formal language, 
to specify a collection of sentence strings that we stipulate to be true. This constrains the range of 
interpretations that we can give the uninterpreted language, to various degrees of determinacy. This 
usage of “theory” and “language” is different from the one adopted in this essay. We can call the usage 
in this essay a language-first approach, and the other a theory-first approach. They are appropriate for 
different projects. Though I will not expand on it any further, I mention it in order to avoid confusion.221 
 
(d) 
Finally, there are many interpretative issues about Tarski that the stratified conception can contribute 
to. There are debates about the extent to which Tarskian truth can justly be considered a correspondence 
theory, and the extent to which it is a deflationary theory. The present development of the stratified 
conception gives complicated answers to both of these questions. The question of whether Tarski’s 
theory explicates the philosophical notion of correspondence with reality receives a different answer 
according to whether we consider it from the standpoint of particular truth definitions or of the general 
character of truth. Particular truth definitions are formulated in theoretical metalanguages which make 
reference to non-linguistic objects. For example, the truth of a sentence such as “snow is white” can 
very reasonably be said to be grounded in the color of snow, which is a physical, not a linguistic 
circumstance. By contrast, thinking generally, we would say that the truth of “snow is white” in a 
language 𝐿 is grounded by its relation to the sentence “snow is white” in 𝐿’s metalanguage. On this 
view truth is a relation between sentences (albeit of different languages) and therefore an inter-linguistic 
phenomenon. The metaphysical outlook of the stratified conception is therefore a methodological 
idealism and theoretical realism.222  
                                                     
221 Tarski is sometimes accused of conflating the notions of language and theory. I think the point made in the text 
is a clue to the reason. See the exchange between DeVidi and Solomon (1999) and Ray (2005) regarding this 
issue. In a similar way I think we can explain the tension that we find both in Frege and Davidson, between 
compositionality on the one hand and the context principle (Frege) or linguistic holism (Davidson) on the other. 
222 This would explain why some writers, e.g. Popper (1979), take Tarski to be the undisputed champion of 
correspondence truth, while others deny it. See Patterson (2012, p. 140ff) for references. See Tarski (1944, 
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I hope to take up some of these issues in the near future.  
  
  
                                                     
§§18,19) for some discussion, which is however somewhat fleeting and superficial. This question cannot be 
addressed without proper consideration of Tarski’s philosophical background, and the fact that attention to the 
correspondence theory and its proper formulation was a central feature of the philosophical tradition leading up 
to Tarski, from Brentano’s occupation with Aristotle’s definition of truth, through Twardowski and Kotarbiński. 
See Woleński and Simons (1989), Murawski and Woleński (2008).  
The slogan I picked for the metaphysical outlook of the stratified conception is obviously meant to evoke Kant’s 
slogan for his own metaphysical position, transcendental idealism and empirical realism. The similarity is not 
superficial, and an important direction of research is to expose the deep philosophical principles common to Kant’s 
project and to Tarski’s (at least as I develop the latter). Let me note that the heart of Kant’s first Critique, the 
Analytic of Pure Reason, is presented by Kant himself as a (transcendental) theory of truth (see A58-9/B83). See 
also Posy (unpublished).  
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Coda 
 
In this essay I have not dealt with what is probably the most prevalent objection to the stratified 
conception since Kripke – the claim that stratification is an ad-hoc device with little or no philosophical 
significance. Although this objection seems to underlie much of the resistance to Tarski’s theory in the 
literature, I have never seen it supported seriously, and hardly ever even stated clearly. The main reason 
that Tarski’s solution is considered ad-hoc is because it doesn’t account for the semantic closure of 
ordinary language. I myself am persuaded by Tarski’s own argument that ordinary language (in the 
sense of unregimented discourse) is simply not an object of study for precise theories of truth,223 but the 
literature on truth does seem to be substantially motivated by this objection, so something must be said. 
My plan is to reconstruct an argument that captures the core of the objection, and to undermine it. The 
argument runs as follows: 
The normative premise: Ordinary language is the philosophically important object for a theory of 
truth; formalized languages aren’t. 
The descriptive premise: Ordinary language is semantically closed. 
Conclusion: A theory of truth that precludes semantic closure at the outset is philosophically 
inadequate. 224  
 
                                                     
223 Compare chapter 2 of this essay with the present section, especially sections 2.1.1 and 2.3.2. 
224 Here are some suggestive quotes: 
Black (1948): “The philosophical relevance of [Tarski’s] work will depend upon the extent to which something 
similar can be done for colloquial English”. (p. 56) 
Strawson (1949): “[I]n so far as [The Semantic or Meta-linguistic Theory of Truth] is simply a contribution to the 
construction of artificial languages, and is not intended to be regarded as relevant to the use of actual languages I 
am not concerned with it. But… the theory has been claimed… to throw light on the actual use of the word ‘true’; 
or (which I take to be the same claim) on the philosophical problem of truth.”. (p.83) 
Martin (1970): “I see the Liar as raising questions concerning the concepts of sentence… truth,  negation, 
reference, etc.; in short, as a problem in the philosophy of language – our language – not primarily as a problem 
having to do with formalized languages.” (p. 91) 
Kripke (1975): “None of [the technical] notions is to be found in natural language in its pristine purity, before 
philosophers reflect on its semantics (in particular, the semantic paradoxes).” (p. 714fn). Kripke is an exception 
in not thinking of ordinary language as semantically closed.  
Priest (1983): “[T]he universality of language makes the metalanguage construction inherently unstable… [S]uch 
castles in the transfinite air [language levels] can be constructed… But they have no more significance than a 
mathematical game. Whatever they are, they are not English. In giving a semantical account of English the 
distinction between object and metalanguage is a logical apartheid which must go… In another jargon, we could 
say that the metalanguage is the alienated essence of (object language) truth. The alienation should of course be 
transcended”. (p.122) 
See also Barwise and Etchemendy (1987, p.5); Simmons (1993, p.62); Glanzberg (2004, p.290); and many others. 
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In the literature various terms in addition to “ordinary language” are used: “natural language”, “our 
language”, “English”, and others. If the difference in terminology reflects a difference in concepts, this 
is usually not remarked on. Nor is it easy to find a detailed characterization of what is meant by these 
terms. This is already enough to cast doubt on the objection from ordinary language, but it is a point I 
will largely ignore.225 My procedure will be to scrutinize the two premises and argue that they are, at 
the very least, ill-founded.  
As I said, the premises are hardly ever given explicit arguments to support them. One commendable 
exception is McGee (1991), which I tackle now. Actually, McGee doesn’t argue for the importance of 
ordinary language, but of semantic closure directly. He writes: 
If we adopt the [stratified conception], we shall find that within the object language we are 
unable even to describe human thought and action… intentional human activities, such as 
speaking, believing, willing and acting will be indescribable and inexplicable. Thus, if we 
accept the limitations imposed by Tarski’s proposal for avoiding antinomies, we forfeit one of 
the highest aspirations of the human spirit, the aspiration to self-understanding. (p.79)  
I take McGee’s worry seriously. I agree that self-understanding is one of the principal goals of 
philosophy, and that if the stratified conception were shown to force us to forfeit this goal, that would 
be a mighty argument against it. But this is not the case. Quite the contrary, I think that with the stratified 
conception we are making an important step in the achievement of this goal. The project that McGee is 
hinting at, that of describing intentional human activities such as speaking, willing etc., is (or is 
intimately related to) the project of giving a philosophical account of the propositional attitudes. McGee 
implicitly assumes that a model of the reflective aspects of human subjectivity, i.e. a theory of 
propositional attitudes, requires a semantically closed language. But this assumption is unfounded. The 
distinctive feature of propositional attitude reports is that they represent the linguistic or cognitive 
agency of the attitude holder. The stratified conception does not preclude such a representation; it 
complicates it by showing that it requires stratification and an appeal to abstract discourse. If this is 
correct, then the stratified conception does not block the way to human self-understanding, but rather 
opens it up by blocking an apparent shortcut, semantic closure, that in fact leads nowhere.  
Why have philosophers been inclined to hold the normative premise? I can think of three contrasts that 
might mistakenly be associated with the contrast between ordinary and regimented language. The first, 
least likely, is the one between interpreted and merely formal language. This association is easy to resist 
when paying attention, but it might be that the term “formalized languages”, and the kinship between 
the concept of truth and the concepts of logic, put on us a subtle but constant pressure to associate the 
                                                     
225 In §7.3 we saw how insensitivity to the ambiguity of the term “language” can lead to fallacies. 
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two contrasts. This is why, as a matter of terminological hygiene, I prefer to say “regimented 
languages”. 
The second contrast is the one between the natural and the artificial, suggested by the term “natural 
language”.226 In general, the “natural” enjoys the positive connotation of being more “real” than the 
artificial. But in the present case this doesn’t hold. Although regimented languages are indeed “man-
made” in the sense that they are a product of convention and will, this confers on them more 
philosophical relevance, not less. Using a regimented language, like, say, speaking under oath, carries 
with it more responsibility and commitment on the part of the user than using unregimented discourse. 
A theory of truth should therefore apply to them first and foremost. The negative connotation of 
“artificial” is something that we need to resist.  
A more potent confound is the superficially similar contrast that ordinary language philosophers such 
as Ryle and Austin, or, in a different way, Wittgenstein, make between language in its everyday use, 
and a philosophical use of words which, by taking them out of context, empties them of their meaning 
and creates philosophical pseudo-problems. At least some thinkers might be confused by this contrast 
and the one between regimented and unregimented discourse.227 Here is a famous passage from 
Wittgenstein (1958) that expresses this worry: 
When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” – 
and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask onself: is the word ever actually 
[tatsächlich] used in this way in the language-game [Sprache] which is its original home 
[Heimat]? – What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. 
(§116)228 
Though we can certainly find cases that fit Wittgenstein’s description of philosophical practice, the use 
of regimented discourse is emphatically not one of them. Regimentation is not about trying to grasp 
“essences” of things. It is the rather humdrum procedure of accepting, in advance of discourse, certain 
norms of expressions that help avoid vagueness and equivocation. This procedure is used in legal 
matters, in science, in engineering, and in every field in which it is important to get things right. 
Philosophy is one of these fields.  
In view of these potential pitfalls that the normative premise faces, I propose that we wait until it is 
stated and defended in a more detailed and explicit manner before we take it seriously.  
                                                     
226 See Strawson’s quote above.  
227 See Kripke’s quote above.  
228 I gave the original German where I thought that the English translation misses something important. In 
particular, the German noun “Heimat”, which has no exact English translation, is an extremely loaded term, 
opposed to terms such as “exile” and “alienation”. It carries romantic and mythical connotations that suggest that 
Wittgenstein’s use of the phrase “the everyday use of words” is anything but an everyday use. 
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So much for my misgivings concerning the normative premise. The situation is not much better with 
the descriptive premise, the claim that ordinary language is semantically closed. It too is rarely spelled 
out, and practically never argued for. I see two possible reasons why such a claim could be relied on so 
often without philosophical argument: either it is self-evident, or it is an empirical fact. In the former 
case, ordinary language is conceived as something the nature of which is given to our consciousness 
unmediatedly, perhaps in the form of “intuitions”; on the latter, ordinary language is an empirical object 
to be discovered by experiments and observations. Either way, I contend, the descriptive premise is ill-
founded.  
Let’s look first at the claim that the semantic closure of natural language is an empirical fact. This might 
make a philosophical argument unnecessary, but reference to some discussion in print of this empirical 
discovery is surely in order. To the best of my knowledge, there is no such empirical result.229 It is 
eminently plausible that most empirical linguists, if asked whether they think natural language is 
semantically closed, would say yes. But this doesn’t make it an empirical fact. If we look at the (truth-
based) semantic theories themselves, for example as reflected in standard textbooks, and assume that 
their object language is semantically closed, we can quite easily derive contradictions from them. The 
implicit working assumption of linguists is therefore that natural language is not semantically closed.230  
Perhaps what is meant by the claim that semantic closure is an empirical fact is not that there is 
published research with that conclusion, but that it is an obvious empirical fact. We all, as competent 
speakers of natural language, have intuitions of its semantic closure. And since speaker intuitions are 
the primary empirical data for linguistics, it should be considered an empirical fact that natural language 
is semantically closed.  
This argument misrepresents the way in which intuitions are used in empirical linguistics. Speakers are 
not consulted for their judgments about theoretical questions concerning language and its nature, but 
only about particular sentences or constructions. It is probably the case that speakers will tend to accept 
all sentences of the form: 
(17) “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white, 
                                                     
229 The closest is Arne Næss’s very comprehensive survey of the opinions of non-philosophers about the nature 
of truth. Næss concludes that there is no single common-sense conception of truth, though the T-sentences are 
indeed accepted, as trivial, by a significant majority. See Næss (1938a,b). Tarski refers to this research in (1944). 
See Ulatowski (2016) for a summary of the results and a brief discussion of the relation to Tarski.   
230 Textbooks in semantics generally take up a healthy insouciant attitude towards the semantic paradoxes. No 
mention is made of them in Chierchia and McGonnell-Ginet (1990), Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Jacobson 
(2014); they get a passing mention in Larson and Segal (1995, p.30fn).  
134 
 
but this in itself doesn’t get us very far, for we don’t know whether the sentence used on the right-hand 
side is the same sentence as that mentioned on the left-hand side, or just a homophonic synonym. And 
this is not a question we can ask our informant. The mere fact that T-sentences are intuitively 
unproblematic is therefore not a valid ground for the descriptive claim.   
We turn to the view that says that the semantic closure of natural language is self-evident, and as such 
requires no support. This claim, if it is to escape the critique of the previous paragraph, must mean more 
than just having intuitions about the T-sentences. It is the very fact of semantic closure that should be 
intuited. The problem with intuitions of the sort appealed to in this claim is that it is not clear how to 
distinguish them from mere prejudice. Indeed, one sure way to recognize mere prejudice is to find out 
that it is false. Yet isn’t this exactly what we did when we discovered that semantic closure is 
incoherent? I conclude that the view that says that it is self-evident that natural language is semantically 
closed is highly suspect, and cannot, on its own, ground the descriptive premise.231  
 
The purpose of the foregoing was to argue that both premises of the argument against the stratified 
conception from the semantic closure of ordinary language are in need of clarification and grounding 
before the argument can be assessed. This does not refute the objection, but it gives the stratified 
conception some breathing space. It is ironic that the  
objection from ordinary language was the first thing that Tarski sought to dissolve in CTFL. We have 
given in chapter 2 an updated version of his classical proof that ordinary language, if assumed to be 
universal, is inconsistent. Slightly less familiar are his comments from §6 of CTFL, directed expressly 
at philosophers who doubt the philosophical relevance of formalized languages:  
Philosophers who are not accustomed to use deductive methods in their daily work are inclined 
to regard all formalized languages with a certain disparagement, because they contrast these 
‘artificial’ constructions with the one natural language – the colloquial language. For that reason 
the fact that the results obtained concern the formalized languages almost exclusively will 
greatly diminish the value of the foregoing investigations in the opinion of many readers. 
(p.267) 
Later history shows that he should not have restricted his warnings to philosophers “not accustomed to 
use deductive methods in their daily work”.  
                                                     
231 One wonders why so many thinkers insist on holding on to something as flimsy as an intuition in the face of a 
refutation as decisive as a contradiction. It’s as though the claim that ordinary language is semantically closed 
stands for a different idea altogether, a yearning after a return to a prediscursive unity of the subject. If this is so, 
then what the indefinability theorem shows us is that once the fruit of reflection has been eaten there is no return.  
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הוראה מוחשית, אבל במחיר של הגבלה של תחום הדיון. הבחנה זו היא בעלת השלכות חשובות להבנה של מושגי 
  ;האמת, המובן והלשון. 
 ב
 
 תקציר
חיבור זה מכיל ניתוח פילוסופי של מושג האמת. זהו פיתוח של והגנה על התפיסה "המדורגת" של אמת, לפיה הגדרת 
רק מתוך שפה עשירה יותר. מקורה של תפיסה זו במונוגרפיה של אלפרד  מושג האמת עבור שפה יכולה להתבצע
. לעבודתו של טרסקי נודעה השפעה עמוקה, גם בפילוסופיה מושג האמת בשפות מוצרנות) בשם 3391טרסקי (
וגם בתחומים טכניים, אך הטענה הפילוסופית המרכזית שלה לא התקבלה בדרך כלל. לחיבור הנוכחי שתי מטרות 
ות: א. להציע הצגה מפורטת ואנליטית של תורתו של טרסקי ושל הבעיות שעומדות בפניה; ב. לחפש פתרון עיקרי
 לבעיות אלה ולפרש מה מתחייב מפתרון כזה.
של תפיסת האמת המדורגת של מפורטת ופרשנית הצגה מכיל החיבור מורכב משני חלקים גדולים. החלק הראשון 
ם: א. הנחות יסוד חשובות, כגון ההגבלה של השיטה לשפות מוצרנות, ניתנות ההצגה בנויה מהשלבים הבאיטרסקי. 
אפשרות של שפה -במפורש, ומשמעותן הפילוסופית נבחנת. ב. התוצאה השלילית העיקרית של השיטה, בדבר אי
 מוסכמה אסגורה סמנטית, ניתנת בפרוטרוט ועם פרשנות. ג. הקריטריון לנכונות תוכנית של הגדרות, 
), מפורשת יחד עם השיקולים שמובילים אליה. ד. מבנה העומק של הגדרות אמת נחקר, כולל T noitnevnoC(
התנאים הנחוצים על מנת שהגדרה כזו תתאפשר. בפרט, פירוש מדויק ניתן למושג של "עושר לשוני". ה. לבסוף, 
, שלפיה אם בתפיסה המדורגת ניתנת הגדרה נפרדת לכל שפה מוצרנת, בעיית האחדותמספר בעיות מועלות, בפרט 
 לספק הגדרה למושג האמת.  –אזי לא מילאנו את המטלה שבה פתחנו 
היסוד המרכזי בתשובה לבעיית החלק השני של החיבור מפתח פתרון לבעיות שעומדות בפני התפיסה המדורגת. 
ות תוכנית, הוא הגורם שמאחד את הגדרות האמת השונות לגדי האחדות הוא הטענה שמוסכמה א, הקריטריון לנכונ
מושג יחיד. הבעיה התשובה זו היא שהיא מניחה שלמוסכמה א יש תוקף אוניברסלי, אך מהתוצאה השלילית של חלק 
א נובע שאין שפה אוניברסלית. המטלה בחלק ב' אפוא היא לפתח אופן ביטוי שיאפשר החלה אוניברסלית של 
לי לדרוש שפה אוניברסלית. המטלה מבוצעת בשלבים הבאים: א. מוסכמה א מוצרנת על מנת לבודד מוסכמה א מב
את הצורך בכלי החדש. ב. התורה של אמצעי ביטוי חדש, בשם "כלליות מופשטת", מפותחת מתוך התורה הפרגמטית 
ם מצביעים, ומוסכמה א של ביטויים מצביעים (אינדקסיקלים) בשפה טבעית. ג. הכלי מותאם לשפות ללא ביטויי
מנוסחת בעזרתו ללא ההנחה שיש שפה אוניברסלית. ג. המטלה של ניתוח מושגים מוכללת על מנת להכיל את 
 התשובה לבעיית האחדות.
לעתים קרובות מועלה נגד תפיסת האמת של טרסקי הטענה שהיא בעלת משמעות פילוסופית מוגבלת. בחיבור זה 
הן בעלות השלכות פילוסופיות כבדות משקל. מושג ושהבעיות שתפיסה זו נתקלת בהן אני טוען שההיפך הוא הנכון, 
מאפשר  מתודולוגיהכלליות המופשטת מביא להבחנה בין שני סוגי שיח שונים באופן יסודי. סוג אחד הוא שיח 
  שמאפשר  תיאורטיכלליות מוחלטת אבל במחיר של מופשטות; הסוג השני הוא שיח 
 ג
 
 
 
 
  ה בהדרכתו של פרופ' קרל פוזיעבודה זו נעשת
  
 ד
 
 
 
 
הערה על מושג האמת (עם 
 השלכות על מושגי המובן והלשון)
 חיבור לשם קבלת תואר דוקטור לפילוסופיה
 
 מאת
 דוד קשתן
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